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The aim of this work is to defend substance dualism by defeating two of its paramount 
potential defeaters. I will argue that a substance dualist position, neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism, provides a solution to the causal pairing problem and a good explanation 
of neural correlates of consciousness. After an introductory first chapter, I’ll explicate 
dualism’s dominant potential defeaters in the next three chapters. Chapter 2 will clarify 
what neural correlates of consciousness are and the objection to dualism based on neural 
correlates. The following two chapters will distinguish and elucidate dualism’s principal 
problem regarding mental causation, which I’ll argue is the causal pairing problem. The 
fifth chapter will introduce and explain neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. Chapter 6 will 
apply neo-Thomistic hylomorphism to the causal pairing problem, providing a solution 
that appeals to a fundamental tenet of neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. In Chapter 7 I’ll 
apply the view and an Aristotelian powers ontology to construct a model of neural 
correlates of consciousness that’s intended to explain such correlations. The final chapter 
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The aim of this work is to defend dualism. I intend to defuse two paramount objections 
threatening to defeat dualism. The causal pairing problem allegedly undermines the 
possibility of mental causation for nonphysical minds. And neural correlates of 
consciousness allegedly provide strong evidence for physicalism and the negation of 
dualism. I will argue that one substance dualist position, neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, 
can solve the causal pairing problem and provide a good explanation of neural correlates 
of consciousness. 
 The next three chapters will clarify and explicate dualism’s potential defeaters. 
Chapter 2 will discuss neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC), what they 
entail, and how they purportedly undermine dualism. Chapters 3 and 4 will distinguish 
and clarify dualism’s chief problem regarding mental causation, which I’ll argue is the 
causal pairing problem. Neo-Thomistic hylomorphism is presented in Chapter 5 and 
subsequently applied to dualism’s defeaters in the following two chapters. In Chapter 6, I 
propose a hylomorphic solution to the causal pairing problem. In Chapter 7, I construct 
my hylomorphic model of NCC intended to explain the correlations between neural 
processes and consciousness. By the end, I hope to have shown that neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism can solve the causal pairing problem and explain NCC, and thus overcome 
the two paramount objections to substance dualism. 
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 Dualism is unpopular; substance dualism is even less popular. So naturally one 
might ask why I would defend such an antiquated view as a contemporary philosopher of 
mind. The fundamental reason pertains to my curiosity and interest. I’m very interested in 
the topic I’ve chosen to research, and it turns out that I’m not alone. As I’ll point out in 
the following section, in the last half century dualism has gone from being nearly 
blacklisted in contemporary philosophy of mind to seriously reconsidered. Surprisingly, 
dualism is being dusted off and reevaluated as “the waning of materialism” becomes 
more evident, to borrow of phrase from a volume published by Oxford University Press 
in 2010.  
 But such reconsiderations will be short lived and dualism’s rejection will be 
renewed, if dualism’s paramount problems are not dealt with. In section 1.2 of this 
introduction, I’ll discuss these problems. In section 1.3, I’ll elaborate on the aim of this 
work and provide a brief overview of the forthcoming chapters. Section 1.4 will address 
my starting presuppositions. 
1.1 Recent History 
Throughout the previous century dualism’s demise seemed imminent. During the 1970s 
Daniel Dennett (1978, p. 252) assessed the field of philosophy of mind and his  
evaluation of dualism is unflattering, to put it mildly:  
Since it is widely granted these days that dualism is not a serious view to contend 
with, but rather a cliff over which to push one’s opponents, a capsule ‘refutation’ 
of dualism, to alert if not convince the uninitiated, is perhaps in order. 
Dennett’s (1978, p. 252) one paragraph refutation claims the dualist has two bad options. 
She can accept an epiphenomenalism that claims there are causally impotent non-
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physical mental states resulting from brain events or a Cartesian interactionist dualism. 
Either way, Dennett (1978, p. 252) concludes, dualism comes with an “exorbitant price.” 
 Two decades after Dennett’s assessment, John Haldane (1998) published ‘A 
Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind.’ In this article, written just before the turn of 
the century, Haldane (1998, p. 257) highlighted an ironic shift in the field: “dualism has 
to be contended with.” The two decades between the two assessments, Dennett’s and 
Haldane’s respectively, included the rising realization that consciousness is quite 
recalcitrant. Reducing consciousness to physics was made difficult by qualia and multiple 
realizability.  
 Qualia are the subjective experiences of what it’s like to be in a particular 
conscious state. For example there’s a difference between consciously tasting chocolate 
versus consciously feeling a bee sting. This is a difference of qualia. Multiple 
realizability is the idea that conscious states like tasting chocolate can be realized by 
different physical states (cf. Bickle, 2016). Accordingly, two subjects with different types 
of physical bodies could have the same conscious state. Both qualia and multiple 
realizability will be discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.4.2.  
 To be sure, the recalcitrance of consciousness has not led to a resurgence of 
dualism, but rather a reconsideration.1 It was true at the end of the previous century and 
has been true during the beginning of this century that “mainstream orthodoxy consists of 
various versions of materialism” (Searle, 1992, p. xiii). Nevertheless a change in the tide, 
a reconsideration of dualism, is evidenced by a brief overview of the publication record. 
The decades following Dennett’s decisive declaration saw a variety of substantial 
																																																								
1 Timothy O’Conner and David Robb (2003, p. 5) speak more optimistically: “…dualism 
in recent years has even enjoyed something of a renaissance.” 
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publications questioning physicalism and supporting nonphysicalist and dualist views. In 
this section I’ll highlight some noteworthy works from 1980 to the present.1  
 In the early eighties, the Gifford lectures given by the well-known neuroscientist, 
Nobel laureate, and dualist, John Eccles were published under the title The Human 
Psyche. In that volume Eccles (1980) argued against materialism and for a dualist-
interactionist position. A couple years later, Howard Robinson (1982) published Matter 
and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism with Cambridge University Press 
(hereafter CUP). The same year Frank Jackson (1982, p. 130) presented his well-known 
Knowledge Argument against physicalism using his infamous thought experiment 
involving a hypothetical neuroscientist named ‘Mary’ (see also Jackson, 1986).  
 In the mid-eighties, Oxford University Press (hereafter OUP) published The 
Evolution of the Soul, in which Richard Swinburne (1986) argues for substance dualism. 
Two years later W.D. Hart (1988) argued for substance dualism in The Engines of the 
Soul published by CUP. Hart was well aware that he was swimming against the current of 
mainstream materialism. “But orthodoxy needs devil’s advocates,” he wrote, “they have a 
serious part in the play of ideas even if committed heterodoxy invites excommunication” 
(1988, p. x). Before the decade closed the University of Virginia Press published The 
Case for Dualism (Smythies and Beloff, 1989).  
 The nineties also saw substantive publications that questioned physicalism as well 
as publications that favored dualism. The year of 1991 witnessed several publications. 
That year, OUP published David Hodgson’s (1991) The Mind Matters: Consciousness 
and Choice in a Quantum World, which challenged a reductive physicalist mechanistic 
																																																								




view of the mind. Roderick Chisholm published ‘On the Simplicity of the Soul’ in 
Philosophical Perspectives. Chisholm (1991, p. 167) argued that the nature of human 
persons is completely unlike that of compound physical things. And Routledge published 
John Foster’s (1991) The Immaterial Self: A defense of the Cartesian dualist conception 
of the mind.  
 Two years after the prolific year of 1991, a volume edited by Howard Robinson 
(1993) entitled Objections to Physicalism was published by OUP. And evidently Hart 
wasn’t excommunicated for defending his unorthodox dualist position in the eighties. In 
the mid-nineties he wrote a section on dualism for A Companion to Philosophy of Mind 
published by Blackwell. Also in the mid-nineties, CUP published E.J. Lowe’s (1996) 
Subjects of Experience, in which Lowe defends substance dualism. And OUP published 
David Chalmers’s (1996) influential work The Conscious Mind, which argues for 
property dualism. Just before the turn of the millennium William Hasker (1999) 
advocated for emergent substance dualism in The Emergent Self, published by Cornell 
University Press. 
 The new millennium brought new works challenging physicalism as well as new 
works supporting dualism. In 2001, CUP published Physicalism and Its Discontents. In 
2005, David Oderberg published ‘Hylemorphic Dualism’1 in Personal Identity, a volume 
published by CUP and edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, et al. The Waning of Materialism, 
edited by Robert Koons and George Bealer was published by OUP in 2010. This volume 
includes intriguing chapters authored by top-tier philosophers, such as Laurence 
																																																								
1 Oderberg spells ‘hylomorphism’ according another common spelling, ‘hylemorphism.’ 
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BonJour’s ‘Against Materialism’ and E.J. Lowe’s ‘Substance Dualism: A Non-Cartesian 
Approach.’  
 In 2011, Continuum published The Soul Hypothesis. The University of Notre 
Dame Press published After Physicalism in 2012. From 2012 to 2013, an interdisciplinary 
research project generously funded by the Templeton Foundation entitled ‘Neuroscience 
& the Soul’ investigated whether the soul exists and what neuroscience has to say about it 
(see Crisp et al., 2016). Around the same time, two works in favor of dualism arrived on 
the scene. Richard Fumerton’s (2013) Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism 
appeared in the Cambridge Studies in Philosophy series and Richard Swinburne’s (2013) 
Mind, Brain, & Free Will was published by OUP. One year later a volume edited by 
Andrea Lavazza and Howard Robinson, Contemporary Dualism: A Defense was added to 
the Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy series. In 2015 another interesting 
study funded by the Templeton Foundation began at Cambridge University. Led by Tim 
Crane, The New Directions in the Study of the Mind investigated non-physicalist views of 
the mind. And in 2017, The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism made its début.  
 Dualism is far from prominent and physicalism is still philosophical orthodoxy. 
Yet it’s apparent that dualism is being reconsidered. And this reconsideration has led to 
the development (or re-development) of considerable arguments for dualism. 
Nevertheless dualism’s defeaters must be dealt with if dualism is to be seriously 





1.2 Dualism’s Defeaters 
The third chapter of Jaegwon Kim’s Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough is entitled 
‘The Rejection of Immaterial Minds: A Causal Argument.’ Kim’s (2005, p. 70) opening 
words allude to dualism’s reconsideration:  
The deep difficulties that beset contemporary nonreductive physicalism might 
prompt some of us to explore nonphysicalist alternatives; in fact, the 
nonreductivist’s predicament seems to have injected new vigor into the dualist 
projects of philosophers with antecedent antiphysicalist sympathies. 
In the first two chapters of the book Kim focused on problems physicalists face regarding 
mental causation. According to Kim (2005, p. 70), the “upshot” is that physicalists have 
two options: epiphenomenalism or reductionism. “With good reason,” Kim continues, 
“most philosophers have found neither choice palatable.” 
 Given two unpalatable options, the worry is that substance dualism will be 
considered an alternative (Kim, 2005, p. 71). But dualism is a dead end that won’t help 
and will actually make things worse when it comes to mental causation, Kim argues 
(2005, p. 71). So as the title of the chapter suggests, we should reject substance dualism. 
His argument for rejecting substance dualism rests on mental causation. In the rest of the 
chapter, Kim (2005, pp. 71, 73-74, 92) tries to defeat dualism by developing a famous 
objection Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia raised against René Descartes’s interactionist 
dualism. The result is the causal pairing problem for substance dualism. 
 I’ll explicate the causal pairing problem at length in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say 
that the basic idea is that a nonphysical mind and a physical body are of such different 
natures that it’s impossible for them to be causally paired as cause and effect. The 
consequence of the causal pairing problem is that mental causation is impossible for the 
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nonphysical (or immaterial) minds of substance dualism. If that’s true, dualism should 
indeed be rejected.  
 If the causal pairing problem is irremediable, it could itself undermine dualism. 
But it is not dualism’s only prominent potential defeater. A second considerable objection 
appeals to neuroscience. Hedda Hassel Mørch (2017) sums up a common conception: 
“Modern science has given us good reason to believe that our consciousness is rooted in 
the physics and chemistry of the brain, as opposed to anything immaterial or 
transcendental.” This claim is so widely believed today that it can be (and often is) made 
without citing any of the evidence that allegedly supports it. Nevertheless it’s neural 
correlates of consciousness that allegedly provide powerful evidence that consciousness 
is rooted in brain processes and that some version of physicalism is true (see e.g. Murphy, 
1998, p. 13). If neuroscience proves physicalism then it disproves dualism, which then 
becomes an “antiscientific” position in contradistinction to the “scientific” physicalist 
alternatives (cf. Searle, 1992, pp. 3-4). 
 Thus despite dualism’s reconsideration in recent times, it faces two potential 
defeaters that threaten to undermine its viability. The causal pairing problem threatens to 
make mental causation impossible for the immaterial minds of substance dualism. And 
neural correlates of consciousness allegedly show that the mind is not immaterial but 
rather something physical. If either defeater succeeds, dualism disintegrates. Thus the 
success of either defeater would stifle the recent reconsiderations of dualism and warrant 
its rejection. Indeed this seems to be Kim’s (2005, pp. 70-71) intention with the causal 
pairing problem. But if these defeaters can be defeated, they provide no such warrant for 
dualism’s demise.  
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1.3 Defeating Dualism’s Defeaters 
My aim is to defeat substance dualism’s potential defeaters. I intend to show that there’s 
a version of substance dualism, which I call neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, that provides a 
solution to the causal pairing problem and a good explanation of neural correlates of 
consciousness. The next three chapters will focus on explicating dualism’s potential 
defeaters. The subsequent three chapters will explain neo-Thomistic hylomorphism and 
how it can solve the pairing problem and account for neural correlates of consciousness. 
 Chapter 2 will focus on neural correlates of consciousness, explaining what they 
are, how we identify them, what they entail, and the argument against dualism based on 
such correlations. The conclusion of this chapter is that neural correlates don’t entail any 
particular view of the mind and the argument against dualism based on these correlations 
has considerable weaknesses. And thus it’s unclear how neural correlates undermine 
dualism.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 will clarify dualism’s paramount problem regarding mental 
causation. However, there are various problems pertaining to mental causation and not all 
of them are serious problems for dualism (cf. Kim, 2001b, pp. 271-272). Therefore these 
chapters will clarify what problem is dualism’s paramount problem regarding mental 
causation and give a detailed explication of it. Chapter 3, entitled ‘Mental Causation and 
Two Other Problems,’ will distinguish two problems that do not provide strong threats to 
dualism, at least relative to the causal pairing problem. A problem Donald Davidson 
raises regarding a lack of psychophysical laws and the causal exclusion problem will be 
clarified and discussed in that chapter. The aim is to distinguish these problems from 
dualism’s chief problem regarding mental causation – the causal pairing problem – and 
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justify setting them aside to focus on the pairing problem. Chapter 4 will explain the 
causal pairing problem. 
 In Chapter 5, I’ll introduce neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. My intention in this 
chapter is to present and describe a view in the philosophy of mind and human ontology 
that is informed by Saint Thomas Aquinas. However, my focus will not be exegetical or 
historical. I will not focus on interpretive debates about what exactly Aquinas thought. I 
call my view a “neo-Thomistic” view because it’s informed by Aquinas’s thought, but I 
make no claim that it is exactly what Aquinas thought. I am interested in whether this 
view can defeat substance dualism’s defeaters. I think it can, and that’s what I intend to 
demonstrate. 
 Since I’ll be defending dualism, and specifically substance dualism, let’s clarify 
what I mean by ‘substance dualism.’ Timothy O’Conner and David Robb (2003, p. 4) 
distinguish substance dualism from property dualism as follows. According to property 
dualism, there are nonphysical mental properties even if the mind itself is a physical 
substance. According to substance dualism, the mind is a nonphysical substance. Property 
dualists say there are nonphysical mental properties. Substance dualists go further and 
say such mental properties are the properties of a nonphysical mental substance (see 
Robinson, 2016, section 2.3). What I mean by ‘substance dualism’ is the idea that human 
persons have or are a nonphysical mental substance.  
 Admittedly, different metaphysical commitments entail different definitions of a 
substance. I’ll discuss what a substance is according to Aristotelian-Thomistic 
metaphysics at the beginning of Chapter 5 before presenting neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism. For now, let me simply say that a substance is a unified entity that can 
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persist through time and change. So what I mean more precisely by ‘substance dualism’ 
is broadly the view that human persons have or are a unified nonphysical mental entity 
that can persist through time and change. 
 In contemporary philosophy, the term ‘mind’ usually refers to a mental substance, 
whether that substance is physical or nonphysical. Thus physicalists will speak of a 
physical mental substance that they call the ‘mind.’ Similarly substance dualists often 
speak of a nonphysical mental substance that they call an ‘immaterial mind’ or 
‘nonphysical mind,’ following the terminology of modern philosophy. I will often do the 
same. However substance dualists also sometimes refer to the nonphysical mental 
substance using the term ‘soul,’ following pre-modern terminology. And I will often use 
this terminology as well, and especially when describing Aquinas’s thoughts or the neo-
Thomistic view I’m advocating.  
 It’s worth explicitly mentioning that, contrary to what’s often thought, not all 
substance dualist think a human person consist of two substances. There are substance 
dualists that claim the mind (or soul) is a nonphysical substance and the body is a 
physical substance. But there are also substance dualists that merely say that the mind is a 
substance without saying that the body is itself a substance. For example, a crude 
caricature of substance dualism presents the picture of a ghost, who we can call Casper, 
in a machine that Casper inhabits and somehow moves around. Suppose someone held 
this Casper dualist view but her metaphysical view of substances only allowed her to say 
Casper is a substance, but not the machine body. She would still be a substance dualist 
because substance dualism is not about counting two complete substances. Rather 
substance dualism is dualist in the sense that it claims there are nonphysical mental 
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properties and it’s substance dualist in the sense that it says there’s a nonphysical 
substance that bears nonphysical mental properties.  
 Interestingly, just as there are property dualists that claim the mind is a physical 
substance that bears nonphysical properties, there are substance dualist that claim the 
mind is a nonphysical substance that has physical properties. In his chapter on dualism in 
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, E.J. Lowe describes his dualist view, non-
Cartesian substance dualism. This view allows for the nonphysical mind to have physical 
properties in virtue of having a body with physical properties (Lowe, 2009, p. 68). As 
will become apparent in Chapter 5, the neo-Thomistic hylomorphic view I propose also 
permits the claim that the nonphysical soul has physical properties of the body.     
 After explicating neo-Thomistic hylomorphism in Chapter 5, I will apply the view 
to dualism’s paramount problems in Chapters 6 and 7. The sixth chapter will apply the 
view to the causal pairing problem. In that chapter I’ll provide a solution to the causal 
pairing problem that capitalizes on the fundamental tenet of neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism. The seventh chapter will introduce an Aristotelian powers ontology and 
apply it to the proposed hylomorphic view in order to give an account of neural correlates 
of consciousness (i.e. NCC). The aim of the seventh chapter is to construct a neo-
Thomistic hylomorphic model of neural correlates, in order to provide a good explanation 
of NCC from a dualist view.  
 Chapter 8 will provide a very brief conclusion and highlight relevant forthcoming 
research. For clarification, this volume will not provide sufficient justification for 
substance dualism broadly, nor neo-Thomistic hylomorphism specifically. My goal is not 
to argue for dualism. My goal is more modestly to defend dualism against what I think 
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are its strongest objections. In other words, I aim to defeat dualism’s paramount potential 
defeaters. I hope to show that dualism’s difficulties are not insurmountable and that it’s a 
position worth keeping on the table for substantive consideration. 
1.4 Presuppositions 
As just clarified, my focus is not to argue for dualism in the sense of giving positive 
arguments for its truth. It’s also not my present intention to argue against physicalism, per 
se. I will argue against physicalist commitments in order to defend dualism and defeat its 
defeaters. But my aim in this work is not to provide a conclusive refutation of 
materialism or physicalism.  
 With that said, I should acknowledge that I find the recent reconsiderations of 
dualism warranted because I think there are substantive objections to physicalism (see 
e.g. Owen, 2015). Furthermore, some arguments for dualism broadly and substance 
dualism more specifically strike me as persuasive and sufficient to justify dualism. For 
example, I find persuasive Dean Zimmerman’s (2011) vagueness argument from property 
dualism to substance dualism based on the subject that is the bearer of experiences. I also 
think William Hasker’s (2010) argument from the unity of consciousness justifies 
substance dualism.1 E.J. Lowes (2001) argument from the simplicity of the self also 
seems forceful to me. And Richard Swinburne’s (1986) case in The Evolution of the Soul, 
especially the evidence from personal identity, is powerful in my opinion. I also think 
there are good arguments for substance dualism based on freewill and human knowledge 
																																																								
1  However, I don’t think the unity of consciousness supports Hasker’s version of 
emergent substance dualism as well as it supports other versions of substance dualism. 
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(cf. Swinburne, 2013). In short, I think there are good reasons to think physicalism is 
false and dualism, even substance dualism, is true. 
 Therefore, I approach the subject of dualism’s potential defeaters with different 
starting presuppositions than many of my physicalist colleagues. After all, it’s not 
uncommon for contemporary philosophers to assume that dualism is simply not worth 
serious consideration. I am assuming just the opposite—dualism is worth considering 
because there are good reasons to think it’s true. However, I also think there are 
considerable objections to substance dualism that must be dealt with. In the next three 
chapters I’ll clarify and explicate what I think are the two most forceful objections to 
substance dualism. In the following three chapters, I’ll try to show that neo-Thomistic 















Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
 
The nonphysical mind of substance dualism is commonly considered a relic of our pre-
neuroscientific past. Neuroscience, many would say, has nullified dualism. According to 
philosopher Nancy Murphy (1998, p. 13), neuroscience provides “dramatic evidence for 
physicalism.” In The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul, 
molecular biologist and neuroscientist Francis Crick (1995, p. 3) proposes that human 
persons are “…in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and 
their associated molecules.”1 Even theologian Michael Horton (2011, p. 376) informs the 
faithful in The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way that 
neuroscience has firmly established “the mind is matter (i.e. the brain).”2  
 Granted, not everyone shares such sentiments. There are numerous dissenters. 
Nonetheless, most would still agree with a concession found in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “the ‘neuroscientific milieu’ of the past four decades has 
made it harder for philosophers to adopt dualism” (Bickle et al., 2010). True as that may 
be, we must ask: What is the evidence modern neuroscience provides against dualism? 
																																																								
1 Cf. Mitchell Glickstein (2014, p. 1). 
2 Horton seems to be disavowing dualism and advocating materialism. The previous line 
says: “Philosophical defenses of materialism seem increasingly substantiated by science” 
(2011, p. 376). Following that line, he says neuroscience has proven the mind is matter. 
However, on the next page he advocates what he calls “dichotomy,” according to which 
the soul is distinct from the body and persists after bodily death (2011, p. 377). This 
seems very dualistic. Moreover, on the same page he has a footnote where he commends 
John W. Cooper’s (1989) position, which Cooper calls “dualistic holism” (see Chapter 
Ten, section IV). And elsewhere Cooper (2009, p. 46) commends “Thomist dualism.”  
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Surely it’s not merely the fact that acts of the mind such as thought are associated with 
the brain. For this is hardly new information provided by modern neuroscience. The 
Greek physician Hippocrates (460-375 B.C.E.) knew this much (see 1886, p. 344), as did 
medieval philosopher and theologian, Thomas Aquinas (see ST 1a 78.4c). So what 
original evidence has modern neuroscience provided that disproves dualism?  
 The foremost answer is: Neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC). 
Accurate or not, the most common example of an NCC is C-fiber activation in one’s 
brain that takes place when they’re in a mental state of pain.1 So when I’m in a conscious 
state of pain there’s a corresponding neural state in my brain, i.e. C-fiber activation. So 
the C-fiber activation is the neural correlate of the conscious state of pain, according to 
this example.  
 On the basis of such correlations, it’s argued that physicalism is true and thus 
dualism is false. This chapter is devoted to explicating and analyzing this line of 
reasoning. In the first section, I’ll clarify what NCC are. Then the methods used to 
identify NCC will be introduced in the following section, where I’ll briefly summarize 
some example studies. The third section will focus on what NCC imply. The fourth 
explicates and critically analyzes the argument against dualism based on NCC and the 
principle of simplicity.  
 In short, this chapter will clarify the objection to dualism that’s based on NCC, 
and highlight its shortcomings in order to cast considerable doubt on its sufficiency to 
undermine dualism. In Chapter 7, I will then argue that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism is 
																																																								
1 C-fiber activation correlated with pain is the standard example in the philosophical 
literature; therefore I’ll often use this example. However, most neuroscientists “would not 
consider these a true content-specific NCC…The pain-NCC is higher-order somato-
sensory cortex…” (Koch, 2017). 
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not only consistent with NCC but also provides a good explanation of NCC. It should be 
noted that throughout this entire work I won’t concern myself with the question of 
whether there are NCC (cf. Noë and Thompson, 2004). I assume there are. My concern is 
what they imply, or what best explains them.  
2.1 What is an NCC? 
Simply put, a neural correlate of consciousness is a neural state or process that’s 
correlated with consciousness. The idea is that when a subject is in a particular conscious 
state there’s a corresponding state of their brain that’s correlated with their conscious 
state. That’s a basic description of an NCC.  
 However, in his influential work ‘What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?’ 
David Chalmers (2000) points out that there are various conceptions of neural correlates 
within the NCC literature. Thus he tries to offer conceptual clarity by giving a 
theoretically neutral, reasonable definition that reflects common usage (2000, pp. 31, 38). 
As a starting point, Chalmers (2000, p. 17-18) presents and considers a definition of an 
NCC derived from the conference program of the Association for the Scientific Study of 
Consciousness.  
A neural system N is an NCC if the state of N correlates directly with states of 
consciousness.  
Chalmers (2000, p. 18) then asks two clarifying questions: “First, what are the relevant 
‘states of consciousness’? Second, what does it mean for a neural state to ‘correlate 
directly’ with states of consciousness?”  
 Regarding the first question, Chalmers (2000, pp. 18-23) surveys several classes 
of phenomenal consciousness sometimes considered in the NCC literature. The first class 
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is being conscious. A relevant NCC would be a neural state that correlates with a subject 
being conscious versus not being conscious. The second is a background state of 
consciousness – such as being awake, asleep, under hypnosis, in a state of flow, or the 
like. A corresponding neural correlate would be a neural state that directly correlates with 
one being under hypnosis.  
 The third class Chalmers covers is contents of consciousness (2000, p. 19). 
Suppose that after a day of teaching I come home from campus with roses. My wife will 
delightfully rush over and smell them. When she does, her experience of the smell of the 
roses is a specific content of her consciousness. A neural state that correlates with that 
particular experience of the smell of the roses would be a relevant NCC. Contents of 
consciousness are more fine-grained than the previous classes. The final class Chalmers 
considers is arbitrary phenomenal properties (2000, p. 22). Specific states of any of the 
above classes can be members of this class, which might be useful if one tries to give a 
general definition of an NCC.  
 When it comes to the second question, the complexity is even more apparent. The 
original question is: “What does it mean for a neural state to ‘correlate directly’ with 
states of consciousness?” Yet this question prompts Chalmers (2000, p. 24-28) to ask two 
more fundamental questions. First, must the neural state be necessary, sufficient, or 
necessary and sufficient for the conscious state it’s correlated with? Second, must the 
correlation hold across all cases or only across specific types of cases (i.e. cases with 
ordinary brain function in an ordinary environment, cases with a normal brain but 
unusual inputs, cases with varying stimulation, or cases with abnormal brain function due 
to lesions)?  
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 Adequately answering the above questions is beyond the scope of this section. 
And my aim is not to formulate an original definition of an NCC. My ultimate aim is to 
show that a substance dualist position, neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, provides a good 
account of NCC. Such an account will be most effective if it assumes a reasonable 
definition that accords with general usage and is theoretically neutral. Since Chalmers’s 
(2000, pp. 31, 38) definition is intended to meet such objectives, I’ll adopt his definition.  
An NCC is a minimal neural system N such that there is a mapping from states of 
N to states of consciousness, where a given state of N is sufficient, under 
conditions C, for the corresponding state of consciousness.1 
 While this definition is more precise, there are several parts that need explaining. 
First, the phrase ‘minimal neural system’ needs clarification. Here Chalmers (2000, p. 24) 
is trying to avoid irrelevant neural processes being included (cf. Koch et al., 2016, p. 
308). To clarify this point, let’s consider a ‘minimal engine system’ that’s a correlate of a 
car starting. The car starts when the ignition switch turns. So the turning of the ignition 
switch is a correlate of the car starting. However, there are other conditions true of the car 
when it starts. The gas tank will contain gas. The fuel line will be clear. The spark plugs 
will be clean. The crankshaft will be in place. The list goes on and on. Yet, if I were to 
explain to a new driver which of the above is a relevant correlate pertaining to their car 
starting, I need not explain the entire system of a properly functioning car engine. I only 
need to tell the new driver about the ‘minimal engine system’ that’s a correlate of the car 
starting – i.e. when the ignition switch turns, the car starts.  
																																																								
1 Leading NCC researcher Christof Koch (2016, p. 307) gives a similar definition: “The 
NCC are defined as the minimum neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one 
specific conscious percept.”  
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 Likewise, when it comes to an NCC we’re not concerned with everything taking 
place in the entire nervous system, or even the brain in particular, when one is in a 
particular conscious state. Rather, we’re concerned with the minimal neural state(s) or 
process(s) that correspond to that conscious state. To refer again to the common example 
regarding the mental state of pain and C-fiber activation, suppose my dog Anselm 
accidently bites my hand while playing. Is every firing synapse between the bite on my 
hand and my brain a neural correlate of my pain state? No, rather the neural correlate is 
the minimal neural system that, under certain conditions, is sufficient for me to feel the 
corresponding state of pain. According to our example, that would be the corresponding 
C-fiber activation, which is the minimal neural system since there’s no more fundamental 
system that suffices for the corresponding state of pain (cf. Chalmers, 2000, p. 25). This 
is just one hypothetical example. Each minimal neural system will vary depending on the 
conscious state it correlates with.  
 The second part of Chalmers’s definition that needs explanation is the qualifier 
‘under conditions C’. To return to our car analogy, while the ignition switch turning is the 
correlate of the car starting, there are further conditions true of the engine when the car 
starts. As mentioned above, the gas tank will have gas, the fuel line will be clear, the 
spark plugs clean, and so on. Such are conditions of a normally functioning car engine. 
And according to Chalmers (2000, p. 31), the conditions typically relevant to NCC 
include normal brain functioning that permits some atypical inputs and brain stimulation 
but not changes to brain structure (e.g. lesions).1  
																																																								
1 Chalmers (2000, p. 32) points out that lesion studies are often used to make inferences 
about NCC, but he thinks such methodology is flawed. According to Chalmers, “the 
identity of an NCC is arguably always relative to specific brain architecture and normal 
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 Lastly, let’s clarify the phrase ‘there is a mapping from states of N to states of 
consciousness.’ First of all, this is not meant to suggest that there’s only an NCC if we’ve 
already identified it and mapped it. Rather, there’s a mapping from the neural state N1 to 
the conscious state C1 if the former corresponds with the latter so that the correspondence 
could be mapped if identified. Secondly, the idea of mapping between corresponding 
neural states and conscious states pertains to subjects across a species, not just an 
individual subject. However, this mapping across a species is not necessarily a 
correspondence of identical neural states in every subject in a particular conscious state. 
The search for NCC is a search for biological regularities, and not necessary identical 
correspondence relations. Biological regularities of all kinds permit variations.  
 For elucidation, let’s return to the familiar example of C-fibers and pain. 
Regarding the human species, there’s a mapping from C-fiber activation to the conscious 
state of pain if it’s true that when humans experience pain their conscious experience 
corresponds with C-fiber activation in their central nervous system. This doesn’t, 
however, rule out variation. After all, pain can be one aspect of someone’s overall 
conscious experience that includes additional mental states, which might result in 
neuronal variations. For example, some endurance athletes mentally train themselves to 
have an unusually high tolerance for pain through self-talk that affects their overall 
conscious experience when they’re in pain. Thus while their experience of pain will be 
																																																																																																																																																																					
brain functioning, and correlation across abnormal cases should not generally be 
expected.” What was an NCC can cease to be such when a lesion alters brain structure, 
thus warranting caution when making inferences from lesion studies. Fully aware of the 
case (and need) for caution, Koch pointed out to me on October 16, 2017 that lesion 
studies can nevertheless provide important information when it comes to identifying 
NCC especially when such information is coupled with findings from artificial 
stimulation studies in a healthy brain that corroborate lesion studies (see e.g. Koch et al., 
2016, p. 308).  
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similar to the experiences of other subjects in pain, there will be some mental variation 
that could result in variation with respect to the neural processes.  
 Such variation is also relevant to a methodological challenge regarding controlled 
experiments. That is, it is very difficult if not impossible to produce identical overall 
conscious experiences in subjects being tested. If a neuroscientist showed me an image of 
red roses I could report to her my conscious perception of the image, just as my wife 
could if shown the same image. Yet, my overall conscious experience will likely vary 
from hers even though we both consciously perceive the same image. After all, I don’t 
care much for red roses whereas she absolutely loves red roses and gets very excited 
about them. And even if the neuroscientist could get us to have the exact same overall 
conscious experience, our brains are not exactly similar. In fact, no two individuals have 
brains that are exactly alike, not even identical twins, or even clones. In light of such 
variations, we should not expect the search for NCC to reveal correlations that are exactly 
the same across a species, but rather similar correlations reflecting biological regularities 
that permit variation.1  
 In sum, according to Chalmers’s definition, an NCC is a minimal neural system 
that’s sufficient under certain conditions for the corresponding state of consciousness, 
such that this correspondence can be mapped. Before concluding this section, it’s worth 
noting that Chalmers’s definition can be modified to apply specifically to specific types 
																																																								
1 I’m indebted to Koch for this point and the foregoing sub points elucidating the overall 
idea. In our conversation on September 11, 2017 he pointed out the variations pertaining 
to NCC due to variations of overall conscious experience and differences in individual 
brains. Koch is the President and Chief Scientific Officer at the Allen Institute for Brain 
Science that’s endeavored to map the human brain and mouse brain, which involves 
cloned mice (see brain-map.org).  
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of phenomenal consciousness. For example, Chalmers (2000, p. 31) gives a modified 
definition particularly relevant to contents of consciousness. 
An NCC (for content) is a minimal neural representational system N such that 
representation of a content in N is sufficient, under conditions C, for 
representation of that content in consciousness. 
While this modified definition applies to contents of consciousness, similar modifications 
could be made so that the definition applies specifically to other types of phenomenal 
consciousness. At times, such modifications might even be necessary.  
 Now that we’re equipped with a definition of neural correlates of consciousness, 
let’s consider how we identify NCC. The next section introduces standard methodology 
used to identify neural correlates of consciousness.  
2.2 Identifying NCC 
The aim of this section is to introduce methods used to identify neural correlates of 
consciousness. In meeting this objective I’ll refer to several example studies. The first 
study took place in the nineteenth century and provided a theoretical basis for techniques 
vital to the contemporary search for NCC. The second study, published in the year two 
thousand, pertains to neural correlates of binocular rivalry. It gives us an example of 
standard contemporary methodology used to identify NCC, which explicitly relies on 
subjective reports from study participants. The third study also pertains to neural 
correlates of binocular rivalry, but it implements the recently developed ‘no-report 
paradigm.’ This paradigm includes trials of the study with explicit reports from 
participants, as well as trials without explicit reports where physiological measures (e.g. 
pupil dilation) are used to infer what participants perceive (Koch et al., 2016, p. 308).  
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 Fundamental to identifying neural correlates of consciousness is finding neural 
activity that consistently corresponds with certain conscious states. Imaging brain activity 
is central to this endeavor. Over a century ago Italian physiologist, Angelo Mosso (1846-
1910), laid the conceptual basis for brain imaging techniques vital to the contemporary 
search for NCC (see Sandrone et al., 2014). A chief challenge to studying the brain is that 
it’s enclosed in a hard protective casing – i.e. the skull. Mosso worked with a patient 
named Bertone who suffered extensive damage to the top of his skull, consequently much 
of it was missing. Where Bertone’s skull was missing, Mosso placed a cap made out of a 
rubber-like substance, gutta percha (Glickstein, 2014, p. 343). This flexible cap made it 
possible to record brain pulsations of blood pressure correlated with mental activity such 
as emotional arousal and doing arithmetic (Glickstein, 2014, p. 343).  
 Mosso’s study confirmed a straightforward hypothesis. That is, if the brain works 
harder there will be increased blood flow to the brain, so if the brain works harder when 
the mind works harder, there will be increased blood flow to the brain when the mind 
works harder. Put differently, (a) increased mental activity means (b) increased brain 
activity, which means (c) increased blood flow in the brain. So (a) increased mental 
activity correlates with (c) increased blood flow in the brain. Mosso confirmed this by 
measuring the increased blood flow in Bertone’s brain that took place when Bertone’s 
mental activity increased.  
 However, the method Mosso used to measure pulsations in Bertone’s brain had a 
limitation. It was effective only if the patient had an abnormal skull breach (Sandrone et 
al., 2014, p. 622). Mosso’s ingenious ‘human circulation balance’ was invented to 
overcome this limitation (Sandrone et al., 2014, p. 622). Mosso had his patients lay on a 
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table that was essentially a balance intended to measure pulsations of blood flow that 
would tip the balance. Whether or not Mosso’s human circulation balance was reliable, 
his work laid the conceptual foundation for noninvasive functional brain imaging 
techniques (Sandrone et al., 2014, p. 621-622). Noninvasive functional brain imaging is 
done while the brain is active and without being invasive to the brain by penetrating it in 
any significant way. Such brain imaging is vital to the search for NCC. Since it allows us 
to see brain activity that corresponds with a conscious subject’s mental activity.   
 Needless to say, noninvasive functional brain imaging technology has advanced 
significantly since Mosso’s day. In the 1920s a German psychiatrist, Hans Berger, 
discovered it’s possible to record electrical activity in the brain from the human scalp 
(Glickstein, 2014, p. 338). This type of recording is called an electroencephalogram 
(EEG) (Glickstein, 2014, p. 338). Positron emission tomography (PET) and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have also since developed. A PET scan can reveal 
blood flow, glucose metabolism, oxygen metabolism, or concentrations of dopamine 
transporter indicative of brain activity (Johnson and Becker, 1999). An fMRI reveals 
increased brain activity by revealing increased blood flow. The blood carries oxygen on 
molecules of hemoglobin containing iron that changes the thermodynamic and magnetic 
properties of the brain area, which is detected by magnetic resonance imaging (see Bulte, 
2011, 4:15-5:00).  
 Such technology is invaluable in the contemporary search for NCC, principally 
instigated in the late twentieth century by Francis Crick and Christof Koch (1990). To 
elucidate contemporary methodology, let’s consider a conventional study done by Alex 
Polonsky and company (2000) to identify neural correlates of perception during binocular 
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rivalry. In Polonsky’s study fMRI was used to measure fluctuations of cortical activity 
correlated with alternating perceptions during binocular rivalry (2000, p. 1153). 
Binocular rivalry is a controllable perceptual illusion that takes place when both eyes are 
presented with different stimuli and the brain only allows one to be perceived (Mormann 
and Koch, 2007).  
 While two different rival stimuli were presented to each eye of study participants, 
the researchers measured fMRI signals in the early visual cortex (2000, p. 1153). One 
stimulus was a higher contrast green grating image. The other was a lower contrast red 
grating image. The subjects would report which stimulus they perceived by pressing one 
button when they perceived the green image and another button when they perceived the 
red image (2000, p. 1154). There was also a third button the subjects were instructed to 
push when their perception of either the higher or lower contrasts were less than seventy-
five percent homogeneous at particular times (2000, p. 1154). The researchers found that 
the fMRI signal in the primary visual cortex (V1) correlated with the perceptions the 
subjects reported. “V1 activity tended to increase when subjects reported seeing the 
higher contrast green grating, and the activity tended to decrease when they reported 
seeing the lower-contrast red grating” (2000, p. 1155).  
 To clarify the degree of these activity fluctuations in the fMRI signal, they did a 
separate series of fMRI scans to measure V1 activity as the stimuli physically alternated 
(2000, p. 1155). Basically, they compared V1 activity during binocular rivalry to V1 
activity during stimulus alternation. Confirming earlier accounts (see Heeger et al., 
2000), it was found that neuronal activity in V1 followed the alternations of the stimuli 
(2000, p. 1155). And they found that the fluctuations of V1 activity during binocular 
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rivalry were forty-five to eighty-three percent as large as fluctuations in V1 activity 
induced during the stimulus alternations (2000, p. 1155). Furthermore, V1 activity 
fluctuations were about equal to those in visual areas nearby, that is: V2, V3, V4v and 
V3a (2000, p. 1155).  
 Polonsky and company (2000, p. 1157) concluded that their findings suggest 
neuronal activity critical for binocular rivalry is expressed as early as the primary visual 
cortex, V1, in the case of human vision. As they (2000, p. 1153) acknowledge, this runs 
contrary to the view that such neural activity occurs predominantly in later visual areas, 
which prior studies indicated (cf. Leopold and Logothetis, 1996; Logothetis and Schall, 
1989; Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997). Simply put, their methodology consisted of 
controlling the stimuli presented to each eye of the subjects to induce binocular rivalry 
and imaging V1 neuronal activity using fMRI as the subjects reported their perceptions.  
 Such methodology critically depends upon the subjects’ awareness of their 
perceptions, because the subjects report what they perceive to the researchers. The 
researchers then infer that the mental perception being reported correlates with the neural 
activity at that time, which is identified via brain imaging. This reliance on subjective 
reports is worrisome because researchers might confuse neural correlates of the subject’s 
mental state during the report for neural correlates of the mental state being reported.1 In 
other words, when a subject (PERCEIVES) perceives a green grating image without 
considering the fact that she perceives the image she is in a different mental state than 
when she (REFLECTS) perceives the image and considers her perception of it. In the 
former case she simply has a first order awareness of what’s perceived (i.e. the green 
																																																								
1 I’m grateful to Koch for clarifying the motivation of the no-report paradigm during our 
conversation at the Allen Institute, March 15, 2017. 
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image). In the latter case she has a second order awareness of her first order awareness, 
so her mental state includes perceiving the green image and being aware of the fact that 
she perceives the green image.  
 Given that, a worry arises. That is, when the subject reports their first order 
awareness then they are in a different mental state that includes the second order 
awareness. And consequently the identified neural “correlate” may actually be correlated 
with the mental state that includes the second order awareness (i.e. REFLECT) when it’s 
thought to be correlated with the first order mental state of simply perceiving the green 
image (i.e. PERCEIVES).  
 This worry motivates what’s called the ‘no-report paradigm’ (cf. Tsuchiya et al., 
2015). This methodological paradigm includes study trials with explicit reports from 
participants, as well as trials without explicit reports where physiological measures are 
used to infer what participants perceive (Koch et al., 2016, p. 308). In 2014, Stefan 
Frässle and a team of researchers did a study on binocular rivalry with a pioneering 
application of a no-report paradigm (see Koch et al., 2016, p. 318, note 36). Again the 
subjects were presented with different stimuli to induce binocular rivalry. Their no-report 
paradigm used the ocular motor reflex, optokinetic nystagmus, along with pupil size as 
“objective measures” of which stimulus was dominant (Frässle et al., 2014, p. 1739). 
These reflex measures together with fMRI purportedly allowed them to assess the NCC 
of binocular rivalry without active reports from the subjects (Frässle et al., 2014, p. 
1738). Frässle and company compared these measures to trials with active reports from 
the subjects, which allowed them to test the “applicability” of the objective measures 
(Frässle et al., 2014, p. 1743). When all was said and done, they concluded that active 
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report and possibly introspection were partly responsible for neuronal activation patterns 
that are typically observed (Frässle et al., 2014, p. 1743-1745).  
 The no-reports paradigm is an innovative approach. Yet its accuracy depends on 
the reliability of the alleged objective measures, which may be difficult to establish. In 
any event, this concludes our brief overview of the methodology used to identify NCC. 
As an introduction to this methodology we’ve briefly considered three example studies 
intended to identify NCC. Given the discovery of neural correlates of consciousness, it’s 
fitting to ask what they imply.   
2.3 Implications of NCC 
While the evidence for neural correlates of consciousness may be clear, it’s not obvious 
what such correlations entail regarding the nature of the mind. At this point a common 
fallacy – post hoc, ergo propter hoc – is tempting to commit. This fallacy is committed 
when one infers that φ caused ϕ simply because φ is correlated with ϕ. If one inferred that 
Barack Obama winning the democratic nomination in 2008 caused the stock market crash 
of 2008 simply because there’s a correlation between the two events, they would commit 
this fallacy. Correlation doesn’t entail causation. One needs further rationale to infer that 
a correlation is best explained by (or suggests) a causal relation.  
 Likewise, a correlation by itself doesn’t entail dependency, identity, or that one 
correlate is reducible to the other. Given that φ is correlated with ϕ, we need more 
information to justifiably conclude that φ depends on ϕ, is identical to ϕ, or is reducible 
to ϕ. Suppose that all around the world whenever any philosopher heard a knock on their 
door they found a packaged philosophy book on their doorstep. On the basis of this 
correlation alone we couldn’t justifiably infer that the packaged books caused the knocks, 
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lest we commit the fallacy mentioned above. But likewise, we couldn’t infer that the door 
knocks depend on the philosophy books. Nor could we infer that the knocks are identical 
to the books or in some way reducible to them. Further information would be required to 
justifiably make such inferences.  
 In some cases where we’ve identified an NCC we might have additional data that 
justifies further inferences. For example, suppose that whenever Fern was in a mental 
state of remembering her childhood in Kansas, a particular part of her brain lit up. And 
suppose further that the same area lights up in Kathryn’s brain whenever she remembers 
her childhood in Washington State. Moreover, presume the data related to Fern and 
Kathryn confirms numerous studies with many human subjects. Given this, we could 
know that Fern and Kathryn’s mental states of remembering their childhood correlate 
with neural activity in a particular part of the human brain.  
 From this correlation alone we couldn’t infer that Fern and Kathryn’s mental state 
caused the neural activity, depended on it, was identical to it, or reducible to it. However, 
suppose that Fern and Kathryn lost the part of their brain with the neural correlates and 
directly after this they could never again remember their childhoods. Given this, the data 
set would then include more than just the correlations. With this additional data it would 
be justifiable to conclude that their mental state of remembering their childhood was not 
only correlated with the neural activity, but also depended on it.  
 If a physicalist assumed physics is fundamental before mapping the correlation 
between Fern and Kathryn’s mental activity and the corresponding neural activity, she 
would likely conclude the correlation implies that the mental activity depends on the 
neural activity before gaining the additional data. And she would be justified in doing so 
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to the degree that her assumption was well justified. But she would not be arriving at this 
conclusion merely on the basis of the correlation. Rather she would be justifiably arriving 
at the conclusion on the basis of the correlation coupled with her preexperimental 
assumption. Similarly, a dualist could justifiably conclude that Fern and Kathryn’s 
immaterial minds stood in some type of causal relation with the neural correlates, if she 
justifiably assumed that their mental states are not reducible to physical states. However 
the dualist, like the physicalist, would be arriving at her conclusion on the basis of the 
NCC and her preexperimental assumption.  
 Pessimists might roll their eyes at this point and remind us that everyone has pre-
experimental assumptions. That’s true. Nevertheless, that doesn’t mean we can’t learn 
anything from NCC. It does mean, however, that it’s important to analyze our pre-
experimental assumptions and to be aware of the justificatory role they play. And 
according to Chalmers (1998, p. 227), “once we recognize the central role of 
preexperimental assumptions in the search for the NCC, we realize that there are 
limitations on just what we can expect this search to tell us.” Given this, it’s fitting that 
Thomas Metzinger (2000, p. 4) writes in his influential volume Neural Correlates of 
Consciousness:  
However, mapping does not mean reduction. Correlation does not mean 
explanation. Once strict, fine-grained correlations between brain states and 
conscious states have been established, a number of theoretical options are still 
open. Additional constraints therefore will eventually be needed. Important 
questions are What is the true nature of these psychophysical correlations? Are we 
justified in interpreting them as causal relations? What additional constraints 
would have to be introduced in order to speak of law-like correlations…? Is a 
fully reductive account, or even an eliminativist strategy, possible? 
Though Metzinger is no dualist (cf. Metzinger, 2003), he goes on to acknowledge: 
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Assume that we find a strict and systematic correlation between a certain brain 
property or type of neural event N and the subjectively experienced phenomenal 
property of “sogginess” S. This is entirely compatible with Cartesian dualism: 
The underlying relation could indeed be a causal one, namely causal interaction 
between events in two ontologically distinct domains.  
 In short, correlations don’t entail causation, dependency, identity, or reducibility. 
Therefore further philosophical argumentation beyond the empirical data of NCC is 
required to arrive at a justified conclusion about the nature of the mind. 
2.4 Against Dualism 
So far I’ve argued that NCC don’t entail a particular view of consciousness. As Jakob 
Hohwy (2007, p. 461) puts it: “…the notion of ‘correlation’ doesn’t by itself commit one 
to any particular metaphysical view about the relation between (neural) matter and 
consciousness.” Given this, a philosophical argument is needed to show that NCC 
suggest dualism is false.  
 In Sensations and Brain Process, J.J.C Smart (1959) aims to provide such an 
argument against dualism. Smart’s influential argument is based on the principle of 
simplicity, also known as Occam’s razor. Simplicity says that when there are multiple 
theories that sufficiently explain a data set the theory that includes the least unnecessary 
entities is preferable.1 Simplicity is one theoretical virtue that helps us discern which 
theory amongst competing theories provides the best explanation.  
 In this section I’ll present Smart’s simplicity argument and then give a twofold 
critical analysis. After presenting the simplicity argument I’ll critique Smart’s conclusion 
by summarizing problems that have convinced many philosophers that it’s false. Then I’ll 
																																																								
1 Koch (2006, p. 11) sums it up well: “…this principle states that of equally good 
explanations for a phenomenon, the best one is the simplest explanation that accounts for 
all the facts.” 
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highlight a handful of weaknesses regarding the argument itself. My focus will be 
Smart’s simplicity argument, but it should be noted that he isn’t the only materialist who 
argues on the basis of simplicity. More recent contributions in this area have come from 
Christopher Hill (1991) as well as Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker (1999).1 However, 
it’s important to note that Hill’s (1991, Ch. 2) simplicity argument against dualism 
markedly differs from Smart’s (1959) argument, and I find it best to focus on Smart’s 
rather Hill’s for two reasons.  
 One, Smart is widely influential. Two, Hill’s argument and conclusion are much 
weaker, in my opinion. According to Hill (1991, pp. 28-29), there are three different 
ways the simplicity argument can be formulated according to different ways of 
understanding simplicity. Hill (1991, pp. 29-39) argues that two of the formulations fail. 
He then presents his own formulation, which relies on simplicity for aesthetic appeal 
rather than epistemic justification (1991, pp. 39-40). Hill (1991, p. 40) concludes:  
It seems, then, that my claim for the simplicity argument must be modest. I must 
not maintain that it can be used to establish that type materialism is probable, nor 
that it can be used to convert all rational beings to type materialism. Rather, I can 
claim only that the argument makes a case that will be found persuasive by people 
whose aesthetic intuitions cause them to attach importance to ontological 
simplicity. It is, of course, my hope that the reader will find on reflection that he 
or she belongs to this group. 
 Hill’s argument and conclusion seem too modest to seriously threaten dualism. 
Unlike Hill, Smart argues on the grounds of simplicity that it’s indeed probable that 
																																																								
1  Block and Stalnaker (see 1999, pp. 23-25) make an important point regarding 
explanatory expectations the advocate of the identity theory might appeal to in response 
to various articulations of the third objection Smart (1959, p. 148, footnote 11) 
considered and described as “the one which I am least confident of having satisfactorily 
met.” See section 2.4.2 below.  
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materialism is true and dualism is false. If his argument is cogent, the implications for 
dualism are clearly consequential. Henceforth I’ll focus on Smart’s simplicity argument.  
2.4.1 Simplicity Argument 
On the basis of simplicity Smart (1959) argues for the thesis that sensations are identical 
to neural processes. Due to advances in brain imaging technology, the amount of NCC 
data has grown significantly since Smart published Sensations and Brain Processes in 
1959. Yet his argument and conclusion presuppose that neural processes are correlated 
with sensations.  
 Smart concludes that mental sensations are nothing more than their neural 
correlates, i.e. neural processes in the brain. So pain, for example, is allegedly C-fiber 
activation according to an ‘is’ of identity (see 1959, p. 145). The mental state of pain is 
nothing over and above the neural process of C-fiber activation. “They” are identical and 
thus have all and only the same properties.1 This thesis is referred to as Smart’s brain 
process theory or Smart’s identity theory. Specifically, it’s a type identity theory since it 
says sensation types (e.g. pain or tasting chocolate) are identical to types of neural 
processes. By contrast a token identity theory says particular instances of a sensation (e.g. 
the pain I now feel after stubbing my toe) are identical to particular neural processes (cf. 
Smart, 2007).   
 Smart (1959, p. 142) acknowledges that consciousness appears irreducible. But 
“for various reasons,” writes Smart (1959, p. 142), “I just cannot believe that this can be 
so.” For one, it seems to him (1959, p. 142) “frankly unbelievable” that everything could 
																																																								
1 However that’s not to say, according to Smart, that ‘pain’ means the same as ‘C-fiber 
activation’ (see 1959, pp. 144-145). Accordingly, one can’t infer that pain is identical to 
C-fiber activation from the meaning of terms; it’s allegedly empirically discovered. 
	
	 35 
be explicable in terms of physics and biology except for dualism’s irreducible conscious 
states. Smart refers to such states as “nomological danglers” because they don’t fit in a 
completely physical world. To make matters worse, these danglers need laws linking 
them to the brain processes they’re correlated with (Smart, 1959, pp. 143, 156).  
 So dualism allegedly includes these copious irreducible conscious states – i.e. 
nomological danglers – and the laws “whereby the ‘nomological danglers’ dangle” (1959, 
p. 156). The alternative is the identity theory, which doesn’t include such odd ontological 
baggage. According to the identity theory there are only brain processes that turn out to 
be sensations upon empirical investigation. Thus the identity theory is simpler and 
therefore enjoys the theoretical virtue of simplicity. In other words, simplicity favors the 
identity theory over dualism. So the identity theory is the best explanation of NCC data. 
We might formally reconstruct the argument like so. 
 (SIMPLICITY)  All else being equal, the simplest explanation of a data set  
    is the best explanation. 
  
 (NCC-DATA)  Neuroscience has discovered NCC. 
  
 (ID-SIMPLER)  Relative to dualism, the identity theory is the simplest  
    explanation of (NCC-DATA). 
  
 ∴ (ID-BEST EX)  Relative to dualism, the identity theory is the best   
    explanation of (NCC-DATA). 
 The first premise (SIMPLICITY) is assumed by almost everyone. The second 
premise (NCC-DATA) is a perfectly safe assumption (see section 2.2). The fact that there 
are NCC is the data to be explained. The third premise (ID-SIMPLER) is a key step in 
arriving at the conclusion. Dualism supposedly includes nonphysical mental states (i.e. 
“nomological danglers”) and the relevant laws relating them to neural events, whereas the 
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identity theory doesn’t.1 So the identity theory is a simpler theory than dualism, says the 
simplicity argument’s proponent. Hence the conclusion (ID-BEST EX) that the identity 
theory is the best explanation of NCC data, and therefore it’s probably true.  
 Now that the simplicity argument has been explicated, we can analyze its merit. 
The following subsection will focus on the conclusion—i.e. Smart’s identity theory—and 
provide reasons to think it’s false. After discussing the viability of the simplicity 
argument’s conclusion, I’ll critically analyze the argument for that conclusion.  
2.4.2 The Identity Theory’s Viability  
The simplicity of the identity theory is an attractive virtue. However, in his critical 
analysis of Smart’s argument from simplicity Jaegwon Kim (2011, p. 102) points out that 
what one person finds to be a simple explanation might seem like an inadequate, 
truncated explanation to someone else. In some cases simplicity can be seen as “poverty,” 
to echo Koch (2012, p. 152), who has recently argued that physicalism in general is “too 
impoverished” to explain the origin of consciousness. Critiques of physicalism generally 
or the identity theory specifically pertaining to explanatory inadequacy are not 
uncommon, and I will raise similar issues in the next section (cf. Nagel, 2012, pp. 39-40). 
 However, given the truth of the identity claim central to the identity theory, 
expecting certain explanations may be unwarranted. After all, the truth of the identity 
																																																								
1 Another interpretation of Smart says irreducible conscious states are “danglers” since 
they’re epiphenomenal (cf. Feigl, 1967; Polgar, 2011; Smart, 2007). This makes Smart’s 
argument hinge on the idea that irreducible mental states are necessarily epiphenomenal. 
Many dualists disagree, so Smart would need to show that such states are necessarily 
epiphenomenal. Some think causal closure entails such. In Chapter 3, I address closure. 
Jaegwon Kim (2011, Ch. 4) has argued that because nonphysical mental states would be 
epiphenomenal we should reduce them to neural correlates. Kim relies on the causal 
pairing problem to support the premise that nonphysical states would be epiphenomenal 
(see 2011, p. 113, endnote 15). I present the pairing problem in Chapter 4 and respond to 
it in Chapter 6. 
	
	 37 
theory would limit the need for some explanations. Consider the following analogy 
offered by Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker (1999, p. 24):  
Suppose one group of historians of the distant future studies Mark Twain and 
another studies Samuel Clemens. They happen to sit at the same table at a 
meeting of the American Historical Association. A briefcase falls open, a list of 
the events in the life of Mark Twain tumbles out and is picked up by a student of 
the life of Samuel Clemens. “My Lord,” he says, “the events in the life of Mark 
Twain are exactly the same as the events in the life of Samuel Clemens. What 
could explain this amazing coincidence?” The answer, someone observes, is that 
Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens. Note that it makes sense to ask for an 
explanation of the correlation between the two sets of events. But it does not 
make the same kind of sense to ask for an explanation of the identity. Identities 
don’t have explanations…The role of identities is to disallow some questions and 
allow others. 
The reasoning here is sensible and it’s clear how it analogously applies to NCC. The 
events in the history of conscious state C are exactly the same as those of neural state N, 
therefore C = N; and this identity relation eliminates the need for certain explanations. 
 The identity relation itself does not need an explanation and it eliminates the need 
to answer questions like ‘how can C fit into a world full of physical things like N’ and 
‘how did C emerge from N.’ After all, assuming that the Evening Star is identical to the 
Morning Star, it makes no sense to ask: ‘how did the Evening Star emerge from the 
Morning Star?’ Given an identity relation, the question is nonsensical, and therefore 
needs no answer. Given the identity relation central to the identity theory, its advocate 
can make the same point. And when allegations are made that the identity theory is 
explanatorily inadequate because it fails to explain something like the emergence of 
consciousness, the identity theorist can claim such an explanation is unnecessary given 
the identity relation central to the identity theory. However, the strength of such a claim 
hinges on the truth of the identity theory.  
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 The aim of this section is to question the truth of the identity claim foundational 
to the identity theory and to highlight reasons to think it’s false. While the reasons I’ll 
provide are not incontestable, they are merely intended to provide warrant for thinking its 
probable that the identity theory is false and its worthwhile to look for alternatives. The 
reasons I offer come in the form of apparent differences between consciousness and its 
neural correlates. Consciousness appears to be different from its neural correlates in 
several respects. If it’s probable that any one of these apparent differences is an actual 
difference, then there is reason to think consciousness is not identical to NCC and 
therefore Smart’s identity theory is false. And the falsity of the theory would render its 
simplicity moot. Even if it cannot be shown that the apparent differences are indeed true 
differences, they nevertheless call into question the identity relation the identity theory 
claims obtains.  
 I’ll focus here on apparent differences between consciousness and neural 
correlates related to well-known and widely discussed issues in contemporary philosophy 
of mind: multiple realizability, the knowledge argument, epistemic access, and the 
possibility of zombies. These topics merit a book length treatment. But since a significant 
amount of attention has been given to them elsewhere and they are not the focus of this 
work, I will only be highlighting key points and their present applicability.1 
 It is important to emphasize that my target in this section is not the explanatory 
adequacy of the identity theory per se. The same points I rely on can be used to argue for 
the explanatory inadequacy of the identity theory. This section, however, focuses on the 
																																																								
1  For further sources pertaining to issues discussed in summary fashion here, see 
Chalmers (1996), Jackson (1982; 1986), Kripke (1981), Block and Stalnaker (1999), 
Robinson (2012), and Swinburne (2013). 
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truth of the identity claim central to the identity theory. I’ll use the same points someone 
else might use to argue that the theory is explanatorily inadequate. But I am arguing 
specifically that there are reasons to think the theory is false. Granted, if (A) the theory is 
false, then (B) it’s explanatorily inadequate, as well. Nevertheless, my focus in this 
section is on giving reasons specifically in support of (A). 
 According to Leibnitz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals, if R is identical to 
S then everything true of R is true of S and what is not true of R is not true of S (cf. 
Beebee et al., 2011pp. 114-115). The foregoing discussion assumes this law and 
addresses apparent differences between consciousness and neural correlates, providing 
reasons to doubt the truth of the alleged identity relation central to the identity theory.  
Multiple Realizability 
 More than any other difficulty the identity theory faces, multiple realizability can 
be accredited with bringing about its “unexpectedly early decline,” according to Kim 
(2011, p. 122). The problem of multiple realizability, famously raised by Hilary Putnam 
(1967), consists of the idea that it’s possible for mental kinds to be realized by multiple 
physical kinds (cf. Bickle, 2016). This possibility doesn’t seem permitted by Smart’s type 
identity theory.1 
 According to his identity theory, a conscious state is its neural correlate. If this 
were true the conscious state could not exist without its neural correlate, which suggests 
that beings without the neural correlate could not have the conscious state. But it seems 
that beings with different neurobiology than that of humans, could have some of the same 
conscious states with different neural correlates. The common examples often include the 
																																																								




idea that pain is correlated with C-fiber activation, and point out that its possible for there 
to be animals without C-fibers capable of experiencing pain. In addition, it’s often 
thought that there could be aliens without C-fibers capable of experiencing pain. Neither 
such animal nor alien pain would be possible, if pain is identical to C-fiber activation.  
 Multiple realizability is relevant to the contemporary neuroscientific study of 
NCC in two ways that provide some support to the idea that multiple realizability is 
possible. The full NCC of consciousness (i.e. the neural correlate of being conscious as 
opposed to NCC of specific conscious states) is not yet identified. Yet, the Integrated 
Information Theory of consciousness (for brevity IIT) is arguably the leading theory 
pertaining to the full NCC (see Tononi et al., 2016).1 On IIT multiple realizability is 
possible (cf. Fallon; Tononi and Koch, 2015). Hence it’s not surprising that a leading 
proponent of IIT, Christof Koch (2012, p. 152), accepts a form of property dualism.  
 Secondly, multiple realizability is relevant to neuroplasticity. In the last two 
decades, there has been much research interests in neuroplasticity, which is the nervous 
system’s capacity “to respond to intrinsic or extrinsic stimuli by reorganizing its 
structure, function and connections” (Cramer et al., 2011, p. 1592). In ‘What is a neural 
correlate of consciousness,’ Chalmers (2000, p. 24) ruled out the idea of an NCC being 
necessary and sufficient on the grounds that such a condition would be too strong. “It 
might turn out,” Chalmers reasoned, “that there is more than one neural correlate of a 
given conscious state.” It now appears that there is some empirical support suggesting 
that after traumatic injury resulting in the loss of NCC, consciousness can come to be 
																																																								
1 IIT claims the physical substrate of consciousness is an integrated structure in the 
central nervous system that exhibits maximal intrinsic cause-effect power (Tononi et al., 
2016, p. 450). See also Chapter 7 section 7.5.2. 
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correlated with different neural mechanism than before (Jensen and Overgaard, 2011; 
Mogensen, 2011; Munoz-Cespedes et al., 2005; Overgaard and Mogensen, 2011). If such 
alterations do to take place, this suggests that multiple realization is not just a possibility 
but an actual occurrence in (some) brains affected by traumatic injury. Yet, the idea that 
this is even a possibility worth investigating suggests something important for our 
purposes.  That is, an apparent difference between consciousness and corresponding 
neural correlates; namely, the former are multiply realizable.  
Knowledge of Qualia 
 In his article ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia,’ Frank Jackson (1982, p. 130) provides an 
infamous thought experiment pertaining to qualia – i.e. felt experiences of what-it’s-like 
to be in a conscious state. The experience of tasting Swiss chocolate feels different than 
the experience of tasting dirt. The difference is a difference of qualia. What-it’s-like to 
taste Swiss chocolate is different than what-it’s-like to taste dirt. Here I will offer a 
modified version of Jackson’s thought experiment that also pertains to direct access to 
one’s conscious states.1 
 Imagine a neuroscientist, Mary, whose parents want her to become the star of a 
famous thought experiment. From birth they have her wear black and white goggles, 
which she never takes off. As a result, she has never seen the color red. One day Mary 
gets a large grant to study all the neurobiological, neurophysiological, neurochemical 
information and every other type of physical information pertaining to the nervous 
system that corresponds to seeing red. If her study is successful, she will learn all the 
physical information there is about the NCC of seeing red.  
																																																								
1 For notable replies to the line of reasoning presented here, see Churchland (1985), Tye 
(1986), and Loar (1990). 
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 Since the grant is very lucrative, Mary decides to hire the band members of Red 
Hot Chili Peppers to be subjects in her study. Mary studies all that takes place in the 
brains of the band members as they view visual images that include the color red, which 
Mary presents them with. However, Mary cannot see the color in the images herself since 
she always keeps her goggles on (to stay true to her parents’ dream). In the end, Mary’s 
study is a major success and she learns all the physical information about the neural 
correlates of the conscious state of seeing red. However, she doesn’t share any of this 
information with the band. For she knows the drummer is upset with the lead singer, and 
is therefore leaving the band to pursue a career in neuroscience. She doesn’t want him to 
publish the information from the study before her, so she keeps it to herself.  
 However, despite her knowledge of all the physical information about the NCC of 
seeing red, it seems the band members would have knowledge Mary would lack. They 
would know what-it’s-like to see red, whereas Mary wouldn’t because she has never seen 
red due to her black and white goggles. Despite her knowledge of all the physical 
information about the NCC of seeing red, it’s reasonable to think Mary wouldn’t know 
what-it’s-like to see red. Yet, the band would know what-it’s-like to see red, even though 
they don’t know the physical information about the NCC. This suggests two differences. 
 One, the physical information describes the neural correlates but not the 
correlated qualia. Two, qualia can be directly known by the subject without knowledge of 
the physical information describing the neural correlates, which cannot be known in the 
same way (see Swinburne, 2013, Ch. 3). It is due to these differences that neuroscientists 
rely on reports from subjects when identifying NCC (even on the so-called “no-report” 
paradigm in order to have trials to compare and to identify the physiological indicators, 
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see section 2.2), and why IIT can reasonably be based on starting axioms conscious 
beings directly know about the nature of their consciousness (see Tononi et al., 2016).  
Zombie Nervous Systems 
 The possibility of zombies can also make one worry about the identity theory.1 
David Chalmers (1996, p. 94) describes a zombie as something physically the same as a 
conscious being such as himself, but with no conscious experience. If the identity theory 
is true, zombies aren’t possible. Given the identity theory, conscious states are identical 
to their neural correlates; therefore neural correlates could not possibly exist without their 
corresponding conscious states. So if zombies are possible, that would imply the identity 
theory is false. Many philosophers think zombies are possible, and many do not. Yet to 
call into question the identity claim central to the identity theory, we only need the 
possibility of an unconscious nervous system, not a complete, embodied, behaving 
zombie.  
 Thus brain organoids, popularly known as ‘mini-brains’ provide an interesting 
conversation piece to the debate. In 2011, at the Institute of Molecular Biotechnology in 
Vienna a postdoctoral researcher, Madeline Lancaster, inadvertently brought about the 
production of a brain organoid from human embryonic stem cells (Willyard, 2015, p. 
520). The brain organoids neuroscientists are now capable of growing consists of several 
million neurons. In April 2018, Nature published an article on the ethics of 
experimenting with brain organoids. The team of authors, lead by Nita A. Farahany 
(2018, p. 430), offer the following description of brain organoids: 
																																																								
1 For worries about zombies, such as whether they’re conceivable and what that would 
entail, see Dennett (1995), Marcus (2004), and Bailey (2009). 
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Brain organoids can be produced much as other 3D multicellular structures 
resembling eye, gut, liver, kidney and other human tissues have been built. By 
adding appropriate signaling factors, aggregates of pluripotent stem cells (which 
have the ability to develop into any cell type) can differentiate and self-organize 
into structures that resemble certain regions of the human brain. 
These so-called “mini-brains” resemble human brains in noteworthy ways regarding their 
constitution, neural activity, and structure. Thus they prompt a key question with serious 
ethical implications: Are they conscious? The question is natural to ask because it seems 
possible that despite them being composed of human brain tissue, and having similar 
structural features, and neural activity, it’s possible they are not conscious. To use 
Chalmers’s terminology, it’s possible they are “zombie” mini-brains.  
 Granted, brain organoids are much, much smaller and far less developed than 
actual brains in full-grown individuals. But we can imagine that in the not so distant 
future scientist could be capable of growing a full human nervous system that they can 
take parts from to replace damaged neural tissue in a human patient. And even when we 
“life-size” these brain organoids it would seem that the same question would still make 
sense: Are they conscious? This question is far from trivial, in light of the ethical risks on 
one side and the potential medical benefits on the other side. For if we say they must be 
conscious, that answer would result in ethical limitations on experimentation and medical 
usage. But if they are non-conscious “zombie” nervous systems, more would seem to be 
permissible.  
 The identity theory appears to rule out the possibility that such nervous systems 
with the same neural function could be non-conscious “zombie” nervous systems. But it 
seems possible that they could be. This suggests it’s possible for the neural correlates of 
conscious states to exist without the corresponding conscious states. But the 
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corresponding conscious states could not possibly exist without the corresponding 
conscious states. This appears to be another difference between neural correlates and 
corresponding conscious states. 
 To recap, in this section I’ve discussed apparent differences between 
consciousness and neural correlates that suggests conscious states are not identical to 
NCC, and vice versa.1  Given that consciousness is not identical to its neural correlates, 
the identity claim central to the identity theory is not true, and therefore the identity 
theory is false, which makes its simplicity moot. The foregoing discussion has briefly 
summarized issues that provide reason to think the identity claim central to the identity 
theory is false. Next I’ll analyze the argument for the identity theory.   
2.4.3 Simplicity Argument Analysis  
Having discussed reasons to think the identity theory is false, which at least provide 
motivation for considering alternative views, I will now critique Smart’s simplicity 
argument for the identity theory. In this section a critical analysis of the simplicity 
argument will be given, but two points of clarification are in order. For one, the principle 
of simplicity and the simplicity argument are not the same thing. The argument utilizes 
(or is based on) the principle. The principle of simplicity is merely a premise in the 
simplicity argument; hence it’s not the argument. Moreover, successful and unsuccessful 
arguments can have one or more true premises.  
 This brings me to the second point: The epistemic principle of simplicity is 
indispensable. Not only is it theoretically well justified, its track record demonstrates it’s 
pragmatically helpful. In this section objections to the simplicity argument will be given, 
																																																								
1 See Hacker (2007, p. 252) for a concise list that includes other apparent differences and 
related issues.  
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but these objections are not aimed at the principle of simplicity. The argument can fail to 
be cogent, even though one of its premises – the principle of simplicity – is true and 
indispensable. 
 As for my critical analysis of the argument, I’ll highlight three concerns. First I’ll 
discuss the fact there are additional theoretical virtues to consider. My second concern 
pertains to the scope of data being explained. Lastly I’ll discuss the simplicity argument’s 
misrepresentation of dualism.  
Theoretical Virtues 
 One weakness of the simplicity argument is that it rests upon one, and only one, 
theoretical virtue. Simplicity is significant, but it’s not the only theoretical virtue. To use 
Mario Bunge’s (1961, p. 120) terminology from The Weight of Simplicity in the 
Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories, simplicity “competes” with additional 
“desiderata.” There are additional theoretical virtues to consider, such as explanatory 
power, explanatory scope, fertility, accuracy, internal coherence and consistency with 
widely accepted theories and background knowledge.1  
 If the identity theory is the simplest theory, that’s a significant point in its favor. 
However, by itself simplicity is not conclusive. If simplicity itself were conclusive, then 
we should go with a view like solipsism and conclude that there’s just one mind that 
exists that’s imagining NCC data along with everything else. It’s hard to think of a 
simpler theory. But given that there’s more to consider than simplicity, we need not 
commit ourselves to solipsism simply because it’s simple. Likewise, simplicity itself is 
not enough to establish that dualism is false and the identity theory is true.  
																																																								
1 While most of these theoretical virtues are commonplace, fertility is less known. If a 
theory leads to further research opportunities, it has the theoretical virtue of fertility.  
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 Unless, of course, all else is equal and the identity theory is on par with (or better 
than) dualism on every other score. If that’s the case, then simplicity can act as an 
epistemic “tiebreaker” tipping the balance in favor of the simplest view. In other words, 
the simplicity argument requires another premise affirming the condition mentioned in 
premise one, which reads: All else being equal, the simplest explanation of a data set is 
the best explanation. Thus the needed premise is: (EQUAL) All else is equal, or in favor 
of the identity theory. So we can give a second, more accurate, formal reconstruction. 
(SIMPLICITY) All else being equal, the simplest explanation of a data set  
   is the best explanation.  
 
(EQUAL)  All else is equal, or in favor of the identity theory. 
 
(NCC-DATA)  Neuroscience has discovered NCC. 
 
(ID-SIMPLER) Relative to dualism, the identity theory is the simplest  
   explanation of (NCC-DATA). 
 
∴ (ID-BEST-EX) The identity theory is the best explanation of (NCC-  
   DATA). 
 While a justifiable appeal to simplicity requires (EQUAL), some might think it 
needs no defense and that it’s quite safe to assume. However, (EQUAL) is not obviously 
true, but questionable given the apparent differences between consciousness and neural 
correlates discussed above, which dualist views are often consistent with. And as 
discussed in Chapter 1, I think there are good arguments offered by leading philosophers 
for dualism. Granted, dualism has its problems; hence my aim in this work to show that 
one dualist view is capable of overcoming dualism’s most significant problems. My 
point, however, is merely that (EQUAL) is questionable. It’s also where much of the 
debate actually lies. And those inclined to either dualism or physicalism will often 
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consider this premise in the light of differing metaphysical presuppositions that influence 
the apparent plausibility of (EQUAL).1  
Data Scope 
 Another limitation of the simplicity argument is that it appeals to a quite narrow 
scope of data. The simplicity argument accounts only for the existence of NCC. It does 
not reference any data about the nature of NCC. As leading NCC researcher, Koch 
(2016) pointed out to me in an email:  
Note that the NCC themselves are neutral from the point of view of 
physicalism/materialism or one of the various shades of dualism. Under any 
reading, consciousness will have physical correlates. The question is what are 
those correlates, where are they and what can and will they tell us about how 
consciousness is generated in the first place. They also don’t speak to whether or 
not consciousness can be analyzed using reductionism or other mereological 
assumptions. 
The data revealing that there are NCC is well established and will become more so as the 
contemporary search for neural correlates continues (cf. Shulman, 2013). This is 
interesting data, but the fact that NCC exist doesn’t tell us much about their nature. And 
as Koch points out, the real question is: What are the correlates, i.e. what’s their nature? 
The answer to that question will tell us much more than the fact that the correlates exist.  
 If an argument appeals to empirical data, you want the scope of the data to be to 
be as wide as possible. The simplicity argument makes such an appeal. A key premise is:  
(NCC-DATA)  Neuroscience has discovered NCC.  
The problem is that this premise says nothing about the nature of NCC. Thus another 
weakness of the simplicity argument is that it doesn’t appeal to any empirical data 
beyond the existence of NCC that tells us about the nature of such correlates. And the 
																																																								
1 Cf. Tahko (2012, pp. 40-41). 
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nature, rather than the existence, of NCC are more likely to provide information that has 
implications for the nature of the mental. In other words, the simplicity argument appeals 
to an empirical data set that has a narrow and limited scope.  
 Physicalists are naturally inclined to think a wider data scope that includes the 
nature of NCC will just further support physicalism anyway. After all, they think their 
view accurately describes reality as it pertains to the mind and a wider data scope will 
only tell us more about reality in that area. But for the exact same reason, nonphysicalists 
might reasonably expect a wider data scope to confirm their view. 1  Again one’s 
presuppositions can play a role. Here they influence expectations of what a wider data set 
will support. In any event, it’s to the simplicity argument’s detriment that it appeals to 
such a narrow scope of neuroscience data.  
 In addition to the simplicity argument appealing merely to the existence of NCC, 
there’s another weakness. The simplicity argument only addresses neuroscientific data. 
Yet, we have more data about ourselves than neuroscientific data. We have what 
Roderick Chisholm (1976, pp. 16-18) called “philosophical data.” Such data includes our 
capacity to reason, to think about things, to make choices, our persistence through time 
and bodily changes, our moral awareness, and so on (cf. Chisholm, 1976). If a theory 
provides the simplest explanation of the fact that there are NCC, that’s a point in its 
favor. However, that doesn’t say much about how well it can account for philosophical 
data about human persons. 
																																																								
1 It has been argued that the nature of certain neural correlates relevant to cases of 
neuroplasticity imply irreducible conscious states (see Owen, 2016; Schwartz, 1999a; b; 
Schwartz and Begley, 2002). 
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 In sum, a considerable weakness of the simplicity argument is that it appeals to a 
narrow scope of data. It only appeals to neuroscientific data about NCC when there’s also 
philosophical data about human persons, and the neuroscientific data it appeals to is 
limited to the existence of NCC and says nothing about their nature. To conclude that 
dualism is false and the identity theory is true based on such a narrow data set seems 
hasty, even if the identity theory is simpler.  
Dualism Misrepresented 
 The version of dualism targeted by the proponent of the simplicity argument is 
often a minimal version of dualism, simply the idea that mental states are irreducible and 
nonphysical. And in light of NCC it’s thought that laws relating irreducible nonphysical 
mental states to neural events must be postulated. This sort of dualism seems to be the 
target of Smart’s (1959, pp. 142-143) presentation and Christopher Hill’s (1991, p. 20) 
presentation of the simplicity argument. It’s easy to understand the motivation for 
targeting a minimal version of dualism. The idea is that if you can undermine the minimal 
tenet(s) common to all versions of dualism, then you undermine all versions of dualism.  
 However, there are several problems with this approach. First, the minimal 
version of a position is not always the most defensible version. Sometimes a more robust 
version of a position is more defensible precisely because it’s more complex, or more 
nuanced, or has more resources available to deal with problems and provide explanations. 
Secondly, the minimal version of dualism that’s the target of the simplicity argument 
misrepresents basic elements of the version of dualism I’ll defend in later chapters. On 
the view I’ll put forth, there aren’t countless individual isolated mental states that 
together compose the mind. Rather there’s one simple substance that engages in certain 
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mental activity. Given this, I think it’s simpler than the typical minimal depiction of 
dualism.  
 Thirdly, proponents of the simplicity argument seem to think that dualism is a 
neuroscience theory meant to account for neuroscientific data. But most dualist 
philosophers are not dualists because they think dualism is the best theory for explaining 
NCC or any other neuroscientific data (cf. Moreland, 2011a, p. 33). Typically, the 
rationale for dualism is strictly or principally philosophical and not empirical. For 
example, the nonphysical mind of substance dualism is thought to be what grounds 
human essence (cf. Oderberg, 2005), personal identity (cf. Lowe, 2001), subjective 
experience (cf. Zimmerman, 2011), agency (cf. Plantinga, 2012), cognition (cf. 
Fumerton, 2013), moral awareness (cf. Swinburne, 1986), and/or the ethical value of a 
human person (cf. Moreland and Rae, 2000).  
 Since the nonphysical mind of substance dualism is not presented as a 
neuroscientific theory by dualists or argued for as if it were, it shouldn’t be evaluated 
principally on how good of a neuroscientific theory it is. With that said, however, in 
chapter seven I’ll try to show how neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can account for NCC. 
Yet my aim will be to defeat a potential defeater of dualism, not to give a positive case 
per se for dualism.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The claim that neuroscience nullifies dualism is often thought to be supported by the 
discovery of NCC. Yet as we’ve seen, such correlations don’t entail any particular view 
of the mind. Moving from the fact of NCC to the conclusion that physicalism is true and 
dualism is false isn’t an empirical step. Rather it requires philosophical argumentation, 
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which the simplicity argument aims to provide. However, there are reasons to think the 
conclusion of the simplicity argument – the type identity theory – is false. Furthermore, 
the argument for the conclusion has considerable weaknesses. Thus contrary to popular 
opinion, it’s not clear how NCC invalidate dualism. Moreover, I’ll argue in chapter seven 
that my neo-Thomistic hylomorphic position, which is a version of dualism, provides a 
good explanation of NCC.  
 However, there’s a different issue threatening dualism’s viability – i.e. mental 
causation. In fact, it’s this issue that’s cited by Koch (2012, p. 151) when he aims to 
falsify substance dualism in Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist:  
Two recent defenders of dualism, the philosopher Karl Popper and the 
neurophysiologist and Nobel laureate John Eccles, made an appearance in chapter 
7. Let me repeat a point I made there when discussing their views on Libertarian 
free will. The dualism they advocate, in which the mind forces the brain to do its 
bidding, is unsatisfactory for the reason that the 25-year-old Princess Elisabeth of 
Bohemia had already pointed out to Descartes three centuries earlier – by what 
means does the immaterial soul direct the physical brain to accomplish its aim? 
The problem regarding mental causation that Koch refers to has been developed by 
Jaegwon Kim (2005). Kim (2005, p. 74) alleges that the argumentation of Descartes’s 
earlier critics, including Princess Elisabeth, falls short even though it’s on the right track. 
So he developed the point made by Princess Elisabeth into what’s known as the causal 
pairing problem. This problem is dualism’s most daunting difficulty regarding mental 
causation. 
 Therefore, addressing the causal pairing problem is one of my primary aims in 
this work. However, there are two other problems regarding mental causation that do not 
threaten dualism like the causal pairing problem does. Thus before addressing the causal 




Mental Causation & Two Other Problems  
 
It’s the bell lap of a one-mile footrace. Four hundred meters to go and Sir Roger 
Bannister’s legs become heavy; lactic acid begins to be released in his blood stream as 
his muscles begin to lack oxygen. His body’s physiology screams at him to slow his pace. 
Yet his mental desire to cross the finish line in less than four minutes causes the opposite 
effect: his stride only quickening. That’s mental causation. Another example would be a 
father’s intention to express love to his child being causally relevant to his arms opening 
wide. Mental causation in terms of top-down, mental to bodily causation, is the focus of 
most contemporary discussions about mental causation. The same will be true of this 
work. Nevertheless it’s worth noting that there is bottom-up causation as well where 
mental events are caused by bodily events. For example, a pin pricking one’s skin causes 
an experience of pain.    
 Mental causation, it seems, is a prerequisite for essential human capacities like 
rationality and agency. Nevertheless, accounting for mental causation is difficult for any 
view of the mind. And the various problems are not merely puzzling; they’re 
consequential. Jerry Fodor (1989, p. 156) offers sobering words: “if it isn’t literally true 
that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, and my itching is causally 
responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for saying…if 
none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false 
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and it’s the end of the world.” Given the consequential entailments, if mental causation is 
incoherent on a particular view, that view ought to be rejected.  
 Many charge substance dualism with such incoherence. The “causal problem” is 
thought to demonstrate it. But what is the Causal Problem against dualism? The fact 
that’s often overlooked is that there are multiple problems pertaining to mental causation. 
Different problems arise given different assumptions. As Jaegwon Kim (2000, p. 29) 
pointed out in his Townsend Lectures at the University of California, Berkeley: 
Philosophical problems do not arise in a vacuum. Typically they emerge when we 
come to see a conflict among the assumptions and presumptions that we explicitly 
or tacitly accept, or commitments that command our presumptive respect.  
These words are now found in, “The Many Problems of Mental Causation;” a chapter 
summarizing various causal problems entailed by assorted doctrines. Different problems 
regarding mental causation arise from different tenets endorsed by different views. As we 
will see the causal exclusion problem arises due to what’s called the ‘causal closure 
principle.’ And as will also become clear, the causal pairing problem arises for Cartesian 
dualism since it denies causal closure and posits causal interaction between a nonphysical 
mind and a physical body.  
  While there are multiple problems regarding mental causation, the aim of this 
dissertation is not to deal with every one of them. Rather, I will ultimately focus on one 
of them. My aim is to address substance dualism’s chief problem regarding mental 
causation. That is, it seems to me, the causal pairing problem. It’s the pairing problem 
that charges substance dualism with incoherence vis-à-vis mental causation. The purpose 
of this chapter is to clarify two other problems of interest to contemporary philosophers 
of mind in order to ultimately set them aside in order to prevent confusion. The goal is to 
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parse out other problems that I subsequently won’t be addressing to make matters more 
clear when I do address exclusively the causal pairing problem.  
 However, avoiding real issues is not the goal. Thus justification will be given for 
why the causal exclusion problem and the problem of a lack of psychophysical laws are 
being set aside while the pairing problem will be focused on. In section 4.1, the problem 
of a lack of psychophysical laws will be explained and my rationale for setting it aside 
will be given. In section 4.2, the causal exclusion problem will be presented and I will 
give considerable space to warranting the substance dualist’s denial of the causal closure 
principle. My rationale will be aimed at questioning the physicalist’s justification for 
thinking closure is demonstrably true, yet it will also include reasons to think the 
principle is simply false. A denial of causal closure, if warranted, circumvents any threat 
the exclusion problem poses for substance dualism. It’s my desire that by the end of this 
chapter two things are clear: one, the causal pairing problem is the problem my thesis 
pertains to hence ensuing chapters will focus on it, and two, my subsequent focus 
particularly on the pairing problem is not without warrant. With that said, let us consider 
the first of these other two problems. 
3.1 Lack of Psychophysical Laws 
The problem of the lack of psychophysical laws is connected to Donald Davidson’s view 
of the mental, which is known as anomalous monism. In this section, I will analyze this 
view and the problem it prompts. To start with, anomalous monism and the way in which 
it leads to the problem of a lack of psychophysical laws will be presented. Then the set of 
assumptions that entail the problem will be specified. Lastly, rationale will be given for 




 On Davidson’s view mental events are events describable in mental terms and 
physical events are events describable in physical terms (see Davidson, 2001, p. 215; cf. 
Glüer, 2011, p. 250). According to his anomalous monism, mental event types are distinct 
from physical event types and there are strict causal laws pertaining to physical types, but 
no such laws regarding mental types (see Glüer, 2011, p. 252). Hence Davidson thought 
that every token mental event that causes a particular physical event is identical to a 
token physical event (Glüer, 2011, p. 250). Yet mental types, according to Davidson, are 
irreducible to physical types. So Emma’s mental intention that causes her left arm to rise 
is identical to some instance of a physical event. However, the type of mental event, 
which Emma’s intention is an instance of, is irreducible to any physical type. In other 
words, the mental type ‘intention to raise left arm’ is not reducible to a specific physical 
type, such as ‘brain fiber-ϕ firing.’  
 Why adopt anomalous monism? At the heart of Davidson’s rationale is the idea 
that there are “strict laws” governing physical causation, which make causation possible 
between physical events, but there are no such laws governing mental to physical 
causation (Glüer, 2011, pp. 248-256). That is, there are no psychophysical laws; i.e. laws 
that govern causation between mental events and physical events. This is problematic 
given two assumptions: a. the causal framework of event causation, and b. the 
nomological requirement. Those who hold to event causation “see causation as a relation 
among events” (Plantinga, 1984, p. 267). Causation, on this framework, is an external 
relation requiring distinct events as relata that stand in relation to one another. The 
nomological assumption says: whenever one event causes another event the causal 
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relationship is derived merely from noncausal features of the situation and pertinent 
covering laws (John Foster, 1991, p. 163). Given these assumptions, every case of 
causation has distinct events governed by a covering law(s).  
 Now we can understand the motivation for anomalous monism. Since there are no 
psychophysical laws there cannot be causation between nonphysical mental events and 
physical events. Thus whenever a mental event causes a physical event, that mental event 
must be a physical event. Otherwise it couldn’t cause the physical event. Reducing the 
specific mental event to a physical event allegedly allows one to explain why the mental 
event caused the physical event. Yet the idea is that mental types are still distinct from 
physical types. Supposedly, this view allows one to have mental causation without a full-
blown reduction of the mental to the physical. 
 Given the above assumptions, and Davidson’s belief that there can be no 
psychophysical laws, we can see why he adopted anomalous monism. But why did he 
think there can’t be psychophysical laws? Before we answer this question, let’s be clear 
about what Davidson considers a “strict law” to be. According to Davidson (2001, p. 
215) laws are linguistic. Strict laws, it’s thought, are true statements that are universally 
applicable without qualification (Glüer, 2011, p. 252). Such laws allow us to explain why 
events take place. Given the law of gravity, for example, we can say why the coin fell to 
the floor when Jon released it. Whenever anyone releases a coin, while on earth, the coin 
will fall toward the ground. The thought is that physical laws apply universally without 
exception. So we can explain physical events by appeal to such laws.  
 Not so for mental events (Davidson, 2001b, p. 216). Davidson (2001b, p. 216) 
thought mental concepts are “irreducibly causal” and thus cannot be specified in a way 
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that universally applies (Glüer, 2011, p. 254). This flows out of Davidson’s position 
known as the ‘holism of the mental.’ According to which, what leads someone to act in a 
specific way has to do with their whole psychology at that time, not particular mental 
events. So psychological causes of actions are not specific mental states or specific 
reasons. Yet Davidson also thought psychological explanations, which are needed for 
“strict laws,” are aimed at specifying the specific reasons that cause someone to act.   
 Therefore, a problem arises: the specific reasons that cause one to perform a given 
action need to be specified for there to be strict laws, but such cannot be universally 
specified (Davidson, 2001b, p. 216; Glüer, 2011, p. 255). For one, we can never identify 
particular reasons that cause one to act because it is one’s entire psychology at a time that 
causes their action, not specific mental states. In addition, the same reasons will not 
always cause the same result. Basically, strict laws depend on psychological explanations 
that require the identification of specific reasons that universally cause specific actions, 
but such identification is not possible given the holism of the mental.  
 To make matters more clear, let’s consider an example. On April 19th 1861, one 
week after Confederate forces fired at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, Abraham 
Lincoln ordered a blockade of southern seaports.1 In essence, Lincoln’s order began the 
United States Civil War. What reasons spinning around in Lincoln’s mind caused his act? 
Consider these hypothetical reasons: a. the blockade will severally damage the economy 
of the rebelling states; b. the blockade will prevent Confederate forces from securing 
needed military supplies; c. instigating war with the South will lead to freedom for 
southern slaves; d. being President during a civil war will secure my place in history; e. 
																																																								
1  The historical details throughout this entire example were gathered from ‘The 
Declarations of War: North and South’ (2015).   
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not responding to the shots fired on Fort Sumter will send the message that the North is 
ill prepared for war.  
 Given the holism of the mental, it’s impossible to specifying which reason (or set 
of reasons) caused Lincoln to act as he did. For Lincoln’s action was determined by 
Lincoln’s entire mental psychology at the time in question, not by any one particular 
reason or set a of reasons. Therefore, we cannot specify which reason(s) caused Lincoln 
to act as he did. And even if we could, there’s an additional problem. The reasons that 
caused Lincoln’s action would not cause the same effect without exception.  
 Suppose Lincoln’s action was caused by reasons a and c. In such a case, for there 
to be a psychological law, we need to be able to say that a and c will always cause the 
same choice by someone in Lincoln’s position. Yet, if Lincoln had one additional 
belief—for example: f. a blockade of southern ports will also damage the economy of 
potential allies—this may have altered his decision entirely. Additionally, suppose the 
First Lady, Mary Lincoln, was President and Abe was the first, First Gentleman. We 
cannot say that she would have done the same, and we especially cannot say whether 
reasons a and c would have caused her to do so. Psychological explanations are not like 
physical explanations. We cannot specify which reasons will universally, and without 
exception, lead to certain actions. Therefore, according to Davidson’s line of reasoning, 
there are no strict psychological laws (Davidson, 2001b, p. 216; Glüer, 2011, p. 255-256). 
For such laws would require us to be able to say which reasons will cause specific actions 
universally without exception. We cannot do so. Thus, according Davidson’s line of 




 That is the problem of a lack of psychophysical laws and the rationale for it. 
Given that there are no psychophysical laws, the alleged problem for dualism is that there 
are no laws to relate nonphysical mental causes to physical effects. And such laws are 
supposedly necessary for one event to cause another event. Therefore, the thought is, 
there can’t be causation between nonphysical mental events and physical events.  
 To be clear, my thesis is not focused on responding to this problem. Rather this 
problem has been summarized and clarified for the sake of preventing confusion in later 
chapters. In fact, this problem—the lack of psychophysical laws—will be subsequently 
set aside and following chapters will not focus on it. Nevertheless, before we set the 
problem aside, let’s consider warrant for doing so. 
3.1.1 Justification For Setting This Problem Aside 
I will not be focusing on the problem of a lack of psychophysical laws in the following 
chapters because my aim is to deal with the chief objection to substance dualism based on 
causal grounds. And this problem doesn’t present such an objection. After all, 
philosophical problems arise given certain assumptions. We considered tenets Davidson 
held that lead him to conclude: there are no psychophysical laws. However, dualists are 
not necessarily committed to the same assumptions that produce the problem. Dualism 
doesn’t commit one to the following assumptions held by Davidson:  
 a. Framework of event causation: causation is a relation between events. 
 b. Causation is an external relation between causal relata (i.e. events). 
 c. Causation requires strict universal laws to explain cause and effect. 
 d. Laws are linguistic and depend on our identification of universal regularities. 
 e. Reasons one has for a particular belief or action cause one’s belief or action.   
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Minus any one of these assumptions, the problem doesn’t arise. Furthermore, dualists 
don’t need to accept any of these assumptions.  
 Many dualists are disinclined to accept the framework of event causation and 
rather endorse agent causation (see Lowe, 2013; Plantinga, 1984). On the framework of 
agent causation, agents have causal power and effects don’t necessarily depend on 
previous events. And one who accepts agent causation can endorse the notion of pure 
powers, which don’t rely on other causal powers to make them powerful (see 
Marmodoro, 2010). Given pure powers, one wouldn’t need to think causation is 
necessarily an external relation between cause and effect. Consequently, the need for 
universal laws connecting cause and effect would be moot. Dualists are not tied down to 
the idea that there must be strict universal laws to account for mental causation (see John 
Foster, 1991). We could go on listing points of disagreement dualists have with 
Davidson’s assumptions. But I will mention just one more: dualism doesn’t say one’s 
reasons for acting cause their action. So it wouldn’t matter if there were no laws causally 
relating particular reasons to particular actions, because on dualism one’s reasons do not 
cause their actions anyway. In short, Davidson’s problem arises due to the assumptions 
he holds and very few, if any, of his assumptions are necessitated by dualism. Therefore, 
the problem of a lack of psychophysical laws doesn’t necessarily arise for the dualist. 
  However, even if dualism’s tenets did give rise to the problem, it’s not clear how 
it would threaten dualism. According to Davidson’s line of thought, strict laws are 
essentially statements with universal applicability. Thus laws depend on our ability to 
ascertain why, how, and when certain events cause other events. And laws are basically 
our linguistic statements that fittingly apply. If that’s what laws are, the lack of them is 
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inconsequential. It could be that whatever makes possible causation between a mental 
state and a bodily state is unascertainable. Yet, nothing follows that compromises mental 
causation on dualism. We may never know why, or how, pin pricks cause pain events. 
Likewise, we may never know why, or how, my intention to raise my arm results in my 
arm raising. Nevertheless, not knowing the answers to the “why question” or the “how 
question” wouldn’t threaten the fact that there seems to be something that makes possible 
the consistency of pin pricks causing pain events, and intentions causing bodily 
movements. Facts about the world can be entirely unknown to us or inexpressible for us. 
Our inability to specify why, how, or when certain mental states will lead to physical 
states doesn’t do anything to undermine the fact that they do. Thus a lack of 
psychophysical laws, in Davidson’s sense of ‘law,’ seems harmless to dualism.   
 To summarize, in this section we have laid out the problem of a lack of 
psychophysical laws and the rationale behind it. Furthermore, two important points have 
been made in an effort to warrant setting this problem aside. The first point is: the 
problem of a lack of psychophysical laws rests on a number of assumptions dualists are 
disinclined to accept. Admittedly, for the one who finds Davidson’s assumptions 
compelling, giving up any of them will entail a cost. And surely some will be more costly 
to give up than others. Nevertheless, the multiple ways of avoiding the problem merely 
require a denial of one of the assumptions that the problem depends on. And substance 
dualists can deny any of Davidson’s assumptions and be perfectly consistent with 
dualism. The second point is: the problem of a lack of psychophysical laws, in 
Davidson’s sense of ‘law,’ doesn’t seem to offer a consequential threat to dualism. In 
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light of these points, I will set this problem aside in an effort to move on and deal with 
dualism’s chief causal problem—the causal pairing problem.  
 However, before doing so there is another problem to be clarified, and yes, 
subsequently set aside. Yet the justification for doing so will demand more extensive 
considerations. Let’s now turn our attention to one of the most notorious problems 
threatening mental causation.  
3.2 Causal Exclusion Problem 
The causal exclusion problem boils down to the mental being excluded from playing a 
genuine causal role. Given that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, 
mental causes are excluded from causing physical events. Loosely speaking: all causal 
jobs are filled by physical causes, so mental causes are out of work. Technically 
speaking: if physical event p is sufficiently caused by mental event M, the causal closure 
of the physical domain will be violated; yet if p has a sufficient physical cause, say P*, 
then P* would preempt M as the cause of p. In effect, P* excludes M as the cause of p.1 
In this section, the causal exclusion problem and what gives rise to it will be explicated. 
Additionally, I’ll consider two routes that can be taken to avoid the problem, one of 
which I’ll endorse. The endorsed route hinges on a controversial denial of what’s known 
as the causal closure principle. Hence considerable space will be devoted to rationale for 
such a denial. 
 Consider an example. Timothy’s mother is teaching him to give charitably. 
Before church, where they’re invited to give charitably, Timothy’s mother hooks him up 
to an electrical system that shocks him. The electrical shock causes his hand to open and 
																																																								
1 My summary is informed by Jaegwon Kim (2000, p. 37). 
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release money held in it. When the offering plate passes by Timothy, his mother hits a 
button that sends electrical currents through his body causing his hand to open, and out 
falls the money into the plate. Given the way things are set up, the money falls into the 
plate due entirely to the physical causes.  
 Timothy’s mother needs parenting classes. But she may also benefit from a 
critical thinking class. After all, she is trying to teach young Timothy to be charitable. Yet 
the causal system she set up leaves no room for genuine charity to play a causal role. The 
physical causes—the electrical current and the automatic neural and muscular reactions—
sufficiently explain why the money falls into the offering plate. There’s no room for a 
charitable attitude, desire, or intention of Timothy’s to play a meaningful causal role in 
bringing about the effect of the money falling into the plate. For even if Timothy desires 
to give to the church that feeds the poor, his desire isn’t necessary to cause his hand to 
open and drop the money into the plate. The money will fall into the plate wholly apart 
from Timothy’s charitable desire. Whether his desire is present or not, the physical 
causes bring about the effect. Here’s the problem: Timothy’s mental states are excluded 
from having a causal impact.   
 Given four principles, the same problem arises for mental causation in general. 
Scott Sturgeon (1998, pp. 413-414) defines these principles as follows.  
(COP) Completeness-of-Physics: Every physical effect has a fully revealing, 
purely physical history. 
 
(IMP) Impact-of-the-mental: Mental events have physical effects. 
 
(NOD) No-Overdetermination: The physical effects of mental events are not 
generally overdetermined. 
 
(DUAL) Dualism: Mental events are not physical events. 
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(COP) is also known as the causal closure of the physical domain. According to it, every 
physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. It’s often thought that this principle is 
supported by the physical sciences. (IMP) essentially says the mental aspect of human 
persons cause physical effects. It’s commonsensical that my mental belief ‘a rock is about 
to fall on me’ plays a causal role in bringing about physical effects such as my legs 
moving in a walking (or running) motion, and my body changing spatial locations. 
According to (NOD), physical effects that are mentally caused are not caused by more 
than one sufficient cause. In most cases, one sufficient cause does the job. (DUAL) is the 
idea that mental events are not identical to physical events. This principle is consistent 
with nonreductive physicalism that says the mental can’t be reduced to the physical, 
property dualism that says mental properties are sui generis properties, and substance 
dualism which claims human persons have or are nonphysical minds.     
 Any set of three of these principles is consistent. Yet the set of four is inconsistent 
(see Sturgeon, 1998, p. 414). Here’s why. If it were true that every physical effect had a 
fully revealing purely physical causal history, then no mental cause could play a causal 
role in bringing about any physical effect as long as mental events are distinct from 
physical events. One might think physical events could just have multiple sufficient 
causes. Like a ship that sinks due to multiple holes that could sink the ship on their own. 
But if this were so, there would be overdetermination, and (NOD) would be false. It 
seems the set of all four principles is simply inconsistent.  
  Yet there are four simple ways to avoid this inconsistency. Since any set of three 
of the principles is consistent, a denial of any one of the four allows one to dodge the 
incoherence. The epiphenomenalist is content with the idea that the mental is causally 
	
	 66 
inefficacious. Thus she denies (IMP). The physicalist has no qualms with a purely 
physical world with merely physical people. So she denies (DUAL). Dualists may have 
options. It seems at first glance, they can avoid the inconsistency by choosing one of two 
routes.  
Route OD: posit that physical effects are often overdetermined by sufficient 
mental causes and sufficient physical causes; thus denying (NOD).  
 
Route CO: admit causal openness between the mental and the physical that allows 
nonphysical causes to have physical effects; thus denying (COP).   
There are different motivations for taking either route. Let’s consider each route in turn.  
Route OD: Positing Overdetermination 
 Route OD seems to be preferable for nonreductive physicalists who think the 
mental can’t be reduced to the physical, and thus endorse (DUAL). For the alternative 
route, Route CO, explicitly requires a denial of causal closure, which many physicalists 
believe is essential to a physicalist worldview (see Kim, 1993, pp. 209-210). So Route 
OD is attractive to physicalists in so far as it doesn’t ask one to deny anything essential to 
orthodox physicalism. However, whether or not positing overdetermination, and thus 
taking Route OD, is an available option for the nonreductive physicalist will depend on 
how she views the closure principle. According to Jaegwon Kim (2000, p. 40), “One way 
of stating the principle of physical causal closure is this: If you pick any physical event 
and trace out it’s causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical 
domain. That is, no causal chain will ever cross the boundary between the physical and 
the nonphysical.” This articulation of closure precludes overdetermination. For if no 
causal chain ever crosses the boundary between the two domains, then physical effects 
simply could not have nonphysical causes that overdetermine them.  
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 Consequently, if the nonreductive physicalist views closure as Kim does, she 
seems to be in a bind. Neither Route CO nor Route OD can be taken without sacrificing 
closure, and so she seems stuck with denying either (DUAL) or (IMP). Given this, Kim 
(2000, p. 30) appropriately acknowledges the weight of this problem for physicalists.   
This, I claim, is our principal problem of mental causation. In referring to this as 
“our” problem of mental causation, what I mean to suggest is that it is a problem 
that arises for anyone with the kind of broadly physicalist outlook that many 
philosophers, including myself, find compelling or, at least, plausible and 
attractive…the exclusion problem is distinctive in that it strikes at the very heart 
of physicalism…  
Kim thinks physicalists can take one of two ways out: reductionism or epiphenomenalism 
(see 2005, pp. 70-71). Other physicalists disagree with Kim and believe that there are 
versions of causal closure that are consistent with overdetermination. 
 Since my aim is not to defend any broadly physicalist view, but rather substance 
dualism, I will leave that debate for physicalist to hash out. Regarding substance dualism, 
I’m inclined to think that overdetermination will lead to problems when it comes to 
certain types of actions performed by agents where mental causes are inherently 
necessary causes, not just overdetermining sufficient causes. Therefore, it seems to me, 
Route CO is worth serious consideration.   
Route CO: Denying Causal Closure 
 Route CO requires a denial of causal closure. That is, a denial of a tenet that’s in 
no way entailed by substance dualism. It’s worth noting that the causal pairing problem 
(which will be presented in Chapter 5) would never arise for dualists if they didn’t deny 
causal closure. In other words, if dualists did not mix “physical and nonphysical events in 
a single causal chain” (Kim, 2000, p. 37) there would be no need to pair nonphysical 
causes with physical effects; yet this need provides the basis for the pairing problem. 
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 Given that causal closure is in no way essential to substance dualism, it’s no 
surprise that most dualists explicitly, or tacitly, deny the principle. Examples include 
Richard Swinburne (2013), Alvin Plantinga (2008), Robert Garcia (2014), Alexander 
Pruss (2013b), Stewart Goetz (2011), Karl Popper and John Eccles (1983), George F.R. 
Ellis (2012, p. 6),  Wilder Penfield (1975, pp. 75-76), and John Foster (1991). E.J. Lowe 
has presented a dualist account of mental causation that is allegedly consistent with 
causal closure (see, 2006, p. 18); nevertheless, even he believed the principle is false (see 
2003, p. 145). And after arguing that it is false, Lowe (2013, p. 169) pointed out that it 
need not concern him that his dualistic account of human agency is inconsistent with it. 
After all, closure is not necessitated by dualism.  
 Since the substance dualist can deny the causal closure of the physical domain 
without giving up anything essential to her view, Route CO is appealing. Yet we must 
consider whether or not dualists have sufficient warrant for denying closure. In the 
following section, we’ll consider the dualist’s rationale for denying the causal closure 
principle.  
3.2.1 Rationally Denying Closure 
Before moving forward let’s take stock of where we are. So far, we’ve considered the 
alleged problem of a lack of psychophysical laws. For a couple of reasons we set it aside. 
We then moved on and presented the causal exclusion problem. Two routes that one 
could take in order to avoid the problem while maintaining that mental events are not 
physical events presented themselves. Route OD requires positing overdetermination. 
Route CO requires a denial of the causal closure of the physical domain. While this 
principle may be essential to physicalism, it’s no part of substance dualism. So dualist 
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can take Route CO without sacrificing anything essential to their view. Now we’ll turn to 
consider whether or not the dualist can rationally deny closure. I will argue that the 
dualist is warranted in denying the causal closure principle. 
 Consider the following words of physicalist Jaegwon Kim (2003, p. 65): “We 
commonly think we, as persons, have both a mental and a bodily dimension—or, if you 
prefer, mental aspects and material aspects. Something like this dualism of personhood, I 
believe, is common lore shared across most cultures and religious traditions…” Kim goes 
on to argue that this common dualistic conception of ourselves is false. Nevertheless, his 
claim that a dualistic conception of human ontology is commonly held seems correct (cf. 
Moreland, 2011b). Since such is necessary for the possibility of disembodied existence 
after the death of our bodies or reincarnation. If we are identical with our bodies, both are 
obviously impossible. Yet, countless people hold such beliefs. So it’s fitting that 
countless people believe we have a nonphysical mental aspect, i.e. a soul. Moreover, it 
seems to us that the nonphysical mental aspect brings about physical bodily effects. This 
is why epiphenomenalism “strikes most of us as obviously wrong, if not incoherent; the 
idea that our thoughts, wants, and intentions might lack causal efficacy of any kind is 
deeply troubling, going against everything we believe about ourselves as agents and 
cognizers” (Kim, 2005, p. 70). In short, it seems to most people that they have a 
nonphysical mental aspect and that the mental has causal power.  
  As Roderick Chisholm (1976, p. 16) once pointed out: that which we’re justified 
in assuming when not philosophizing, we’re also justified in assuming when doing 
philosophy. Of course, such assumptions are not infallible. They can be proven false. The 
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commonly held dualistic conception of human persons is a fair place to start, but it can be 
falsified by sound argumentation. The causal exclusion argument allegedly does just that.   
 At this point, for the sake of clarity, let’s formalize the causal exclusion argument 
against (DUAL) and for reductive physicalism in the following way.1  
 (IMP) Mental events have physical effects. 
 (NOD) Physical effects of mental events are not generally overdetermined. 
 (COP) Every physical effect has a fully revealing, purely physical history. 
 ∴ ¬(DUAL) Mental events must be identical to physical events.  
The physicalist relies on (COP) to secure the conclusion that (DUAL) is false and 
reductive physicalism is true.  
 Clearly, if physicalism is true, (COP) makes sense. Thus the argument is forceful 
for those who accept a physicalist view. But according to the commonly held substance 
dualist view, (COP) seems false. For it seems that our nonphysical mental aspect causes 
physical effects all the time. The rock climber’s trust that her rope will hold her and her 
intention to rappel down the cliff causes her grip of the ledge to release. The expectation 
that a specific person far away will receive a signal from their phone when a particular 
number is dialed leads to one’s fingers pushing specific buttons. The skydiver’s desire for 
a thrill and confidence that her parachute will open causes her to physically jump out of a 
plane. The judge believes the terrorist bomber consciously intended to cause an explosion 
in order to kill innocent citizens, so he sentences the terrorist to life in prison while totally 
ignoring the flames causal role in igniting the dynamite. As if a mental intention was 
needed to cause a specific physical effect.  
																																																								
1 This formalization was guided by Robert Garcia’s (2014, p. 97) presentation of the 
argument. David Papineau (2013) has articulated the argument in a very similar way. 
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 In short, it prima facie seems plausible that we have a nonphysical mind that often 
causes physical effects. Thus causal closure seems false. Moreover, most philosophers 
that hold to substance dualism think there are further reasons that suggest we have a 
nonphysical mental aspect with causal power to produce bodily effects (see Plantinga, 
1984; 2012; Swinburne, 2013). Rationale for this view would serve as justification for the 
falsity of the closure principle. What’s important to note is that the substance dualist 
comes to the exclusion problem with a very different outlook than the physicalist. Given 
the physicalist’s worldview, closure may seem obviously true. But given the substance 
dualist’s worldview, which is not without warrant (see Chapter 1), closure seems 
obviously false. For on dualism, the world is chalk full of nonphysical minds that bring 
about physical effects all the time. 
 We must ask: what obliges the substance dualist to accept causal closure? The 
dualist is obliged to accept it if, and only if, the physicalist can demonstrate that closure 
is true. To do so, the physicalist must give compelling reasons that don’t presuppose 
physicalism. Let’s consider how the physicalist might show that the causal closure 
principle is demonstrably true.  
3.2.2 Analyzing the Justification For Closure  
In this section we will critically analyze justification physicalist commonly give for the 
causal closure principle. Throughout this section, I aim to give four primary points of 
rebuttal to the physicalist’s rationale for closure. The first point will be that it’s not easy 
to say what the principle actually claims, and therefore, it’s difficult to say whether or not 
it’s justified by support offered in its favor. The second point is that empirical 
observation falls short of demonstrating that closure is true. The third point is that the 
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success of science doesn’t necessitate the truth of the causal closure principle. The fourth 
and final point will be that there are positive reasons to think closure is false. Each point 
will be considered in turn. 
Ambiguity of the Causal Closure Principle 
 A prerequisite for justifying a claim is specifying the claim to be justified. If you 
don’t know what the claim is then you can’t know whether rationale given for it actually 
supports it or not. Thus, the first step in justifying the causal closure principle is 
clarifying what exactly it says. That is no easy task. As we shall see, various formulations 
of the principle and the variety of ways a key term in the principle can be understood 
make satisfying this prerequisite quite difficult.  
 After surveying five different versions of the principle, E.J. Lowe (2000, p. 574) 
aptly remarked: “One might have hoped for more exactitude and agreement amongst 
physicalists when it comes to the formulation of a principle so central to their position.” 
Unfortunately, there isn’t one clear principle everyone has in mind in the conversation 
about causal closure. We have already noticed above that Sturgeon’s definition of closure 
differs from Kim’s, and that the former is consistent with overdetermination whereas the 
latter isn’t. Here’s a small sampling of further versions of the principle.  
Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. Papineau (1998, p. 375) has 
presented this version. In contrast to Kim’s articulation above (see p. 6), this 
version is compatible with overdetermination (Garcia, 2014, p. 99). 
  
The chances of physical effects are always fixed by sufficient physical causes. In 
an endnote following the above version, Papineau (1998, p. 386) assumes his 
reader asks about quantum indeterminacy and he indicates that closure can be put 
this way. More so than the above version, this version suggests determinism. 
 
At every time at which a physical event has a cause it has a sufficient physical 





Every physical effect has its chance fully determined by physical events alone. 
Martin Noordhof (1999, p. 367) prefers this version, which doesn’t permit 
overdetermination and suggests determinism.  
 The various versions of the principle confuse matters. Yet perhaps we could just 
pick one version that’s agreed on by most physicalist in order to satisfy the prerequisite 
of specifying the principle to be justified. Kim (2009, p. 38) thinks most ontological 
physicalist will accept the following. 
(COP*) If a physical event has a cause at t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. 
This principle seems simple and straightforward enough. Until we ask: what is meant by 
‘physical’?1 The answer is anything but straightforward. For consider the following 
puzzle.  
 Suppose that at a particular time t0, you have two physical items. The first is a log 
with a circumference of one meter and height of one meter. The second is a flat square 
board with a length of one meter and a width of one meter. While it’s clear that you have 
two physical objects at t0, suppose that at a later time t1 you place the log under the center 
of the board. So at t1 the board rests on the log and forms a table (T). Do you now have 
three physical items—the log, the board, and a table? Or do you just have one physical 
item, the table? Or do you still just have the two original physical items, the log and the 
board? Various philosophers, even various physicalists, will give various answers. The 
same would be true if our example pertained to fundamental physical particles, rather 
than a log and a board. Such puzzles may seem irrelevant, yet there are genuine 
implications for the causal closure principle. 
																																																								




 Scott Sturgeon (1998) has pointed out that the term ‘physical’ in the causal 
closure principle can mean microphysical or macrophysical. If microphysical is meant, 
then the claim is that every microphysical event has a sufficient microphysical cause. 
And what would count as ‘physical’ would be fundamental physical particles (whatever 
they happen to be). If macrophysical is meant, the claim is that macrophysical events 
have sufficient macrophysical causes. And entities composed out of more basic 
fundamental physical particles could be concrete particulars that could causally produce 
effects. Simply put, if ‘physical’ means microphysical then our table (T) from our above 
puzzle doesn’t count as a physical entity that exists, but if ‘physical’ means 
macrophysical then it does.   
 Thus if what counts as physical, according to (COP*), is microphysical 
fundamental physical particles, this appears to be inconsistent with the existence of 
macrophysical things such as planets, jet airplanes, animal bodies, biological organs, 
plants, automobiles, tornadoes, weather patterns, and so forth. These seem to be physical 
things, although they are not microphysical things. Thus if the only things that count as 
physical entities are microphysical entities, according to the principle, then the principle 
seems to be at odds with the apparent existence of non-microphysical, macrophysical 
entities.  
 Furthermore, it is not just that macrophysical things seem to exist, but they also 
seem to causally produce physical effects that the principle doesn’t address, if ‘physical’ 
only means microphysical. Consider automobiles that collide into one another causing 
shattered glass and dented doors, jet engines that propel an airplane from one location to 
the next, a hearts that pumps blood, a river that causes erosion, the movement of a 
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runner’s legs propelling her forward, and the like. It seems that these are physical entities, 
but not microphysical entities, which cause physical effects in the world. Thus if 
‘physical’ in (COP*) only means microphysical, then the principle doesn’t appear to 
address macrophysical causes of physical effects, which appear to exist. Moreover, it’s 
also reasonable to think there are macrophysical causes of microphysical effects, which 
would be inconsistent with (COP*) if ‘physical’ means microphysical. While there are 
many examples one might give, I’ll give just two brief examples here of apparent 
macrophysical causes of microphysical effects that present prima facie difficulties.  
 First, consider a fundamental physical particle, P, which is sitting on the surface 
of my floor (let’s call its location L1) at time t1. Suppose that I move a vacuum cleaner 
hose over L1 and the vacuum inside the hose lifts P upward into the hose causing it to 
change locations to L2 inside the hose, where it is located at time t2. It seems that the 
cause of P moving from L1 to L2 is the vacuum inside the vacuum hose. And it is difficult 
to reduce a vacuum to a fundamental physical entity because a vacuum requires a whole 
system of physical parts to be co-operative. The vacuum might be reducible to a 
structured collection of fundamental physical entities functioning in tandem. But such a 
collection does not seem to be a fundamental microphysical entity, and therefore if it is 
the cause of P moving from L1 to L2 it seems to provide a counterexample to (COP*) if 
‘physical’ means microphysical. 
 Second, the natural function of a human brain requires countless individual 
oxygen molecules consisting of two oxygen atoms (i.e. O2). For simplicity’s sake, let’s 
assume an atom is a fundamental physical entity, and thus microphysical. Through a 
physiological process – the repetition of systolic contractions – a human heart pumps 
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blood that carries erythrocytes including hemoglobin with oxygen molecules consisting 
of oxygen atoms (see Martini et al., 2006, p. 68). We can imagine an individual oxygen 
atom, which is a constituent of an oxygen molecule, that is in a heart chamber at one time 
and then subsequently moves to the brain because the heart pumps the blood carrying the 
oxygen molecule including the individual atom to the brain. And without the heart (or an 
artificial heart) pumping the blood, the movement of such atoms to the brain would cease 
and the natural function of the brain would cease. The causal explanation of the 
movement of the individual oxygen atom seems to include a macrophysical cause – the 
heart’s contractions. Thus it appears to be an example of a macrophysical cause of a 
microphysical effect, which (COP*) understood in terms of ‘microphysical’ wouldn’t 
permit. 
 One might respond and say that the heart pumping blood is nothing more than the 
combination of more fundamental physical things such as heart chambers, composed of 
heart tissue, composed of cells, and so on down to the most fundamental physical 
particles that are structured in a particular way. This is a reasonable response, but even if 
this is true it is still the structured combination of these things that performs the 
physiological process that causes blood to be pumped and the oxygen atom considered to 
be transported. And such a structured combination is not clearly a microphysical entity. 
 To recap, if ‘physical’ means microphysical then (COP*) has several prima facie 
difficulties. In addition to microphysical entities, our world appears to include 
macrophysical entities, and there appear to be macrophysical causes of macrophysical 
effects as well as macrophysical causes of microphysical effects. Collectively, these 
issues suggest that it may not be wise to articulate (COP*) in terms of microphysical.  
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 Therefore, the physicalist may want to define ‘physical’ in terms of 
macrophysical. Then (COP*) would say all macrophysical events have sufficient 
macrophysical causes. However, as Sturgeon (1998, p. 416) points out, if ‘physical’ 
means macrophysical then the closure principle isn’t supported by commonsense nor any 
scientific theory. Rather, “everyday experience indicates that mental events have 
macrophysical effects. So does macro science” (1998, p. 416). Regarding the first point, 
that experience suggests the mental produces physical effects, we must remember two 
things. One, (DUAL) is plausible at the outset. In Sturgeon’s (1998, p. 214) words: 
“Mental and physical events are distinct. This is how reality strikes us pre-theoretically.” 
The exclusion argument aims to prove (DUAL) is false nevertheless. Yet at the outset, we 
can’t just presuppose (DUAL) is false, and given (IMP) the impact of the mental on the 
physical, it seems plausible that irreducible mental events cause physical events. In other 
words, from everyday experience it seems plausible that closure is false. Moreover, as 
Sturgeon (1998, p. 416) points out: “No working scientific theory says broadly physical 
[i.e. macrophysical] effects have fully revealing broadly physical histories.” In other 
words, science doesn’t say macrophysical events like handshakes have merely physical 
causes. So if ‘physical’ means macrophysical, closure isn’t supported by everyday 
experience nor is it scientifically supported.  
 At the end of the day, justification that the causal closure principle is 
demonstrably true requires clarity regarding what the principle actually claims. Such 
clarity is not only lacking, it’s also difficult to secure. For one, there are various versions 
of the principle with different entailments. Perhaps more importantly, however, the 
clarity of the principle depends on the clarity of the meaning of ‘physical.’ This term is 
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absolutely critical to the principle. Yet it’s not easy for physicalists to clarify what they 
mean by ‘physical.’ And roadblocks crop up whether they mean microphysical or 
macrophysical by the term ‘physical.’ We have only considered challenges regarding 
‘physical.’ However, another key term—cause—would no less require clarity and would 
potentially present no fewer difficulties. The physicalist owes us at least a basic 
clarification of what is meant by the key terms in the principle. For without such clarity, 
the physicalist could equivocate on the meaning of terms unknowingly. If the exclusion 
argument is to be logically valid, it can’t equivocate on the meaning of ‘physical’ from 
one premise to another.1 In sum, to show that the causal closure principle is demonstrably 
true physicalists must clarify what the principle claims, and that’s a very tall order.  
Inadequacy of Empirical Investigation 
 Clarifying the meaning of the causal closure principle is difficult to do. 
Nevertheless, let’s assume for the sake of argument that such a prerequisite can be met. 
We shall now consider the merit of justifying causal closure on the basis of empirical 
investigation, which is a common way physicalists try to warrant the principle. In this 
subsection I argue that such justification fails to demonstrate that the causal closure 
principle is true.  
 Let’s consider the physicalist’s line of argument that I have in mind. Kim (2011, 
p. 214) provides us with a place to start:  
Pick any physical event—say, the decay of a uranium atom or the collision of two 
stars in distant space—and trace its causal ancestry or posterity as far as you 
would like; the principle of physical causal closure says that this will never take 
you outside the physical domain. Thus, no causal chain involving a physical event 
																																																								
1 Indeed, Sturgeon (1998, p. 415) has shown that the “the plausibility of (COP) and (IMP) 
trade on distinct readings of ‘physical.’” 
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ever crosses the boundary of the physical into the nonphysical: If x is a physical 
event and y is a cause or effect of x, then y too must be a physical event.  
Kim is not here arguing for the principle. Nevertheless his words echo common 
argumentation for closure, which can be put as follows. 
1. If causal closure is true, empirical investigation will lead us only to physical 
causes of physical effects.  
 
 2. Our empirical investigations lead us only to physical causes of physical effects.  
 
 3. Therefore, causal closure is true. 
 Let’s call this the Empirical Investigation Argument for closure, or the E.I. 
Argument for short. Initially, we might think it’s an argument in the form of modus 
ponens, which says:  
 A→B 
  A 
 ∴ B 




 ∴ A 
Notice (A) does not logically follow from (A→B) and (B). However, that’s not 
problematic. In this case, it just means that the argument is not meant to be deductive.  
 It’s either an inductive or abductive argument, which is what we would expect 
given that it’s based on empirical observation. The conclusion of a good inductive 
argument is probable if the premises are true. The conclusion of a good abductive 
argument is a hypothesis that provides the best explanation of true premises.1 Given that 
																																																								
1 My articulation of inductive and abductive arguments is informed by Tim Pickavance’s 
(Logic and Reasoning, p. 6) description. 
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the two argument types are similar and space is limited, let’s simply ask: is the above a 
good inductive argument for closure?  
  It doesn’t seem to be. For there are two good reasons to think the premises, if true, 
do not suggest that closure is probable. The first reason is that the majority of scientists 
consider it their job to find physical causes of physical phenomena. They try to do so via 
empirical observation. Most scientists do not see it as their job to identity nonphysical 
causes. The idea is that the job of the scientist, qua scientist, is to find physical causes of 
effects, thus her theories and hypothesis are to be aimed toward that end. The empirical 
observations of physical scientists are not aimed at identifying nonphysical causes. So it 
seems inconsequential if empirical investigations of scientists do not identify nonphysical 
causes. For they are not looking for them! Only if one presupposes physicalism and thus 
that the physical sciences give an exhaustive account of the world, does it make sense to 
conclude that there are no nonphysical causes because physical scientists haven’t 
identified them through empirical investigation.  
 Even if scientists were looking for nonphysical causes there is a second reason to 
think the premises do not make the conclusion probable. That is: nonphysical causes, if 
they exist, are most likely invisible and not observable by empirical investigation. A line 
of reasoning mirroring E.J. Lowe’s (2003) in Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility 
of Mental Causation, applies here.  
 Suppose there is a physical event E that necessitates two co-causes that are always 
actualized together. Suppose further that one of the necessary co-causes is physical and 
observable while the other is nonphysical and invisible to empirical investigation. Let us 
use ‘O’ to designate the observable cause and ‘i’ to designate the invisible cause. To 
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summarize: O and i inevitably cause E. Thus, when you have O & i, you get E. Let us 
represent this idea as: (O&i→E).  
 The tricky part is that i will not be recognized by the empirical investigator, but O 
will be. Thus, to the observer, whenever (O&i→E) is true it will appear as though (O→E) 
is true. Consequently, it appears that O is a necessary and sufficient cause of E, but in 
reality it is merely necessary. Moreover, the invisible cause i is also necessary and 
present, despite appearances. One might think we could deduce that a co-cause is 
necessary if there were some cases where the cause O was present along with E; and 
other cases where O was present and E was absent. Yet, since the two co-causes are 
always actualized together, such a scenario would never take place.  
 The basic worry is that if there were an invisible nonphysical co-cause of E that 
was necessary, it could not be known on the basis of empirical investigation; nor could it 
be known that the observable cause is not sufficient. For the observable cause would 
appear to be the lone sufficient cause from the vantage point of empirical investigation, 
whether or not it actually is. Note that even if such a scenario is not actual anywhere, but 
merely possible, it undermines the legitimacy of inferring that there are no nonphysical 
causes on the basis of such empirical investigations. Thus, such investigations cannot, in 
principal, prove that there are no nonphysical causes (cf. BonJour, 2010, p. 6; Lowe, 
2003).  
 In this subsection, the merit of the E.I. Argument as an inductive argument for 
closure has been challenged. We have not challenged the truthfulness of the premises 
meant to support the conclusion. Rather, we have given two reasons to think the 
premises, if true, do not make causal closure probable. For one, the empirical 
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investigations of physical scientists are not aimed at identifying nonphysical causes so if 
they don’t find such causes, that doesn’t mean there are not such causes. Secondly, if 
there are nonphysical causes it’s possible that they are invisible and unidentifiable via 
empirical investigation. What these points suggests is that the conclusion of the E.I. 
Argument is not supported by its premises, and thus, the argument falls short of 
demonstrating that closure is true. However, there is another way one might appeal 
science to support closure.     
The Inevitable Success of Science 
 Causal closure proponents sometimes defend their position on the basis that 
“research programs in physics, and the rest of the physical sciences, presuppose 
something like the closure principle” (Kim, 2011, p. 215). This fact combined with the 
success of physical sciences is thought to support the truthfulness of causal closure. The 
rationale goes like so: a. physical scientists presuppose something akin to closure during 
their research; b. such research has seen success that we wouldn’t expect if the 
presupposition were false; c. therefore it’s likely true. Such rationale is persuasive. But 
several points collectively undermine it.  
 First, the presupposition is just that, a presupposition, that scientists bring to their 
research, not a conclusion they derive from it. The presupposition is not a scientific 
hypothesis that scientists are aiming to prove by their research. So it’s misguided to think 
that the presupposition scientists make is a scientific hypothesis or theory that they’ve 
proved. That’s not the case. Rather, it’s an assumption they make at the outset of 
empirical investigation.  
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 Second, the presupposition of scientists is methodological naturalism, not 
ontological naturalism. Furthermore, methodological naturalism doesn’t entail 
ontological naturalism. Assuming that the physical sciences are aimed at the discovery of 
physical causes of physical effects, scientific methodology is guided by the 
presupposition that there are physical causes responsible for physical effects. Given this 
presupposition scientists focus their empirical investigations on discovering physical 
causes, and only physical causes. Thus it’s thought that they should construct and test 
theories that appeal only to physical causes. The basic idea is that science investigates 
physical causes not nonphysical causes, thus the methodology of scientists should be 
focused on the discovery of only physical causes and assume the possibility of such 
discovery. But this doesn’t necessarily rule out the existence of nonphysical causes. It’s 
just that scientific methodology is not aimed at discovering such causes. So what follows, 
at most, from the fact that many scientists presuppose methodological naturalism is that 
nonphysical causes will not be discovered by scientific investigation. Yet there could still 
be such causes, which brings us to our next point.  
 Third, methodological naturalism is entirely consistent with there being 
nonphysical entities that have causal power to produce physical effects. Since 
methodological naturalism is not a presupposition about the nature of reality, but rather 
about the nature of scientific methodology, it doesn’t rule out an ontology that includes 
nonphysical causes. Moreover, success due to the presupposition of methodological 
naturalism would at best indicate that most effects studied by physical scientists have 
physical causes. That doesn’t rule out the existence of nonphysical causes. One can 
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endorse methodological naturalism and consistently be a dualist that believes mental 
causes can produce physical effects.  
 Stewart Goetz (2011) gives a prime example: the well known Wilder Penfield. 
Penfield assumed during his experiments regarding neural impulses that brain regions of 
patients he studied were closed to nonphysical causes, yet as Goetz (2011) notes, Penfield 
was a dualist (see Penfield, 1975, pp. 79-82). Thus the former chair of Yale’s philosophy 
department, Charles Hendel, fittingly comments on an early manuscript of Penfield’s The 
Mystery of the Mind. In the preface, Penfield (1975, p. xii) relays Hendel’s comments.  
As I read it again and again, your story is one of your starting with the physical 
hypothesis (accepted by all scientists as a belief in order to gain knowledge): that 
the physical attributes of man and energy alone are what they can deal with. You 
start here and cannot do otherwise, and ought not to do so. But there are 
discoveries made which made you wonder about something that does not fit into 
the scientific picture, and you wonder again and again. It is the testimony of 
living, conscious patients. This is an objective item in your scientific evidence. 
How can it be fitted into the assumed hypothesis of an entirely physical nature of 
man?  
Penfield practiced methodological naturalism. Yet that didn’t stop him from concluding 
there is a nonphysical mind that acts, or in other words, makes decisions put into effect 
through brain mechanisms (see 1975, pp. 75-76). “It does this,” according to Penfield, 
“by activating neurone-mechanisms” (1975, p. 76). Although Penfield presupposed 
methodological naturalism, no entailment of it obliged him to conclude that the physical 
domain is causally closed.  
 In sum, whether or not there are nonphysical causes of physical events, the 
physical sciences have been and will be successful in providing useful knowledge about 
reality. That’s inevitable. All it requires is the prevalence of empirically detectible 
physical causes that produce physical effects of interest to scientists. Such causes can be 
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(and are) prevalent whether or not nonphysical causes exist as well. Thus the success of 
physical science does not require the causal closure principle. So one need not conclude 
that the principle is true just because physical science is successful. 
 This brings us to the end of our analysis of justification for closure. Throughout 
this section, I’ve argued against justification often offered for the causal closure principle. 
At the outset, it was emphasized that in order to justify closure physicalists must meet the 
prerequisite of clarifying the closure principle; so we can know whether or not the 
justification offered actually supports the principle. We’ve seen that meeting this 
prerequisite is no easy task. Never mind the various versions of the principle, clarifying 
the meaning of ‘physical’ is hard enough to do in a way that doesn’t cast doubt on the 
principle’s veracity. Subsequently I argued against the notion that causal closure is 
empirically verified. Lastly, the idea that the success of physical science proves closure 
was challenged. At this point, I think it’s quite safe to doubt the physicalist’s claim that 
closure is demonstrably true and therefore dualist ought to accept it. After all, warrant 
commonly offered by physicalists for this claim seems to fall short.   
3.2.3 Reasons to Think Closure is False  
Up until this point, I’ve merely argued against justification offered for the causal closure 
principle. In light of our considerations thus far, it’s reasonable to demur the claim that 
closure is justified and dualist ought to believe it. Now I will give two reasons to think 
closure is actually false. 
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 Reason one: The initial singularity of spacetime suggests causal closure is false.1 
According to the standard Big Bang model spacetime began at an initial singularity. This 
singularity either had a cause or it didn’t have a cause. If it had a cause, it’s likely that 
cause was nonphysical (see Pruss, 2010b). For given that space and time began at the 
singularity it seems that before the singularity there would be nothing physical to cause 
the singularity. Thus, the cause would be nonphysical.  
 One might wish there was something physical capable of causing the singularity 
before spacetime began. But that would be at odds with the fact that space and time 
began at the singularity. For one, physical things have spatial extension. Thus a physical 
thing couldn’t have existed before space. For another, before the singularity there was no 
time, and it’s difficult to see how there could be a physical entity capable of causing the 
singularity that existed before time. To see why, consider the fact this physical entity’s 
causation of the singularity would be either necessary or contingent. It would either cause 
the singularity as a necessary outworking of its own existence or the causation of the 
effect would be conditional. If the former is the case, the physical entity could not have 
preexisted the effect; which would be necessary for it to exist before time given that the 
effect is the starting point of time. The reason the physical entity could not have 
preexisted the effect is simply that the cause and effect would always coexist since the 
effect would be a necessary corollary, or outworking, of the physical entities existence.  
 Therefore, the causation of the singularity by this supposed preexistent physical 
entity would have to be contingent. But how could a physical entity that is outside time 
																																																								
1 My argumentation for this first reason to think closure is false, throughout the next 
couple pages, is informed by William Lane Craig’s work on the Kalam cosmological 
argument (see 1979; 2008, Ch. 3; 2003, Ch. 23). I’m indebted to him for numerous points 
throughout this section. 
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contingently cause the singularity? Since a purely physical entity wouldn’t be capable of 
agent causation, some event would have to take place that causes the physical entity to 
cause the singularity. For the physical entity could not choose to cause the singularity. 
Thus something would have to take place that causes the physical entity to cause the 
universe. But it seems that couldn’t happen without there being an event before the 
singularity, and therefore, time before the singularity. Yet that would clearly be 
inconsistent with the fact that time began at the singularity.  
 So in the final analysis it seems that if there was a cause of the singularity it was 
nonphysical and thus closure is false. Seeing what follows if the singularity had a cause, 
physicalists may prefer to say it had no cause at all. Yet if the singularity had no cause at 
all that would undermine the popular version of closure that says all physical events have 
a sufficient physical cause. For the singularity would not have a sufficient physical cause 
if it had no cause at all. Given this problem one might opt for a version of the principle 
that doesn’t require there to be any cause at all, but just says that if there is a cause it 
must be physical. (COP*) is such a version, it permits the possibility of no cause, but 
rules out nonphysical causes. Thus one could hold that the universe was uncaused and 
that science has proved causal closure. The physicalist who adopts this position could 
avoid surrendering causal closure by denying that there was any cause of the universe.  
 However, this way of salvaging closure seems to shipwreck the legitimacy of 
scientific investigation. For only if physical events have causes, does it makes sense to 
investigate what those causes are. But if it’s perfectly adequate to say physical events like 
the initial singularity can be uncaused, what prevents that from being a viable option 
regarding any physical event? One might respond: “the laws of physics.” But the 
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response won’t do because the laws of physics wouldn’t place any more constraint on 
entities that don’t exist before they pop into existence than they would on the singularity 
before it allegedly popped into existence. After all, before an entity exists in space and 
time, the laws of physics cannot affect them any more than laws of physics could have 
affected the singularity before it existed. The only satisfying answer, and the only answer 
that salvages the legitimacy of science is that it’s a metaphysical principle that physical 
effects have causes. So this fact doesn’t depend on any other physical facts. If this 
metaphysical principle were not legitimate then scientific investigations for causes, such 
as the laws of physics, would not be warranted. In the end, the route of denying that the 
universe had a cause undermines a metaphysical presupposition undergirding the 
legitimacy of science. That presupposition is: effects have sufficient causes. To deny this 
to preserve causal closure would be ad hoc and certainly more dubious than admitting 
nonphysical causes of physical effects (cf. Pruss, 2010b).  
 Someone might respond by claiming that the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum mechanics provides counterexamples of uncaused quantum events. I offer two 
points in reply. First, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is just one 
interpretation and there are also causal interpretations, according to which quantum 
events have causes. For example, a theory proposed around the same time as the 
Copenhagen interpretation by Louis de Broglie, in 1927, provides such an alternative 
interpretation (Bricmont, 2016, p. 129). After being neglected for about twenty-five 
years, the theory was proposed again by David Bohm (1952; 1993, p. 3). The Broglie-
Bohm theory, also referred to as Bohmian mechanics, provides a causal interpretation of 
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quantum mechanics (Goldstein, 2017). It’s not at all clear, at this point, that quantum 
events can be uncaused. 
 Second, if there are quantum events lacking a cause identifiable by physicists, or 
if it empirically seems that such events do not have a cause, it doesn’t follow that such 
events have no cause at all. They could have a nonphysical cause that is unidentifiable via 
empirical investigation. Thus they would appear empirically to have no cause at all. 
Interestingly, in Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will, leading 
scientist George F.R. Ellis (2009, pp. 78, 74-76) appeals to what appears to be 
randomness at the quantum level to account for the fact that there are nonphysical causes 
of physical effects. Ellis (2012, p. 6) thinks “the mind is not a physical entity, but it 
certainly is causally effective…” He reasons that causal slack at the quantum level 
permits nonphysical causes to occur along with, and without violating, physical causation 
(Ellis, 2009, p. 63). On his view there are higher and lower levels of causation 
interacting. These levels include both physical and nonphysical causation. According to 
Ellis (2009, p. 78), causal interaction between the various levels is always taking place. 
Given such causal interaction, there may be so-called “undetermined” events at a 
particular level that are actually determined by causes at another level. So on Ellis’s view, 
if I have understood him correctly, so-called “undetermined” quantum physical events 
may not be determined by physical causes, but rather by nonphysical causes.  
 In any event, the fact that some quantum events appear to have no cause from the 
vantage point of empirical investigation looking only for physical causes, is what we 
might expect if there are nonphysical invisible causes of physical effects. So the objection 
regarding the Copenhagen interpretation doesn’t undermine my point that the singularity 
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must have had a nonphysical cause. In fact, given the metaphysical principle that effects 
have sufficient causes, and supposing that some quantum events really have no physical 
cause, it seems most fitting to conclude those events have a nonphysical cause. Thus 
given the principle that effects have sufficient causes, my point would only be confirmed 
by the fact that some events don’t have physical causes. Some, it would seem, must have 
nonphysical causes. On that note, let’s conclude the first reason to think closure is false 
and move on to a second reason. 
 Reason two: The causal closure principle undermines the possibility of rational 
belief in the causal closure principle.1 By “rational belief,” in this context, I mean belief 
that’s arrived at via logical or mathematical inferences. Let’s assume the exclusion 
arguments rationale: If closure is true, then mental causes of physical effects must be 
physical. Given this, a problem arises. That is, if all mental causes are physical, it would 
be impossible for ones belief to form via logical and mathematical inferences.  
 For the sake of giving ourselves an example to work with, let’s suppose that 
Papineau arrived at his belief that closure is true by logically deducing it from empirical 
data. Let’s also suppose, however, that Plantinga arrived at his belief that closure is false 
by logically inferring it from the fact that God exists and caused the universe. In short, 
they both arrived at their beliefs rationally. Assuming that closure is true and the rationale 
of the exclusion argument, it seems that neither scenario would be possible. For given 
such, all mental events are physical events. And thus, mental events themselves must be 
caused by prior physical events. But if that’s the case, Papineau’s belief that closure is 
																																																								
1 The argumentation here presented is not original. The list of philosophers who have 
argued along the same lines includes: Richard Swinburne (2012), C.S. Lewis (1947), and 
R. Scott Smith (2012).  
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true and Plantinga’s belief that closure is false must have been caused purely by physical 
events. This undermines the possibility that they arrived at their beliefs rationally. To do 
so they would’ve had to depend on inferences that are justified by laws of logic. But laws 
of logic are nonphysical, for they can exist in nonphysical worlds and physical entities 
can’t. As a result, laws of logic would be excluded from playing any causal role in the 
production of either person’s belief on the same grounds that mental causes would be 
excluded if they were nonphysical. So the process by which they arrive at their beliefs 
would not include laws of logic. Hence, neither Papineau’s belief nor Plantinga’s belief 
could be rational in the sense we stipulated above.  
 One might respond by claiming that the physical causal chain leading up to each 
person’s belief would just be what a “rational process” would amount to (cf. Anscombe, 
1981, pp. 224-232). Thus, as the response goes, rationality would not be excluded from 
the process of belief production. However, such an objection misses the point: that in 
such a process, whether we call it a “rational process” or not, laws of logic are excluded 
from playing any role in the production of the resulting belief (see Owen, 2015). If 
closure were true and mental events were physical events, then the existence of every 
physical event would be due entirely to physical causes. Consequently, the only roles to 
be played in the production of such beliefs would be causal roles and such roles would be 
filled by physical causes. Since laws of logic are not physical, they couldn’t play such 
roles. Thus they could play no role in the production of any belief. Hence, neither 
Papineau’s belief nor Plantinga’s belief could be rational in our above sense, if closure 
were true. Therefore, if you have reason to belief that either Papineau or Plantinga arrived 
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at their belief in the sense we supposed they did, then you have reason to think closure is 
false.  
 Now we have two reasons, which don’t presuppose dualism, to think closure is 
false. However, the dualist that already rationally believes we have a nonphysical mind 
has another obvious reason to think closure is false. That is: we seem to mentally cause 
bodily effects all the time. For instance, the dualist that’s justified in believing that 
intentionality is sui generis mental has strong motivation to deny closure every time it 
seems to her that her intention plays a causal role in her bodily actions. Additionally, 
many dualists are also theists. Theism and dualism fit well together. And any dualist that 
rationally believes that God exists has reason to believe closure is false. Given that God 
would be the cause of the universe’s existence. Furthermore, any theist that has sufficient 
warrant to believe God has performed miracles has grounds for believing closure is false. 
Thus, the historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth could justify one’s 
belief that closure is false (see Licona, 2010; Wright, 2003). As could the evidence for 
contemporary miracles (see Keener, 2011). At the end of the day, the dualist has several 
reasons to think closure is false, and the theist has still further reasons.  
 In summary, we have not only analyzed justification often given to oblige dualists 
to accept closure and found it wanting. We’ve also seen that there are reasons to think 
closure is false that do not depend on dualism being true. The first reason is that the 
initial singularity of spacetime most likely had a nonphysical cause. The second reason is 
that the causal closure principle undermines the possibility of rational belief in the causal 
closure principle itself. Therefore, it appears that dualists are fully within their intellectual 
rights to deny causal closure. Given that dualists can justifiably deny closure and the 
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principle isn’t entailed by their view, dualists can rationally evade the causal exclusion 
problem via Route CO without sacrificing anything essential to dualism. Hence why I 
don’t find the causal exclusion problem to be dualism’s chief causal problem. 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have considered two other causal problems: the problem of a lack of 
psychophysical laws and the exclusion problem. I refer to these problems as two “other” 
problems because I am hereafter setting them aside. In the following chapters that deal 
with dualism and mental causation, these two “other” problems will not be in view. The 
basic reason is that I don’t think they offer very strong threats to substance dualism, and 
my aim is to deal with the problem that offers the greatest threat to dualism on causal 
grounds. We have seen that the problem of a lack of psychophysical laws arises on the 
basis of certain assumptions, none of which are entailed by dualism. And the causal 
exclusion argument crucially depends on the causal closure principle, which most dualists 
deny, and reasonably so. In any event, it seems to me that neither of these problems pose 
the greatest threat to substance dualism when it comes to mental causation. The purpose 
of this chapter has been to clarify and distinguish these two other problems and justifiably 
set them aside.  
 We can now move forward and focus on dualism’s chief causal problem: the 
causal pairing problem. In light of the dualist’s denial of the causal closure principle, the 
pairing problem arises and apart from such a denial it would never arise. The pairing 
problem boils down to the alleged impossibility of nonphysical causes and physical 
effects standing in a causal relation with one another. If legitimate, the pairing problem 
would certainly threaten dualism, but it would also provide the strongest a priori 
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rationale for causal closure (cf. Tiehen, forthcoming). Given that the pairing problem is 
the most likely candidate for a sound a priori defense of causal closure, I didn’t bother 
considering a priori arguments for closure above. Since the following chapter will be 


















The Causal Pairing Problem  
 
In the previous chapter we saw that the causal exclusion problem arises due to the causal 
closure principle. Given that substance dualism in no way entails the closure principle, 
one way of avoiding the problem clearly presents itself to the dualist. That is: deny causal 
closure. Doing so costs the dualist nothing that’s essential to substance dualism. And as I 
argued in the last chapter, dualists have warrant for such a denial. However, given such a 
denial another problem appears to arise. That is the causal pairing problem. This problem 
boils down to the alleged incoherence of a nonphysical mind being causally paired with 
physical effects. If dualists didn’t deny causal closure by positing causal interaction 
between a nonphysical substance (the mind) and a physical substance (the body), the 
pairing problem wouldn’t arise. Given a denial of closure entailed by causal interaction 
that “mixes physical and nonphysical events in a single causal chain,” it appears that 
dualists face the pairing problem (Kim, 2000, p. 37). This problem, it seems to me, is 
substance dualism’s chief problem regarding mental causation. For relative to the “other” 
two problems considered in Chapter 3, it depends on less assumptions that dualists are 
strongly inclined to demur.  
 In Chapter 6, I will argue that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism is a dualist position 
capable of solving the causal pairing problem. In that sense, I will be offering a rebuttal 
to the pairing problem. However, a prerequisite of any good rebuttal is an adequate 
hearing of the argument to be rebutted. The aim of this chapter is to meet that 
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prerequisite. The focus of this chapter is to give a fairly in depth presentation of the 
pairing problem and an analyses of its conclusion, or thesis. In section 5.1, a summary of 
the causal pairing problem will be given. The summary will be somewhat detailed and at 
the end a formulization of the argument is presented. In section 5.2, we’ll analyze the 
thesis of the argument in an effort to be as clear as possible about what the charge against 
substance dualism is. Such clarity will aid my rebuttal in Chapter 6. 
4.1 Summarizing The Pairing Problem 
Jaegwon Kim is the clearest contemporary proponent of the causal pairing problem. 
Hence my summary throughout this section will focus on his work in “Mental Causation” 
and Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough.  
 Kim (2005, pp. 73-74) tees up his argument for the pairing problem by offering an 
analysis of earlier arguments given by historical critics of “Descartes interactionist 
dualism.” According to this dualist view, an immaterial mind and material body are 
united because they causally interact with one another (Kim, 2005, p. 77).1 Past critics 
include: Antoine Arnauld, Pierre Gassendi, and Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (Kim, 
2009, pp. 29-30). Perhaps the first presentation of the argument is found in a letter the 
princess wrote to Descartes (Kim, 2009, p. 31). The principle point of Descartes’s 
objectors is easily grasped: the two substances—the immaterial mind and the physical 
body—are of such different categories that it seems impossible for them to causally 
interact (see Kenny, 1968).  
																																																								
1 Kim seems to express doubt about the historical accuracy of his reading of Descartes’s 
view on mind-body unity (see 2005, p. 77); cf. Keith Ward (2013). 
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 According to Kim (2005, p. 74), however, the argumentation of Descartes’s 
earlier critics “is incomplete and unsatisfying…it only expresses a vague, inchoate 
dissatisfaction of the sort that ought to prompt us to look for a real argument.” Kim 
(2005, p. 74) asks: “Why is it incoherent to think that there can be causal interaction 
between things in ‘diverse categories’? Why is it ‘impossible’ for things with diverse 
natures to enter into causal relations with one another?” By his critique of Descartes’s 
earlier critics, Kim clearly indicates that his aim is to go further than they and to put forth 
a “real argument” demonstrating why mental causation is incoherent and impossible on 
substance dualism (cf., 2005, p. 86). 
4.1.1 Prerequisite: Pairing Relation 
Kim explicitly states that Descartes’s interactionist dualism is the target of his causal 
argument for the rejection of immaterial minds (2005, p. 71). At the outset of his 
argument he invites his reader to “consider an example of physical causation” (2009, p. 
32). A fundamental assumption that Kim and his interlocutors presuppose is that the 
nature of immaterial substances and physical substances are very different. Nonetheless, 
from the outset it is assumed by Kim that an example of physical causation is fittingly 
paradigmatic for all causation, even causation involving immaterial substances.  
 The example given involves two guns fired simultaneously. Gun A’s firing causes 
X’s death; gun B’s firing causes Y’s death. What explains the fact that A’s firing caused 
X’s death, not Y’s; and that B’s firing caused Y’s death, not X’s? “That cannot be an 
unexplainable brute fact. There must be a relation R that grounds and explains the ‘cause-
effect pairings’”(2009, 32). Kim quickly points out: “We are not supposing at this point 
that there is a single such R for all cases of physical causation, only that some relation 
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must ground the fact that a given cause is a cause of the particular effect that is caused by 
it” (2009, p. 32). It’s worth noting that Kim’s example demands one posit an external 
relation between cause and effect. In any case, Kim’s key point is: Some pairing relation 
must ground the fact that a particular cause caused a particular effect (2009, p. 32).  
4.1.2 Necessity of Spatiality 
Kim’s second key point is: Spatio-temporal relations pair causes with their effects (2009, 
p. 32). Kim considers the prospect of a causal chain fulfilling the job of linking causes 
with effects, but such will not suffice as an independent solution. A causal chain would 
only multiply relations and the fundamental question—what does the job of pairing a 
cause with an effect—would remain. The answer to which, Kim believes is: spatial 
relations. “Intuitively, space seems to have nice causal properties” (Kim, 2009, p. 32). He 
doesn’t say whether it follows from this that only space has such properties. Nonetheless, 
he (2009, pp. 32-33) explicates his intuition:  
…I can state my fundamental assumption in general terms, and it is this: It is 
metaphysically possible for there to be two distinct physical objects, a and b, with 
the same intrinsic properties and hence the same causal potential or powers; 
further, one of these, say a, causes a third object, c, to change in a certain way but 
object b has no causal effect on c. Now, the fact that a, but not b, causes c to 
change must be grounded in some fact about a, b, and c. Since a and b have the 
same intrinsic properties, it must be their relational properties with respect to c 
that provide an explanation of their different causal roles vis-à-vis c. What 
relational properties, or relations, can do this job? The only plausible answer 
seems to be that it is the spatial relation between a and c, and that between b and 
c, that are responsible for the causal difference between a and b vis-à-vis c (a was 
in the right spatial relation to c; b was ‘too far away’ from c to exert any 
influence). At least, there is no other possible explanation that comes to mind.1 
Kim appeals to spatial relations to explain causal pairing relations. One might ask what 
accounts for spatial relations themselves? However, a demand for an answer might miss 
																																																								
1 Bold mine.  
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the point of Kim’s task at hand. In which he has pinpointed a key prerequisite for causal 
relations between the purely physical entities in his examples—spatiality.    
 Kim (2005, p. 85) explains how spatiality accounts for pairing relations: “By 
locating each and every physical item—object and event—in an all-encompassing 
coordinate system, the framework of physical space imposes a determinate relation on 
every pair of items in that domain.” A key principle Kim’s account (2009, pp. 34-35) 
relies on is the ‘impenetrability of matter,’ which says physical objects occupying the 
same space-time location are one and the same object.1 Due to this principle, specific 
physical objects exclude other objects from a particular spatial locale (2009, pp. 34-35). 
Consequently, we can say why the cue ball, rather than the eight ball, knocked the two 
ball into the corner pocket. The answer depends on their spatial locations.  
 In sum, spatiality provides a determinate coordinate system given the 
impenetrability of matter, and this makes it possible for individual physical causes to be 
paired with specific physical effects. Since this is how causation works in the examples 
of physical causation he has selected, Kim (2009, p. 35) deems that causation for 
immaterial minds must require the same essential framework and an analogous principle 
of the impenetrability of matter:  
This principle is what enables space to individuate material things with identical 
intrinsic properties. The same goes for causation in the mental domain. What is 
needed to solve the pairing problem for immaterial minds is a kind of mental 
coordinate system, a ‘mental space’, in which minds are each given unique 
‘location’ at a time. Further, a principle of ‘impenetrability of minds’ must hold in 
this mental coordinate system; that is, minds that occupy the same ‘location’ in 
this space must be one and the same. I don’t think we have any idea how a mental 
space of this kind could be constructed.  
																																																								
1 One might ask: What about coincident objects like a lump of clay and a statue? Kim 
acknowledges the issue of coincident objects and understandably sets it aside, not to be 
distracted from the trajectory of his argument (see 2009, p. 34, footnote 6). 
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Given that a coordinate system is necessary for causation and space is necessary for such 
a system, an obvious problem arises for immaterial Cartesian minds, which are 
nonspatial.  
 To use an example Kim (2005, p. 76) gives, suppose there are two persons, Smith 
and Jones, who are psychologically synchronized. Consequently, when Smith wills to 
raise his hand, Jones wills to raise his hand as well. A question arises: why is Smith’s 
willing causally paired with his hand rising, not Jones’s, and vice versa? One might say 
their respective minds are united to their respective bodies. But according to Kim’s 
understanding of the Cartesian’s account, their minds are united to their bodies on the 
basis of being causally paired with their bodies. Thus, the vital problem arises: “The 
‘union’ of a mind and a body that Descartes speaks of, therefore, presupposes mental 
causation” (Kim, 2005, p. 77).  
 Let’s elaborate on this, for it’s the crux of the problem. On Kim’s understanding 
of Cartesian dualism, Smith’s mind is causally paired with his hand rising because his 
mind is united to his body since his mind causes his body to move. In other words, 
according to Kim’s reading of Descartes, the Cartesian explanation essentially says 
Smith’s mind causes his body because his mind causes his body. For one, this 
explanation is fatally circular. For another, this explanation relies on a mind-body causal 
relation that’s unavailable on dualism if we assume that spatiality is necessary for 
causality. Given that immaterial minds are nonspatial and causality requires spatiality, a 
causal explanation of mind-body unity is unavailable to the dualist. After all immaterial 
minds that are nonspatial can’t stand in causal pairing relations that require spatiality. In 
the end, an immaterial mind cannot be united to a body via causation since causation is 
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impossible for such a mind. And so this causal account of mind-body unity that Kim 
(2005, p. 77) thinks is “the most natural option for substance dualists” is fundamentally 
flawed. 
 This problem might be avoided if Cartesian minds were spatial. Yet according to 
Kim (2005, p. 88-90), supposing such will only raise more problems. First off, we 
allegedly lack any rational motivation for locating immaterial minds in a given spatial 
location. Secondly, if souls are spatial, it seems to Kim that they would just be a strange 
kind of matter. Kim brings up several questions he thinks such a move would raise 
without a hope of answering. Among such puzzles, is the question: if immaterial minds 
were spatial, wouldn’t they exclude bodies from spatial locations and thus preclude them 
from indwelling collocated bodies? Ultimately, Kim reasons that the Cartesian is stuck 
with biting the nonspatial bullet of immaterial minds. After all, on Kim’s (2005, p. 88) 
reading of Descartes, space is the realm of matter. In the final analysis, given their 
nonspatiality, immaterial minds cannot stand in causal pairing relations, whether such 
causal relations are mental-to-physical or mental-to-mental relations (Kim, 2005, p. 87).  
 Hence, Kim concludes: “causal interaction between mind and matter is precluded 
by their diverse natures, and we have identified the essential diversity that matters, 
namely the spatiality of bodies and the supposed nonspatiality of minds” (2005, p. 87). 
According to Kim, his causal argument for the rejection of immaterial minds “shows that 
immaterial minds, if they existed, would be incapable of entering into any causal 
relations, whether with material things or with other immaterial minds” (2005, p. 3-4). In 
light of the alleged impossibility of mental causation on Cartesian dualism, Kim reasons 
that dualism generally “…is not a workable option for anyone” (2005, p. 3).  
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4.1.3 Formulation of Kim’s Argument   
Neither in Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough, nor in “Mental Causation,” does 
Kim present a formal version of his argument. Yet, here is an attempt at a formal 
reconstruction of his argument.1  
(1) For every case of causation there is a cause-effect pairing relation between 
cause and effect. 
 
1.1 For every case that x caused y, that ‘x caused y’ cannot be an 
inexplicable brute fact. 
 
1.2 Therefore, for every case that x caused y, there must be a cause-effect 
pairing relation that explains why x caused y (from 1.1). 
 
(2) All cause-effect pairing relations require spatial relations. 
 
2.1 In clear cases of physical causation, spatial relations account for cause-
effect pairing relations. 
 
2.2 Besides spatial relations we do not know what could account for 
cause-effect pairing relations.  
 
2.3 Therefore, spatial relations are necessary for all cause-effect pairing 
relations (from 2.1 & 2.2). 
 
(3) An entity/event must be spatial to stand in any cause-effect pairing relation 
(from 2). 
 
(4) Immaterial minds are not spatial. 
 
(5) Immaterial minds cannot stand in any cause-effect pairing relation (from 3; 4). 
 
(6) Therefore, mental causation is impossible for immaterial minds (from 1; 5). 
Now that we have laid out Kim’s causal argument demonstrating the causal pairing 
problem for dualism, let’s analyze the argument’s thesis. 
 
																																																								
1 For another formulation of Kim’s argument, and a formulation of a more modest 
version of the “Pairing Argument,” see Andrew M. Bailey et al. (2011). 
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4.2 Analysis of Kim’s Thesis 
Andrew Bailey and company have pointed out that “Kim says that it’s impossible for a 
soul to cause something, not just that none in fact do” (2011, p. 351). Why opt for this 
stronger claim? To rule dualism out, or to warrant a full sail rejection of immaterial 
minds, it must be shown that mental causation is impossible on dualism, not just 
mysterious unchartered territory. Otherwise, if there were good reasons to believe (a) 
humans are composed of a body and an immaterial mind, and (b) that such a mind is 
causally responsible for some physical states of our bodies, we could justifiably conclude 
(c) that there is genuine top-down mental causation, whether or not we understand such 
causation.1  As long as such causation is possible and we have good reasons to think 
there is such causation, there is no warrant for the rejection of dualism on causal grounds. 
We would simply be faced with territory yet to be understood.  
 Since Kim’s aim is to justify a rejection of immaterial minds, his argumentation is 
judicious. His thesis—mental causation is impossible for immaterial minds—may seem 
too ambitious to some, yet it’s needed to warrant a rejection of dualism. Yet, we must 
ask: impossible, in what sense? Kim doesn’t say. His reader is left to figure this out 
herself.  
 There are four relevant senses of impossibility. Something is physically 
impossible if the laws of physics preclude it from happening.2 It is physically impossible 
for an elephant to fly like a bird. Something is logically impossible if the laws of logic 
preclude it from ever being so. To use a popular example, it is logically impossible for 
																																																								
1 George F.R. Ellis (2009, p. 75) makes a similar point. Richard Swinburne (2013, p. 105) 
also makes a very similar point, if not the same point. 
2 For a brief discussion of physical necessity, the corollary of physical impossibility, see: 
Chisholm (1976, p. 22). 
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there to be a married bachelor. For given the meaning of the terms ‘married’ and 
‘bachelor,’ the law of non-contradiction precludes such a possibility.  
 The third sense of impossibility is nomological impossibility, which is like 
physical impossibility since it pertains to laws. Assuming there are natural laws beyond 
the laws of physics, something is nomologically impossible if such laws preclude it. The 
fourth relevant sense of impossibility is metaphysical impossibility. Something is 
metaphysically impossible if it cannot be given the natures of the entities in question (cf. 
Moreland and Craig, 2003, p. 50). It is metaphysically impossible for two rocks to fall 
helplessly in love. Since it is essential to the nature of a relationship of love that the 
entities standing in the relation be personal (let’s assume), but by nature rocks are 
impersonal. Thus, it is metaphysically impossible for two rocks to be in love. Let us now 
try to decipher what sense of ‘impossibility’ is meant in Kim’s thesis: mental causation is 
impossible for immaterial minds. 
4.2.1 Physically Impossible?  
The claim that mental causation on dualism is physically impossible would be as 
interesting as a flat, straight, road in the middle of Kansas cornfields. That is, not 
interesting at all; nor would such be consequential. For if there were nonphysical minds 
that have causal power to affect nonphysical mental states and physical bodily states, we 
have no reason to suspect such causation would be purely physical and therefore 
governed only by principles governing merely physical entities. For the entities doing the 
causing ex hypothesis would not themselves be merely physical, nor would all the effects 
be purely physical. Apart from the assumption that physicalism is true, we couldn’t 
justifiably expect that such causation would necessarily be purely physical or governed 
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merely by laws of physics. Rather, given the nonphysical nature of the cause, we could 
expect the causation to be supra-physical. In other words, we could reasonably expect the 
governing principles of such causation to go beyond the laws of physics, while not 
necessarily violating them. Such principles could be in concert with physical laws and yet 
not be identical to physical laws, nor regulated by physical laws (see Ellis, 2009).  
 The dualist could grant that such causation is not physically possible in the sense 
that laws of physics alone could govern it. Yet, she would do well to point out that the 
primary question is whether or not there could be a coherent framework that includes 
principles of causation beyond just the laws of physics that govern causation involving 
nonphysical entities. To answer this question by asserting that such is physically 
impossible is nonsensical, for the question is whether or not something beyond mere 
physical possibility is possible. If Kim’s conclusion was that mental causation is 
physically impossible for immaterial minds, the primary question would remain 
unanswered. Consequently, sufficient warrant for the rejection of immaterial minds 
would be lacking.  
4.2.2 Logically Impossible?  
Given that a physical impossibility of mental causation on dualism would be 
inconsequential, one might think Kim’s conclusion pertains to logical impossibility. 
However, if the conclusion of Kim’s argument is that mental causation is logically 
impossible on dualism, his premises fall short of guaranteeing such a conclusion. 
Consider this simplified formulation of his argument:  
 (P1) Necessarily, spatiality is needed for causality.  
 (P2) Necessarily, immaterial minds are not spatial.  
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 (C)  Necessarily, mental causation is impossible for immaterial minds. 
For the impossibility arrived at in C to be a logical impossibility, the necessity of C must 
be of logical necessity. Yet, if the necessity of C is a logical necessity and C is to follow 
from P1 and P2, the necessities of both P1 and P2 must be logical necessities as well. 
And for these necessities to be logical necessities the propositions they modify must be 
entailed by the meaning of the relevant terms, that is ‘causation’ and ‘immaterial minds.’  
 Therefore, in order for the necessity of P1 to be one of logical necessity, it must 
follow logically from the meaning of ‘causality’ that spatiality is needed. Kim offers his 
reader rationale for why he thinks causation in the actual world requires spatiality. He 
does so through giving examples of causation in the actual world and pointing out how 
causation works in those cases. But showing that causation is a certain way in the actual 
world is not the same as showing that causation could not have been otherwise out of 
logical necessity. And that is what must be done in order to show that Kim’s concept of 
causation in the actual world is one that’s logically necessary in any possible world. 
Thus, even if Kim’s depiction of causation in the actual world was perfectly accurate, it 
would not prove that his understanding of causation and what it requires is logically true. 
So if Kim’s conclusion is of logical necessity, his argument is severely weakened by the 
fact that he only offers justification to think causation requires spatiality in the actual 
world. He needs to demonstrate that causality logically requires spatiality in order for his 
argument to be sound. At best, Kim has shown that, given the laws of physics in our 
world, cases of mere physical causation require spatiality. 
 Not only does Kim’s argumentation lack rationale justifying the idea that 
causality logically necessitates spatiality, such an idea is doubtfully true. It seems 
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logically possible for there to be different laws governing causation with different 
prerequisites than what the laws of physics require. For if this were not so, empirical 
investigation would be unnecessary for discovering truths about laws of physics. After 
all, if such truths were logically necessary, we could arrive at such truths through a priori 
reasoning alone. Yet the discovery of physical laws often depends on empirical 
investigation, even if a priori reasoning is involved. So not only does Kim’s 
argumentation lack justification for thinking P1 is true in the sense of logical necessity, it 
is doubtfully true in that sense.  
 Yet, even if it were true that causality requires spatiality out of logical necessity, it 
is doubtful that such is demonstrably true. In the case that causality logically necessitated 
spatiality, such a truth would clearly undermine some of the most widely held views 
throughout human history and during contemporary times. And given that such a truth 
would be knowable a priori, since it would follow logically from the meaning of 
‘causation,’ it would be dumbfounding that it escaped the notice of countless thinkers. 
After all, many thinkers throughout western civilization have thought it’s at least 
logically coherent to think an immaterial nonspatial being caused the space-time realm to 
come into existence and to persist with consistency. And many eastern thinkers have 
thought that the idea of Karma being causally responsible for certain events in our world 
is logically coherent.   
 However, causality logically necessitating spatiality would not only be at odds 
with religious ideology. As Andrew Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen, and Luke Van Horn 
(2011, p. 351) have pointed out along with J.P. Moreland (2005): the idea that causality 
requires spatiality entails that the singularity on the standard model of the Big Bang could 
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not have a cause. According to the standard model of the Big Bang the entire spacetime 
continuum began at the singularity; so if causality necessitates spatiality then any model 
proposing that the Big Bang had any cause at all, such as Quentin Smith’s (2002) 
atheistic explanation of the singularity, would be disqualified. This would be odd to say 
the least. The idea that there can be effects like the Big Bang that have no cause 
whatsoever seems far more incoherent than the idea that there can be nonspatial causes of 
such effects (Pruss, 2010a). After all, I think C.D. Broad doesn’t merely speak for 
himself when he says: “…I cannot really believe in anything beginning to exist without 
being caused (in the old-fashioned sense of produced or generated) by something else 
which existed before and up to the moment when the thing in question began to exist” 
(1955, p. 10). In the case of the initial singularity there is much disagreement about the 
nature of the cause, yet it has seemed quite reasonable to many to suppose it had a cause.  
 In sum, Kim has not given us reasons to believe it’s logically necessary that 
spatiality is required for causality, which is needed for his argument to be sound if C is of 
logical necessity. To boot, it’s likely false that causality requires spatiality out of logical 
necessity. But even if such were true, it’s doubtful that it is demonstrably so. Given that 
countless thinkers have held central beliefs that stand in opposition to such a “fact” that 
would be knowable a priori. Thus, I think it’s safe to say with physicalist, David 
Papineau (2011, p. 55): “there is nothing conceptually contradictory in the idea that 
physical phenomena may be affected by non-physical causes, as Descartes supposed, for 





4.2.3 Nomologically Impossible? 
Nomological impossibility is the third sense of impossibility worth considering. 
Something is nomologically impossible if it cannot be due to laws of nature, whether 
such laws are laws of physics or another type of natural law that might even be 
nonphysical.  
 Due to biological laws (let’s assume), it is possible to cut a limb from one apple 
tree that grows red delicious apples and graft it into another apple tree that grows granny 
smith apples, so the tree grows apples of both types. This is an example of a nomological 
possibility. Likewise, it’s nomologically impossible (we can assume for the sake of the 
example) to graft the same apple tree limb into a pine tree so it grows both pinecones and 
red delicious apples. 
 To elucidate how nomological impossibility could apply to dualism and mental 
causation, let’s imagine that the natural laws in our universe include psychophysical laws 
that govern all causation between the mental and the physical. Suppose that these laws 
permit physical causes of nonphysical mental effects but preclude nonphysical mental 
causes of physical effects. If this were the case, it would be nomologically impossible for 
there to be nonphysical mental causes of physical effects in the body. And there would be 
no laws that could causally pair mental causes with physical effects, if such laws were 
needed. 
 As one reads the earliest works related to the causal pairing problem, one might 
get the impression that nomological impossibility is the issue.1 However, Kim’s (2005, 
																																																								
1 According to Kim (2001a, p. 35, footnote 7), his thinking on the causal pairing problem 
was prompted by Foster’s (1968) article ‘Psychophysical Causal Relations’ and Kim first 
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Ch. 3) most developed case for the causal pairing problem discussed in this chapter 
doesn’t appeal to laws in order to demonstrate that mental causation is impossible for 
nonphysical minds. Rather, he appeals to natures, which strengthens his case.  
 If Kim’s argument hinged on an appeal to laws, there would be several ways the 
dualist might try to escape the conclusion. The dualist might (1) deny that such laws 
govern causation, (2) deny that such laws govern all causation, (3) deny the existence of 
the laws that preclude nonphysical minds from producing physical effects, or (4) only 
accept revised versions of the laws that don’t preclude such mental causation (cf. John 
Foster, 1991, Ch. 6). However, these escape routes will not be available, if the causal 
pairing problem is not rooted in laws but rather in the very nature of causation, physical 
bodies, and nonphysical minds. Thus it’s not surprising that Kim’s (2005, Ch. 3) most 
developed presentation of the argument for the causal pairing problem doesn’t appeal to 
laws, but rather to natures.1 His emphasis on natures – the nature of causation that relies 
on spatiality, the spatial nature of physical bodies, and the nonspatial nature of 
nonphysical minds – strongly suggests that metaphysical impossibility is the type of 
impossibility Kim’s conclusion pertains to (as I’ll discuss in the following section). 
 However, those who think laws of nature are grounded in natures might object as 
follows. When we consider the above example regarding biological laws and grafting an 
apple tree limb, biological laws grounded in the natures of the apple tree and pine tree are 
what make one scenario possible and the other impossible. The nature of the apple tree 
entails certain laws that make it possible to graft the limb, and the nature of the pine tree 
																																																																																																																																																																					
(1973) discussed the causal pairing problem in ‘Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the 
Concept of Event.’ 
1 Kim (2005, p. 76) seems clearly interested in closing off escape route (1) above. 
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entails certain laws that make it impossible to graft the limb. Thus the possibility and 
impossibility are determined by the laws, which are entailed by the relevant natures. And 
the same is true with regards to the impossibility that the causal pairing problem presents, 
one might argue. It’s laws grounded in the natures of causation, physical bodies, and 
nonphysical minds that make mental causation impossible for nonphysical minds. Thus 
the causal pairing problem identifies a nomological impossibility based on laws, which 
are grounded in natures. 
 The idea that laws of nature are grounded in natures is reasonable. But if this is 
so, the laws grounded in natures are less fundamental than the natures that ground them. 
And if the laws responsible for the causal pairing problem are entailed by the natures in 
question, it seems that the root of the problem is the natures. Thus if Kim’s argument 
shows that the very natures of causation, physical bodies, and nonphysical minds prompt 
the causal pairing problem, he will have identified the very root of the problem. 
Additionally, his argument will close off the escape routes mentioned above. In short, his 
argument will be stronger and the problem identified will be more threatening to dualism. 
Given this, I think our fourth sense of impossibility that pertains to natures – i.e. 
metaphysical impossibility – provides the best interpretation of Kim’s argument and its 
conclusion.  
4.2.4 Metaphysically Impossible? 
To say that mental causation is metaphysically impossible for immaterial minds is to 
make a stronger and more substantive claim than saying such causation is physically 
impossible. Yet it’s a more conservative claim than saying that such causation is logically 
impossible. As we have seen, if Kim’s thesis pertains to physical impossibility it’s 
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inconsequential, but if his thesis pertains to logical impossibility then his premises don’t 
warrant such a conclusion. In any event, Kim need not worry about such charges. For it 
seems that his thesis pertains to neither sense of impossibility, but rather to metaphysical 
impossibility.1  
 As mentioned above, something is metaphysically impossible if the natures of the 
entities in question preclude it from happening. While setting up his argument, Kim 
(2005, p. 74) asks: why is it impossible for entities of different natures to stand in causal 
relations with one another? Moreover, Kim (2005, p. 87) concludes that causal 
interaction between an immaterial mind and matter “is precluded by their diverse 
natures.” And Kim (2005, p. 87) believes he’s pinpointed the diversity that precludes 
such: the nonspatiality of immaterial minds and the spatiality of material bodies. This is 
so only if the nature of causality requires spatiality, which Kim thinks it does. Thus the 
nature of immaterial minds and the nature of causality are thought to give rise to the 
causal pairing problem. This problem amounts to the alleged metaphysical impossibility 
of a nonphysical mind causing a physical effect; that is, the metaphysical impossibility of 
mental causation on dualism. 
 In closing, let’s summarize our analysis. The thesis of the causal pairing problem 
is not that mental causation is physically, logically, or nomologically impossible on 
dualism. Rather it’s that mental causation is metaphysically impossible on substance 
dualism. The idea is that the nonspatial nature of immaterial minds and the nature of 
causation, which supposedly requires spatiality, preclude the mind from causing effects. 
Causality requires spatiality and immaterial minds are not spatial, thus causation on 
																																																								
1 Andrew Bailey et al. (2011, p. 350, footnote 3) likewise interpret Kim.  
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dualism is allegedly incoherent. 
4.3 Conclusion 
The greatest objection to dualism regarding mental causation is the causal pairing 
problem. As we saw in the previous chapter, the problem raised by Donald Davidson of a 
lack of psychophysical laws rests on several assumptions dualists need not accept and the 
causal exclusion problem hinges on a premise dualism doesn’t entail in any way. The 
causal pairing problem, however, is aimed at objecting to dualism on grounds dualists are 
more inclined to accept. For since the 17th century a mechanistic view of causation has 
become increasingly favorable, and it’s thought to depend on spatiality. Yet according to 
the most well known substance dualist view, Cartesian dualism, nonphysical minds are 
nonspatial. Thus a framework of mental causation presupposing such a view of causation 
and nonphysical minds seems to have an inconsistency, which the pairing problem 
exposes. That is: causation requires spatiality and minds are not spatial. Thus the pairing 
problem is aimed at undermining dualism’s coherence vis-à-vis mental causation. As 
such the pairing problem is a grave potential defeater of dualism. 
 My aim is to defeat this defeater by presenting a dualistic view that offers a 
coherent framework for mental causation. In the next chapter we shall outline that view 









Neo-Thomistic hylomorphism  
 
“Cartesian dualism has clear and unassailable pride of place as the whipping post on 
which dualists are ritualistically flailed,” notes David Oderberg (2005, p. 71). When it 
comes to considering and critiquing substance dualism, a depiction of Descartes’s view is 
almost always at center stage. At this point we’ll diverge from such orthopraxy as we 
focus on a different form of dualism—neo-Thomistic hylomorphism.   
 The aim of this chapter is to summarize neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, which I’ll 
often refer to simply as ‘hylomorphism’ for brevity.1 The following two chapters will 
apply the view to the causal pairing problem and the issue of neural correlates. While 
these subsequent chapters will deepen our understanding of hylomorphism, this chapter is 
introductory. The goal is to clarify the view.  
 I’ve labeled the view ‘neo-Thomistic hylomorphism’ because I think it’s 
appropriate to attribute the view to Aquinas. Given that the fundamental principles of the 
view are derived from his thoughts on human ontology, which were greatly influenced by 
Aristotle. Yet, for several reasons I call it neo-Thomistic. First of all, I make no claim that 
the view is identical to Aquinas’s. Although my neo-Thomistic view is significantly 
influenced by his ideas about human nature, I give myself the freedom to disagree with 
Aquinas on certain points or to modify his ideas in order to make the view more 
defensible. I look to Aquinas as a philosophical authority who provides a good starting 
																																																								
1 Another common spelling is: hylemorphism. 
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point, but not as an infallible final word. Furthermore, my focus is not on exegeting 
Aquinas’s works. My intention is not to engage in hermeneutical debates about how to 
interpret Aquinas. As valuable as such debates are, they are not my focus in this 
particular work, and I’m aware that other philosophers have different interpretations of 
Aquinas than I do on key points.1 My focus is rather on applying a view that’s informed 
by Aquinas to two chief contemporary problems that substance dualism faces. In the end, 
I hope to have shown that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can adequately handle them.    
 While presenting a view of the mind and body is the purpose of this chapter, it 
would be naïve to think such could be done in a metaphysical vacuum. For Aristotelians, 
such as Aquinas is, metaphysics is the “engine that drives every other field of 
philosophy” (Oderberg, 1999, p. ix). I do wish to propose a “mere-hylomorphic” view in 
the sense that one can adopt the mind-body view presented without becoming a full-
blown Aristotelian or Thomist on every philosophical point. Yet I do not wish to propose 
a “shallow-hylomorphic” view in the sense that hylomorphism is presented in a context 
devoid of metaphysical presuppositions that are critical to the view. Hence, our 
considerations of hylomorphism will involve metaphysical tenets importantly related to, 
but not necessarily proper to the philosophy of mind.   
 In section 5.1 we’ll wade into the waters of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics in 
order to introduce key terms and concepts. The following section, 5.2, will focus on 
Aquinas’s human ontology and the nature of human persons. Then section 5.3 will 
specifically discuss the human soul. Our considerations of the soul will move from 
focusing on the souls relation to the body to clarify the nature of the soul in itself. Once 
																																																								
1 See Alfred J. Freddoso (2012, p. 6, footnote 5), James Madden (2013, Ch. 8) and Peter 
King (2012).  
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the nature of the soul is clarified it will become apparent that the hylomorphic view I’m 
proposing is a substance dualist position. Section 5.4 will conclude the chapter and offer 
a summary of neo-Thomistic hylomorphism.   
5.1 Aristotelian Terminology 
I wish we could just translate all Aristotelian terms into our contemporary vernacular. 
However, some Aristotelian terms convey specific ideas not entirely captured by 
contemporary metaphysical terms. So it’s worth clarifying some essentials before trying 
to articulate neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. This section is devoted to doing just that. I 
won’t cover all the terms that will subsequently be employed. But I will introduce enough 
terms to start us down the path of explicating hylomorphism. The systems of thought 
referred to as ‘Aristotelianism,’ ‘Thomism,’ and ‘Scholasticism’ have benefited from 
some of the longest time periods of intellectual consensus and tradition in Western 
culture. As a result these systems of thought, which share in common their Aristotelian 
elements, are very substantive as well as nuanced. And I’ll merely scratch the surface of 
an extraordinarily rich intellectual tradition. 
 Nevertheless, one must begin somewhere. And I’ll begin with clarifying the term 
hylomorphism. Then substances will be distinguished from aggregates before we clarify 
the Aristotelian notion of a form. The concept of matter will then be discussed. At the end 
of this section we’ll employ the Aristotelian terms already discussed to clarify what a 
material substance is and to introduce what I’ll call an ‘en-forming relation.’  
5.1.1 Hylomorphism 
Fittingly, ‘hylomorphism’ is a compound Greek word that conveys the idea of a 
composite of form and matter. The Greek word ‘hyle’ means matter, while the word 
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‘morphe’ means form (Feser, 2009, p. 13). Put the two together and you get 
‘hylomorphism.’ Christopher Shields (2014) offers the following definition. 
 Hylomorphism =df ordinary objects are composite of matter and form. 
As the words ‘hyle’ and ‘morphe’ together amount to ‘hylomorphism,’ a real form and 
matter together constitute a concrete hylomorphic object. The key point expressed by this 
basic definition is that objects have two constituents: form and matter. While this 
definition is helpful it’s quite basic, if not too basic. For according to an Aristotelian-
Thomistic ontology, there are aggregates and then there are substances. The constitution 
of the former is significantly different than that of the latter.  
5.1.2 Substance vs. Aggregate 
A pile of logs is an aggregate and a tiger is a substance according to Aristotelian 
metaphysics. In this section substances will be distinguished from aggregates. My 
discussion will focus on three differences. First, substances are more ontologically 
fundamental than aggregates since aggregates are composed of substances whereas 
substances are not composed of further substances (Inman, 2018, pp. 102-106). Second, 
the parts of a substance (if it has parts) only have existence as a part of the whole 
substance, whereas the parts of an aggregate have existence that’s independent of the 
whole aggregate. Third, and most importantly, substances have an internal unity that 
aggregates lack (cf. Marmodoro and Page, 2016, pp. 6-7). This is because one single 
form grounds the existence and essence of a substance and all its parts. By contrast, the 
parts of an aggregate are themselves substances with their own individual forms that 
ground their own individual existence as the kind of substance they are. So an aggregate 
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depends on the forms that ground the existence of its parts, which are substances, as well 
as the form that modifies the parts in a way that unites the parts into one aggregate.  
 Let’s unpack these differences, beginning with the fundamentality of substances 
vis-à-vis aggregates. Substances are metaphysically prior to aggregates. Put differently, 
substances are more ontologically fundamental than aggregates. The reason is that 
aggregates are composed of substances and therefore substances are more basic than what 
they compose. Aggregates depend on the existence of their constituent substances like a 
pile of rocks depends on the rocks composing the pile. If you take away the rocks, the 
pile no longer exists. The pile’s existence depends on the existence of the rocks. 
Likewise, any aggregate’s existence depends on the existence of the substances that are 
parts of the aggregate.  
 My first job as a teenager can help us explicate the second difference between 
aggregates and substances, which pertains to their parts. My job was to walk through 
large cornfields in Mattawa, Washington in order to spot sizeable basalt rocks buried in 
the dirt, remove them from the dirt, and then pile them on the surface of the ground so 
that tractors could grade the dirt without inadvertently hitting the rocks beneath the 
surface. Let’s assume each individual basalt rock is itself a substance and consider five 
rocks – r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 – ten meters apart from each other. Imagine that after spotting these 
rocks in the dirt, I dig them out of the dirt and put them in one rock pile – R – that 
consists of the set of rocks {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5} and the external spatial relations they stand in 
to each other. In Aristotelian terminology, R is an aggregate consisting of substances 
standing in a configuration.  
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 Before R came into existence, the individual rocks existed as basalt rocks, by 
themselves, apart from one another. After compiling R, my job was to put its constituents 
into a tractor that would haul the rocks away. Imagine that one of the rocks, r2, falls out 
of the tractor as it drives down the bumpy dirt road. Clearly, r2 would no longer be a 
constituent of R, lying there on the ground by itself in the middle of Mattawa, as the other 
rocks (i.e. r1, r3, r4, r5) continue down the dirt road in the tractor. Although separated from 
R and its other constituent parts, r2 would still exist as what it was (i.e. a basalt rock) 
before it became a part of R and as what it was while a part of R (i.e. a basalt rock). The 
existence and essence of r2 remains the same since its existence and essence doesn’t 
depend on being a part of R, given that R is an aggregate and r2 is a substance. In other 
words, r2 is a separable part of R since it has its own existence that does not depend on it 
being a part of the aggregate R, which it was a part of at one time.  
 The substances that are the parts of aggregates are separable parts because their 
existence doesn’t depend on being a part of the aggregate. They have their own existence 
apart from the aggregate; that is, apart from the whole. By contrast, the parts of a 
substance are inseparable parts that do not and cannot exist apart from the substance 
they’re part of. 
 The reason why the separable parts of aggregates have their own existence apart 
from the whole aggregate they’re part of and that the parts of substances do not have 
existence apart from the whole substance they’re part of also pertains to the difference of 
unity aggregates have versus the unity substances have. An aggregate consists of 
multiples substances that are its parts, and each of these substances has its own individual 
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form that grounds its existence as the kind of thing it is. So each substance that’s part of 
an aggregate has existence in virtue of its own individual form.  
 The parts of substance are very different. One form grounds the existence and 
essence of the whole substance including each of its parts. Such a form is called a 
‘substantial form’ (see section 5.1.3). A single substantial form grounds the existence and 
essence of the whole substance including all its parts that it’s the form of. The parts of the 
substance are unified in virtue of the existence and essence of each part being grounded 
by one and the same form. Thus a substance is unified to the highest degree as each of its 
parts share the same form and exist only as a part of the substance they’re a part of (see 
Inman, 2018, pp. 103-104).  
 A human body is a common example of a substance. And as will be discussed 
further below, Aristotle and Aquinas thought the soul is the substantial form of the body, 
which grounds the body’s existence by grounding its unity and essence. Socrates’s body, 
for example, is a unified whole body since the existence and essence of each of its parts is 
grounded by one individual form, which is Socrates’s soul. Unlike the parts of 
aggregates, Socrates’s hand cannot exist apart from the whole substance and the form that 
unifies it. The parts of substances are inseparable parts. According to an Aristotelian 
understanding of substances, if Socrates’s hand were severed from his body, it would no 
longer literally be what it once was. We could debate what it would be, but one thing it 
would not be is: Socrates’s hand. 
 We can now summarize the differences here considered between substances and 
aggregates. To begin with, an aggregate is an entity composed of multiple substances, 
and the substantial form of each individual substance grounds the existence of each 
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individual substance that’s part of an aggregate. And the existence of the aggregate 
depends on the substances that are its parts and each of these substances depends on its 
own individual substantial form. Thus the aggregate’s existence depends on multiple 
substantial forms that ground the existence of its parts. In contradistinction, a single 
substantial form grounds the existence of a whole substance including its parts. Therefore 
a substance is fundamental in that it is not composed of further substance with their own 
individual substantial forms. The parts of a substance have their existence and their 
essence grounded by the same form that grounds the existence and essence of the whole 
substance. This is what unites a substance in a way that an aggregate is not united. Unlike 
the inseparable parts of a substance, the parts of an aggregate don’t depend on the same 
form for their existence and essence. 
 There are two passages from Aquinas’s writings that capture well the 
foundational differences between substances and aggregates we’ve addressed. In each, 
Aquinas uses the example of a body unified by a substantial form and a house composed 
of substances unified by a configuration that’s an ‘accidental form’1: 
Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. 
For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give 
existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and 
order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental. But the soul is a 
substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the 
whole, but also of each part (ST 1a 76.8c).  
The substantial form of the body grounds the existence of every part of the body as the 
kind of thing it is. Whereas the parts of a house, assuming they’re themselves substances, 
have their existence and essence grounded in their own distinct substantial forms. The 
substances composing the house are united by an accidental form, the configuration 
																																																								
1 See the following section 5.1.3 for an explication of what an accident form is. 
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they’re in. A foundational difference is the oneness (or unity) of the body due to the one 
form that unites it by grounding the existence and essence of each of its parts:  
For since the body of a man or that of any other animal is a certain natural whole, 
it will be said to be one because it has one form whereby it is perfected, and not 
simply because it is an aggregate or a composition, as occurs in the case of a 
house and other things of this kind (Aquinas, QDA 10c in Marmodoro and Page, 
2016, p. 12).1 
The body is internally unified because one form grounds its existence and essence as well 
as that of all its parts. The house consists of substances that have their own existence in 
virtue of their own substantial forms, and there’s a configuration (i.e. external spatial 
relations the parts stand in to one another) that is the accidental form that externally 
unites the house’s parts.  At this point, it behooves us to discuss forms more in depth.   
5.1.3 Forms 
To understand forms it’s important to know that there are both accidental forms and 
substantial forms. An accidental form modifies an existing entity, whereas a substantial 
form grounds the existence of a whole substance including its parts. A substantial form 
grounds the existence of a substance in virtue of grounding its unity and essence, thus it 
also grounds the properties and powers the substance has and naturally develops due to 
its essence.2 In this section, I’ll briefly describe accidental forms and then elaborate on 
substantial forms. 
 The shape of a statue is a well-known example of a form. When most people think 
of an Aristotelian form they think of a shape. Yet if a shape is all that comes to mind 
when one considers the hylomorphist’s claim that the soul is the form of the body, 
																																																								
1 Italics mine. ‘Questions on the Soul’ is abbreviated ‘QDA.’ With the exception of this 
quote, all other references to QDA are referring to James H. Robb’s (1984) translation. 
2 For an explication of grounding, see section 5.1.6. 
	
	 123 
misunderstanding will abound. A shape is an accidental form, whereas the soul is a 
substantial form.  
 Further examples of accidental forms are: the whiteness of a bench, the 
temperature of a body of water, and the firmness of a mango. Notice that these forms do 
not ground the existence of what they modify. The bench could become pink and still 
exist. The water could change its temperature without ceasing to exist. The mango could 
become soft as it ripens while continuing to exist. Each entity could exist without the 
specified accidental form. Thus such a form doesn’t ground the entity’s existence. 
Moreover, the bench could be what it is—a bench—with a different color. The water 
could be water if its temperature changed. The peach could still be a peach if it softened 
as it ripened. So the specified forms do not ground the essence of the entities in question 
any more than they ground the existence of the entities.  
 Unlike accidental forms, a substantial form grounds the existence of what it en-
forms (see section 5.1.6 on ‘en-forming’). A substantial form grounds the existence of a 
substance that it’s the substantial form of in virtue of grounding its unity and essence (see 
Marmodoro and Page, 2016, p. 15). This has multiple entailments. First, since the 
substantial form grounds the unity of the substance by en-forming every part of the 
substance, the substantial form not only grounds the existence and essence of the 
substance but also its parts. Second, since the substantial form grounds the essence of the 
substance and its parts, the substantial form is ultimately what grounds what properties 
and powers (or ‘capacities’/‘dispositions’) the substance and its parts essentially have and 
develop. For clarification, a substance and its parts can also have nonessential properties 
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that are not grounded by the substantial form (e.g. a starfish’s spatial location is 
nonessential and not grounded in its form).  
 To further elucidate the idea of a substantial form, let’s consider an apple tree, 
assuming that such is a substance. Suppose that in the summer of 2020 I plant a very 
young apple tree in my yard. Suppose further that the tree is so young it doesn’t have 
limbs or leaves when first planted, and therefore no fruit. Despite this, I can know that the 
tree will come to have a structure with limbs and leaves in due course, as long as the tree 
is well kept and maintains good health. Moreover, if it stays healthy for several years it 
will develop to the point where it consistently produces a fruit with a very standard 
structure. The structure of this fruit is so standard and predictable that we can imagine the 
shape of the fruit simply by knowing that the tree is an apple tree.  
 So about five years after being planted, the tree will predictably develop certain 
parts – limbs, leaves, and apples – with standard structures. While the structure of the 
limbs, for example, can vary to some degree, their structure will be standard enough that 
one could easily discern the apple tree limbs from willow tree limbs, or pine tree limbs, 
etc. The apple tree will develop these parts with certain structures due to the type of thing 
it is, which depends on the form that grounds its essence. Thus because the physical 
material of the apple tree has the form of an apple tree, it will develop to have apple tree 
limbs, leaves, and apples by the summer of 2025.  
 But let’s entertain the idea that in the autumn of 2025 the leaves and apples fall 
off the tree, and deer chew off all its young branches. Even so, there’s no need to fret. 
Assuming I maintain the tree well, it will regrow limbs, leaves, and apples over time. The 
old leaves and apples that grew in the summer of 2025 and fell off that autumn will 
	
	 125 
decompose. And the limbs eaten by deer will be digested and return to the soil. At the 
end of this cycle, the apple tree will have new limbs, leaves, and apples. But these new 
parts will be composed of different matter than the original parts.  
 Since an apple tree can live for a hundred years, this process of “part regrowth” 
can happen multiple times. The tree can lose its old parts and then regrow such parts with 
different constituent matter. Surely by the time the tree is one hundred years old it will 
have changed significantly and the matter that constitutes it will be different from the 
matter that constituted it when it was first planted. Yet the tree will persist. Despite the 
change, the tree that I planted in the year 2020 can live to 2120. That which makes it the 
same tree throughout the time and change is its substantial form. Since from 2020 to 2120 
the tree has the same substantial form, which grounds its existence, it’s the same tree 
throughout the time and change. Thus the substantial form also provides a way of 
explaining how the tree can persist through significant time and change: The tree persists 
because its substantial form persists through the time and change.  
 This is fitting since the substantial form of the apple tree is what grounds the 
existence of the tree as a unified apple tree at any given time. Since every material 
constituent of the tree shares the same form that grounds its existence, every material 
constituent is united as a material constituent of the same organism – an apple tree. 
Moreover, the apple tree is an apple tree, rather than say a dinosaur, because of the 
substantial form it has. If it had the substantial form of a dinosaur, it would have different 
properties, different powers, and different parts with different structures capable of 
manifesting the different powers. After all, the substantial form of a dinosaur has 
different properties and powers than the substantial form of a tree. So basically, if the 
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entity had the substantial form of a dinosaur rather than the form of an apple tree, it 
would be a dinosaur, not an apple tree.  
 In the final analysis the substantial form provides the ultimate natural explanation 
for the substance’s existence.1 In the case of our apple tree, the substantial form grounds 
the existence of the tree by grounding its unity as well as its essence, and therefore its 
essential properties and powers. And the parts of the apple tree are en-formed by the 
same substantial form, which therefore grounds their existence and essence as well. 
Given that the form grounds the tree’s existence and that of its parts, we could say the 
tree and its parts ontologically depend on the form.   
 By way of summary, according to Aristotelian metaphysics there are accidental 
forms and substantial forms. Accidental forms modify that which they are the accidental 
form of and an entity may have numerous accidental forms that modify it. By contrast, a 
substance will have only one substantial form that grounds its existence by grounding its 
unity and essence. Now that we have a basic grasp of forms, let’s consider the other 
constituent of a hylomorphic object. 
5.1.4 Matter 
Matter is the physical material of an entity. The matter of a ball is the physical material 
comprising the round ball. The matter of my wedding ring is the physical material 
																																																								
1 ‘Natural’ here is not meant to mean ‘physical’. Rather, assuming the natural world 
includes metaphysical facts, the form is thought to provide a metaphysical explanation. 
So it would provide a natural metaphysical explanation in contrast to either a natural 
physical explanation on the one hand or a non-natural, super-natural, explanation (e.g. 
God sustaining it in existence) on the other hand. I’ll often use the term ‘natural’ referring 
to the regular way things are given the nature of reality. So there can be natural physical 
facts, but also natural metaphysical facts.  
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wrapped around my finger. The matter of the statue David is the physical material shaped 
like the man, King David.  
 Notice that matter is the physical constituent of an entity, on Aristotelianism. All 
matter is the matter of something (Leftow, 2010, p. 397). And since all matter is the 
physical constituent of something that exists, it too exists. While Aristotelian and 
Thomistic metaphysics includes the concept of ‘prime matter,’ such matter doesn’t 
actually exist (cf. Feser, 2009, p. 14). ‘Prime matter’ refers to matter that has no form 
(see Wuellner, 1956, prime matter). But all matter that exists has a form(s), according to 
Aristotelianism. So prime matter doesn’t actually exist. Matter, on the other hand, does 
exist. And it’s a constituent of a particular type of substance, i.e. a material substance. 
5.1.5 Material Substance 
A material substance is a substance that consists of a substantial form that naturally en-
forms matter. Human persons, according to Aquinas, are material substances given that 
the human soul en-forms matter, constituting a physical body. By contrast, bodiless 
angels are immaterial substances. The difference between a material substance and an 
immaterial substance is that the substantial form of a material substance en-forms matter, 
which is not true of immaterial substances. Given that I’ve used and will often use the 
term ‘en-form,’ I’ll discuss it and the related concept ‘en-forming relation’ in the next 
section. 
5.1.6 En-forming Relation 
As just noted, a material substance consists of a substantial form that en-forms matter. 
This brings us to what I call the en-forming relation between the form that en-forms and 
the matter that’s en-formed. I’ll use the phrase ‘en-forming relation’ in reference to the 
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relation the substantial form and matter of a material substance stand in. When the 
substantial form en-forms matter, the form and matter stand in an en-forming relation. 
This relation, on my view, is an explanatory relation that’s not causal. Rather, this non-
causal explanatory relation is a grounding relation.1 The type of explanation grounding 
provides is distinct from scientific explanation or causal explanation, it provides 
metaphysical explanation (Fine, 2012, p. 37). To elucidate this type of explanation let’s 
consider two examples and then applying the concept of grounding to the en-forming 
relation. 
 First, imagine a halfpipe that’s decorated with graffiti at the notorious Burnside 
skatepark in Portland, Oregon. Suppose someone spray painted a white, red, and black 
image of a bloodshot eyeball onto its surface. Thus the halfpipe is colored. One could 
explain why it’s colored by referring to the graffiti artist’s actions and the cans of spray-
paint used to produce the effect of the skatepark feature being covered in white, red, and 
black paint. Such a causal explanation would be what most people are interested in.  
 But a non-causal metaphysical explanation could also be given for why the 
halfpipe is colored given that it’s dressed in white, red, and black paint. The metaphysical 
explanation is that the halfpipe is white, red, and black and white, red, and black are 
colors, and therefore the halfpipe is colored. Put differently, the halfpipe is colored in 
virtue of being white, red, and black. The reality that (a) the halfpipe is white, red, and 
black grounds (b) the reality that it’s colored.  
																																																								
1 Here I am only claiming that the en-forming relation is a grounding relation, not that all 
grounding is relational. Proponents of grounding disagree about whether grounding 
necessarily involves a relation (see Bliss and Trogdon, 2016, section 3).  
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 It’s important to notice several things about the grounding of b in a. First, there’s 
asymmetry. It is the case that a grounds b, but b does not ground a. After all, b doesn’t 
explain a, since b could be true and a could be false. The halfpipe could have been 
painted different colors and b would be true in that case as well. Second, related to this 
asymmetry is dependency; b depends upon a but not vice versa. Third, notice that a is 
explanatorily prior to b. We can assume that a and b became actual simultaneously, and 
therefore a is not temporally prior to b which we could assume if a provided the causal 
explanation of b. So the sense of priority that’s relevant is not causal but rather 
explanatory. It’s not that a is temporally prior to b, it’s explanatorily prior. Given that a is 
true, b is true; the former explains the latter. This notion of non-causal priority is 
fundamental to grounding (see Correia and Schnieder, 2012, p. 1). 
 Now, let’s consider a second example involving David Beckham. Let’s assume 
that he is, at present, a football player on the Manchester United football team. If we 
wanted to explain why Beckham is a Manchester United football player, we might give 
several different kinds of explanations. We could appeal to the lucrative salary he was 
offered to play for Manchester and the psychological influence that had on him, which 
led to his decision to sign with Manchester. We might call this an economic or 
psychological explanation. We also might give a physical explanation, such as he’s 
wearing a Manchester jersey and he is passing the ball to other Manchester players.  
 Yet, a metaphysical explanation could also be given. Such as, Manchester United 
is a football team consisting of a set of twenty football players and Beckham is a member 
of this set. In other words, Beckham is a Manchester United football player in virtue of 
being a member of a set that the Manchester United football team consists of. The reality 
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that Beckham is a member of the set constituting the Manchester team grounds the reality 
that Beckham is a Manchester football player. Notice that this doesn’t give us a causal 
explanation of why Beckham is a Manchester player. It gives us a metaphysical 
explanation in terms of grounding. 
 Suppose further that we wanted to know why Beckham is a professional football 
player. Once again we could give a metaphysical explanation in terms of grounding. That 
is, Manchester United is a professional football team and Beckham is a Manchester 
United player and therefore he’s a professional football player. So the reality that (A) 
Beckham is a member of the set of players that Manchester United consists of grounds 
(B) the reality that he is a Manchester player, which grounds (C) the reality that he is a 
professional football player. Here the fact that grounding can be transitive becomes 
relevant (see Correia and Schnieder, 2012, p. 8). In this example, A grounds B and B 
grounds C, so A grounds C.  
 In sum, the type of explanation grounding provides is distinct from scientific and 
causal explanation. Grounding provides metaphysical explanation. Furthermore, 
grounding is asymmetric, it involves asymmetric dependence where what’s grounded 
depends on what grounds it, and what grounds is explanatorily prior to what is grounded. 
And in some cases grounding is transitive.  
 There’s much more that can be said about grounding and there are issues that 
different proponents of grounding might disagree on. One issue, for example, is how 
grounding relates to modality. If x grounds y, is y necessary in every possible world that 
includes x? Or, is it possible for x to exist without y even though x grounds y? Different 
proponents of grounding have different views about whether or not grounding includes 
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necessity (cf. Audi, 2012; Chudnoff, 2011). Another topic of disagreement is whether or 
not grounding is analyzable in non-grounding terms or whether it’s primitive and 
unanalyzable. Most proponents of grounding, but not all proponents, think grounding is 
primitive and unanalyzable (Bliss and Trogdon, 2016, section 2; Correia and Schnieder, 
2012, p. 13). The claims I’m defending in this work don’t require any particular position 
on these issues; therefore I won’t defend any particular position on these issues here.  
 Having introduced grounding, let’s return to en-forming. The en-forming relation 
between a substantial form and the matter it en-forms is a grounding relation. Suppose 
substantial form x stands in an en-forming relation to y, then x grounds y. Because en-
forming is grounding. The non-causal en-forming relation between a substantial form and 
matter is an instance of grounding. The form grounds the existence of the matter it en-
forms.  
 As mentioned above, Aristotelian metaphysics includes the concept of ‘prime 
matter,’ which is matter that’s not en-formed and therefore doesn’t exist. Matter, on the 
other hand, does exist and it exists in virtue of being en-formed, but it never exists as 
undifferentiated matter. It exists as matter of a particular type of material object. In the 
case of a material substance, the material entity that consists of the en-formed matter is a 
unified entity of a particular kind.  
 In Aristotelian terms, the material entity is a unified entity with a particular 
essence. And this unified material entity exists in virtue of being en-formed by a 
substantial form. That is, the substantial form grounds the material entity’s existence. 
And the form grounds the material entity’s existence in virtue of the substantial form 
grounding the unity and essence of the matter that the material entity consists of. So 
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there’s a transitivity of grounding as follows. The substantial form grounds the unity and 
essence of the matter, and therefore it grounds the existence of the unified material entity 
of a particular kind.  
 According to the fundamental principle of neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, which 
will be discussed in much more detail below, the human soul en-forms the human body. 
The human soul stands in an en-forming relation to the matter it en-forms. The en-formed 
matter is the body. In light of our foregoing discussion, we can describe this en-forming 
relation the soul stands in to the body in terms of grounding. In short, the soul grounds 
the body. That is, the soul grounds the existence of the body. This is in virtue of the soul 
grounding the body’s unity and essence.  
 For elucidation, let’s consider the soul and body of a particular individual human. 
Allow ‘S’ to stand for Socrates’s soul and ‘B’ to stand for his body, which is a unified 
entity that’s a particular kind of thing, i.e. a human body. S en-forms B means S grounds 
the existence of B. And S grounds the existence of B because S grounds B’s unity and 
essence. The en-forming relation is a grounding relation.  
 As I move forward in describing and then applying neo-Thomistic hylomorphism 
I will use the Aristotelian and Thomistic terminology explicated in this section, including 
‘en-forming relation.’ Yet as I’ve discussed, what I mean when I say that Socrates’s soul 
en-forms his body is that Socrates’s soul grounds the existence of his body. And as we’ll 
see, contra Plato, the body is imperative on the view I’m advocating. 
5.2 Human Ontology   
This section is devoted to explicating a neo-Thomistic view of human persons. To begin 
with, Aquinas’s view of the whole person will be presented. Then the nature of the 
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human soul will be our focus. After which the human body will be considered. 
Subsequently I’ll discuss how neo-Thomistic hylomorphism differs from various 
competing views in the philosophy of mind.  
 Some may find it odd that the study of human ontology and philosophy of mind 
will be done in tandem throughout this section. However, rationale for considering 
Aquinas’s philosophy of mind and human ontology together is simple: that’s how 
Aquinas himself approached the subject. It doesn’t seem that the two areas of study are 
disjointed independent areas of inquiry in his mind. After all, his most elaborate 
discussions of the soul and the body are found in a section of the Summa Theologiae 
known as ‘the Treatise on Human Nature’ (see Aquinas, 2002). Hence in this section 
Aquinas’s thoughts on the nature of human persons and his philosophy of mind will be 
discussed in tandem.  
5.2.1 Human Persons 
It’s well known, or at least often thought, that Descartes held that human persons are 
thinking substances and thus identified human persons with their soul (cf. Descartes, 
1996, p. 54).1 On this Cartesian view it seems there is a disconnect between the nature, or 
essence, of humanity and the body. Our body is in no sense essential to our humanity. 
Such a notion is at odds with the intuition that our bodies are integral to us as human 
																																																								
1 My comments here pertain to the popular reading of Descartes and the view that’s 
commonly labeled ‘Cartesian dualism.’ Yet, as Stump (2003, p. 512) points out, at times 
Descartes seems to think a complete human person is a soul-body compound. Keith Ward 
(2013) makes a very similar point. He thinks Descartes viewed an embodied human 
person as one substance. It’s quite likely that Descartes has been misunderstood. 
Nevertheless, historical merits aside, the “Cartesian” view I will be referring to 
throughout this work is the popular understanding of Cartesian dualism. For it is the 
popular version of Cartesian dualism that’s almost always the focus when substance 
dualism is considered, and it’s the popular version of Cartesian dualism that Jaegwon 
Kim (2005) focuses on when he presents the pairing problem.  
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beings. An intuition that’s evident when we make comments like ‘Jordan is two meters 
tall,’ ‘Aryn looks beautiful,’ or ‘Kai is paralyzed from the waist down.’ Clearly it is one’s 
body that is a certain height, that looks beautiful, or that is paralyzed. And since it seems 
that a human person’s body is an integral aspect of them, it’s fitting to say a human 
person is a certain height, looks beautiful, or is paralyzed. In short, it seems intuitive that 
our bodies are integral to us and Cartesian dualism apparently disagrees with this 
intuition.  
 Like Cartesian dualism, Platonic dualism also identified human persons with their 
soul (ST 1a 75.4c; Stump, 2003, pp. 191-192). This view was well known in the 
thirteenth century, and particularly well known, and resisted, by Aquinas (Stump, 2003, 
pp. 192-194). The body, on Aquinas’s view, is not an extra add-on to a human person like 
one’s clothing. One respect in which hylomorphism differs from Platonic and Cartesian 
dualism is that the body is seen as essential to a human person.  
 Aquinas’s most concise teaching on human ontology is found in the 
aforementioned ‘Treatise on Human Nature’ (Pasnau, 2012, p. 350). This work is in the 
first part (i.e. prima pars) of the Summa Theologiae, from questions seventy-five to 
eighty-nine. The Summa is a theological work meant to educate those who are just 
beginning theological study (Pasnau, 2002b, p. xiii). As Aquinas explicates his views 
throughout this work he relies on three authorities: Aristotle, Church tradition, and 
Scripture. As Eleonore Stump (2003, p. 192) points out, Aquinas’s general thoughts on 
human nature were guided by intuitions summed up by two biblical passages: Genesis 
3:19b and Ecclesiastes 12:7. The former reads, “…for you are dust, and to dust you shall 
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return.”1 God is here speaking to Adam as if Adam is dust, and thus a physical being. 
According to the latter verse, “…and the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit 
returns to God who gave it.” These words are spoken by the Preacher, the son of King 
David (see Ecclesiastes 12:8; 1:1) about the death of man. Interestingly, this latter 
passage suggests that human persons have a spiritual constituent that’s not identical to the 
body and that persists after death. Together these passages imply that human persons are 
physical beings, but not merely physical beings. They can easily be taken to suggest 
Aquinas’s view that a human person is composed of matter and soul.  
 After discussing purely spiritual creatures and merely corporeal creatures, 
Aquinas (ST 1a 75) turns in the ‘Treatise on Human Nature’ to consider human beings 
“who are composed of a spiritual and corporeal nature.”2 The spiritual nature Aquinas is 
referring to is the soul; the corporeal nature is the body. He thought a human person is a 
material substance composed of matter that’s the physical constituent of the body, and a 
soul that’s the substantial form of the body. Reasoning from what he thinks is true of a 
particular human to what he thinks of the human kind, Aquinas (ST 1a 75.4c) writes: 
“For just as it belongs to this human being to be composed of this soul, this flesh, and 
these bones, so it belongs to the account of human being to be composed of soul, flesh, 
and bones.”3 Regarding human nature, Aquinas agrees with Augustine who thought “a 
human being is neither the soul alone, nor the body alone, but the soul and the body 
together” (City of God, XIX 3, in Aquinas, ST 1a 75.4sc). 
																																																								
1 Biblical quotations are from the English Standard Version, unless otherwise noted.  
2 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the ‘Treatise on Human Nature’ refer to Robert 
Pasnau’s (2002) translation published by Hackett. 
3 Italics are not mine. 
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 On another critical point mentioned above, Aquinas agrees with Aristotle, who 
thought the human soul must be the form of a material body (see De Anima 412a 20). As 
the form of the body, the soul “contains the body” and “makes it be one thing” (ST 1a 
76.3c). Simply put, it unites the body by grounding the existence and essence of each of 
its parts. A human person, on this view, is a substance that naturally consists of a 
substantial form (i.e. the soul) that en-forms matter (i.e. the body). A human person 
consists of a soul that naturally en-forms its body, which is essential to human nature (cf. 
Pasnau, 2012, pp. 349-350).  
 But why is the human soul naturally the form of a body that’s essential to human 
nature? Couldn’t it be nonessentially united to a body? Following Aristotle, Aquinas (ST 
1a 76.1c) reasons:  
For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local 
movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which 
we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, 
is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 
2).1  
Here we get introduced to a fundamental reason Aquinas thought the body is essential to 
human nature and the human soul naturally en-forms a body. The reason is that the 
human soul depends on the body in order to operate consistently with its nature (ST 1a 
84.4c & 89.1c; cf. 75.7 ad 3).  
 An essential operation Aquinas often refers to is sensing. Humans, like animals, 
are sensory creatures (Aquinas, SCG II.57). According to Aquinas, human nature 
includes sense perception and the human soul by nature senses. Though the human soul is 
an intellectual soul with the capacity to reason, it is also a sensory soul with the capacity 
																																																								
1 Quoted from the Benziger Brothers (1947) edition, translated by the Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province. 
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to sense. But Aquinas did not think the soul could sense by itself without the body; rather 
it depends on the body to sense. Once again following Aristotle, he thought that in order 
to sense one must be moved by external objects and therefore the soul needs something 
that can be so moved, which is the body (Aquinas, SCG II.57). For example, the heat 
from a campfire affects the body producing a sensation of warmth. Since the human soul 
is sensory and depends on the body to sense, human persons by nature consist of a soul 
that en-forms a body, as Aquinas (ST 1a 75.4c)  explains:  
But any given thing is identified with what carries out the operations of that thing, 
and so a human being is identified with what carries out the operations of a 
human being. We have shown, however, that sensing is not the operation of the 
soul alone [75.3]. Therefore since sensing is one of the operations of a human 
being (even if not one unique to humans), it is clear that a human being is not a 
soul alone, but something composed of a soul and body. Plato, however, since he 
claimed that sensing belongs to the soul alone, could claim that a human being is 
a soul using its body. 
Here we see a dependence of the soul on the body for its operations, or the exercise of its 
powers. This idea of soul-body dependence will be taken up again in Chapter 7, as it’s 
integral to the explanation of neural correlates of consciousness that I present.  
 There is a second line of rationale for the idea that the soul is by nature the form 
of the body that’s essential to human nature. It appeals to soul-body unity. If, as 
Platonists thought, the body is nonessential to human nature and the soul is not naturally 
the form of the body, then it’s difficult to explain why the human soul is united to a body 
that’s nonessential to human nature. As Stump (2003, p. 194) points out: 
According to Aquinas, Platonists will have trouble explaining the way in which 
soul and body are joined. Platonists, Aquinas says, are committed to supposing 
that the soul is united to the body through some intermediary, because diverse, 
distinct substances cannot be bound together unless something unites them. 
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Because the body is nonessential to human nature according to Platonists, it will be 
difficult for them to explain why the human soul is united to a body and they will have to 
explain it by appealing to an intermediary between the soul and its body. But if, as 
Aquinas held, the human soul is by nature the substantial form of a body essential to 
human nature, then it’s only fitting for it to en-form a body and appealing to any 
intermediary that unites body and soul won’t be necessary (see QDA 9c). Since 
Aquinas’s view doesn’t require postulating something that unites the human soul to its 
body, his view provides a simpler explanation of why the soul is united to a body. This 
issue of soul-body unity that Aquinas was concerned with is similar to the causal pairing 
problem and, as will become apparent in Chapter 6, my response to the causal pairing 
problem is similar to Aquinas’s treatment of this issue.  
 Yet for now, it’s important to further explain hylomorphism before applying it to 
mental causation and NCC, which I’ll do in the next two chapters. While human nature 
includes the body because humans are sense-perceptible and the soul depends on the 
body to sense, the body depends on the soul for its existence. The soul doesn’t depend on 
the body for existence, but rather grounds the existence of the body. In Aquinas’s (QDSC 
un. 2 ad. 3) words:  
…It must be said that the soul has subsistent actual being, inasmuch as its own 
actual being does not depend on the body, seeing that it is something raised above 
corporeal matter. And yet it receives the body into a share in this actual being in 
such a way that there is one actual being of soul and of body, which is the actual 
being of a man. 
According to Thomism a human person is one substance that consists of a soul that en-
forms matter, which is the body that exists because it’s en-formed by a soul. Given that 
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the body’s existence depends on being en-formed by the soul, it cannot subsist on its own 
apart from the soul that is its substantial form.  
 It’s critical to see that on the hylomorphic view of a human being, the soul (i.e. 
the substantial form) and the body (i.e. the en-formed matter) are related via an en-
forming relation. As the form of the body, the soul en-forms the body. The existence of a 
particular human body is grounded by a particular human soul. Were the body not en-
formed, it wouldn’t exist. And not only does an individual human body have existence 
because it’s en-formed by a particular human soul, it’s also what it is because it’s en-
formed by a form of a certain type. Hillary Clinton’s body, for example, exists since it’s 
en-formed by a soul, it’s a human body since it’s en-formed by a human soul, and it’s 
Clinton’s body since it’s en-formed by her soul. In short, Clinton’s body exists and exists 
as her human body because her soul en-forms the matter her body is comprised of.  
 At this point, hylomorphists disagree with physicalists who think the existence of 
the mental ontologically depends on the physical. Such ontological dependence of the 
mental on the physical would safeguard the explanatory priority of physics, which is 
critical to physicalism (cf. Kim, 1993, pp. 209-210). Thus many physicalists who hold to 
mind-body supervenience see it as a relation of ontological dependence, where the mental 
is dependent on the physical (see Kim, 2011, p. 12). For instance, “according to realizer 
functionalists, a mental property is to be identified with the first-order physical property 
occupying (or ‘realizing’) that mental property’s defining causal role” (Tiehen, 2012, p. 
223). If that’s the case, then the mental property couldn’t exist without some physical 
base property realizing such a causal role. So the mental, on this view, depends for its 
existence on the physical. Hence the realizer functionalist sees the dependency relation 
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going in the opposite direction than the Thomistic hylomorphist. For physicalists in 
general, mental states ontologically depend on the physical. For the Thomistic 
hylomorphist, the mental soul grounds the physical body’s existence, and therefore the 
latter ontologically depends on the former.  
 Interestingly, hylomorphism also differs from dualist views that assign 
ontological priority to the physical, such as property dualism and emergent dualism. 
Property dualists admit sui generis mental properties, but see such properties as 
depending for their existence on the physical (see Chalmers, 1996; O'Conner, 1994). 
Similarly emergent substance dualists think a mental substance emerges from, and thus 
ontologically depends on, the physical (see Hasker, 1999, pp. 189-190). Given that 
hylomorphism claims the dependency relation goes in the opposite direction because the 
soul grounds the body’s existence, hylomorphism differs from property and emergent 
dualism.  
 Hylomorphism doesn’t only distinguish itself from physicalist views or views 
with physicalist leanings. It also differs from Cartesian substance dualism. The body, on 
hylomorphism, is a substance only in the sense that it’s an inseparable aspect of a single 
human substance.1 Apart from being an aspect of a human substance, it’s not a substance. 
In other words, it’s not a substance in-and-of itself. However, according to Cartesian 
dualism the body is a substance in itself, as the soul is.2 Hence you have two substances 
on the Cartesian view that exist in-and-of themselves. But according to hylomorphism, 
																																																								
1 I frequently use the phrase ‘inseparable aspect’ in reference to what metaphysicians call 
an ‘inseparable part,’ especially in the context of discussing substances. For the word 
‘part’ conjures up images of separable parts in the minds of most English speakers. And 
since an inseparable part is very different from a separable part, the word ‘aspect’ is 
preferable when conveying the idea of an inseparable part. 
2 At least this is how Cartesian dualism is often described (cf. Stump, 2013, 26:02). 
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it’s not that two substances, which exist in-and-of themselves, form one person consisting 
of two substances. Rather, a human person is one substance. The body is an inseparable 
aspect of that one substance, on neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. 
 Furthermore, the body is critically relevant to human nature from the Thomistic 
perspective. Accordingly, in Disputed Question on Spiritual Creatures Aquinas (QDSC 
un. 2 ad. 5) writes:  
…It must be said that no part has the perfection of a nature, when separated from 
the whole. And hence the soul, since it is a part of a human nature, does not have 
the perfection of its own nature, save in union with the body. 
Since Aquinas sees the body as essential to human nature, it’s fitting that a human soul 
devoid of its body is lacking as a human substance on his view. In reference to what’s 
lacking, Aquinas employs the concept of: the perfection of an entities nature. The idea 
seems to be that a human soul lacks the perfection of its human nature when unembodied. 
According to Aquinas, the body is required for the perfection of human nature.  
 What Aquinas (QDSC un. 2 ad. 5) goes on to say in the same passage suggests 
why. He thought a thing is not “perfect in its own nature unless what is virtually 
contained in it can be actually brought out.” And certain powers of the soul, Aquinas 
seemed to think, are “dependent on corporeal matter.” For “powers which are acts of the 
organs flow from it.” In other words, some actions of the body are the exercise of powers 
grounded in the soul. If such powers are significant, or essential to human nature, the soul 
needs the body to be perfected in nature. For without the body, the soul lacks its capacity 
to exercise such powers. Thus elsewhere, Aquinas (ST 1a 76.4 ad 2) notes that the soul 
moves the body “…through its potential for producing movement, the actualization of 
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which presupposes a body…”1 Basically, a human person’s body is needed to fully 
exemplify their human essence, which includes certain properties and powers. 
 By way of summary, according to this view, a human person is a hylomorphic 
object consisting of soul and body. Furthermore, the body is essential to a human person. 
This distinguishes hylomorphism from Cartesian dualism, but also prompts the questions: 
What qualifies hylomorphism as a substance dualist position? After all, hylomorphism 
shares common ground with materialist positions like animalism and Peter van Inwagen’s 
materialist human ontology.2 Yet, my thesis is that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can 
overcome the chief contemporary objections to substance dualism. While I gladly admit 
hylomorphists share common ground with materialists, in the following section I’ll 
clarify what makes neo-Thomistic hylomorphism a substance dualist position. 
5.3 Incarnate Souls 
According to Aristotle (402a 10): “To attain any knowledge about the soul is one of the 
most difficult things in the world.” If that’s true, the second most difficult thing is 
interpreting what Aristotle and Aquinas said about the soul. True, their insights are worth 
the exegetical labor. Nevertheless, interpreting these two philosophical giants is not 
always easy. And the nature of the soul on Aquinas view is particularly controversial, 
especially the issue of whether the soul is an immaterial substance. According to my 
interpretation of Aquinas described in this subsection, the soul is an immaterial or 
nonphysical substance. Given that some will think I’ve misinterpreted Aquinas, I re-
emphasis the neo-Thomistic element of my neo-Thomistic hylomorphic view. The 
																																																								
1 Italics mine. 
2 On animalism, see Eric Olson (2007, Ch. 2). For van Inwagen’s materialist human 
ontology, see van Inwagen (1990; 1993; 2007). 
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primary aim of this subsection is not to defend my interpretation, but rather to explicate 
the nature of the soul according to neo-Thomistic hylomorphism.  
 To begin with, let’s consider the passage that will guide our exposition. In 
Question 76.1 of the Summa, Aquinas’s hypothetical objector challenges his view that the 
soul is the form of the body on the grounds that the soul subsists, or is a subsistent (ST 1a 
76.1 obj. 5). And according to Aquinas (ST 1a 29.2c), a subsistent is a thing that has 
existence in itself, as opposed to having its existence in another.1 Essentially, Aquinas’s 
interlocutor claims Aquinas’s view that the soul is the body’s form is incompatible with 
his view that the soul is subsists (see ST 1a 75.2c). Aquinas (ST 1a 76.1 ad 5) responds as 
follows: 
(Section I) The soul shares with corporeal matter the existence in which it 
subsists: from that matter and from the intellective soul, one thing comes about. 
This occurs in such a way that (Section II) the existence that belongs to the whole 
composite also belongs to the soul itself, something that does not occur in the case 
of other forms, which are not subsistent.  
I’ve labeled two sections of Aquinas’s response, which will guide our considerations 
respectively. We’ll begin with Section I and consider the soul as the form of the body. 
Then we’ll move on to Section II and consider the soul in itself.  
5.3.1 The Form of the Body 
I mentioned above that Aristotle and Aquinas considered the soul to be the form of the 
body. As such, the soul grounds the body’s existence. We see this idea described in 
Section I of the passage above. In the description there’s one thing that exists in itself – 
																																																								
1 For example, my dog Anselm is subsistent, but his tail is not subsistent. It exists only as 
a part of Anselm’s body. Strictly speaking, his tail would not exist as his tail if it were 
separated from his body.  
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the soul. But also included in the description is something that depends on the soul for its 
existence. That’s the corporeal matter en-formed by the soul – i.e. the body.  
 The soul “shares” its existence with the body. The soul has existence that doesn’t 
depend on the body, but the soul confers existence on the body. The soul grounds the 
existence of the body given that it grounds the body’s unity making it a unified existing 
entity that’s a human body as opposed to another type of body. The soul exists in itself, 
whereas the body exists because the soul exits and grounds the unity and essence of the 
body. In that sense, the soul “shares” its existence with the body. Consequently, there’s 
one hylomorphic object—a human person—that exists. The person consists of a soul that 
en-forms corporal matter, which is the body. 
 As the form of the body the soul is meant to be embodied, according to Aquinas 
(see ST 1a 76.2 ad 6). Since my soul is the form of my body its natural state is to be en-
forming my body. Thus it’s naturally related to my body via an en-forming relation, as 
form en-forming matter. According to hylomorphism, a soul is not related to a body 
through an external relation such as a causal relation that pairs an immaterial substance 
with a material substance. Rather, there’s an en-forming relation where the soul en-forms 
matter and therefore a single material substance exists.1 This en-forming relation is an 
intrinsic relation because it’s internal to one substance, rather than between two 
substances. And as discussed in section 5.1.6, this en-forming relation is a grounding 
relation. The soul grounds the body’s existence. 
 The body, according to this view, would not exist as a single biological human 
organism were it not a unified entity. The form of the body, the soul, grounds the unity of 
																																																								
1 See section 5.1.5. 
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the body. Moreover, there are other kinds of unified biological organisms. What grounds 
the fact that the body is a human body, as opposed to some other kind of biological 
organism, is the fact that a human soul en-forms it. Thus the form of the human body, the 
human soul, grounds the human body’s existence in virtue of grounding its unity and 
essence. 
 Given that the substantial form grounds the unity of the body, one might think the 
form is like what contemporary metaphysicians call bare particulars or bare substratum. 
A key difference, however, is that bare particulars and bare substratum are bare property-
less entities (cf. Loux, 2006, p. 84; Mackie and Jago, 2013, 4.5). Substantial forms are 
not bare. The form of the human body, the soul, has properties and grounds the essential 
properties and powers of the human being (see Pasnau, 2012, p. 361). So the human soul 
of hylomorphism should not be thought of as a mere bare substratum, nor tantamount to a 
powerless “free-floating shape” (2012, pp. 352-353). Souls have properties and powers. 
As Pasnau (2012, pp. 352-353) notes, souls are agents with causal power.  
5.3.2 The Soul Itself 
Since we’ve fleshed out Section I of our guiding text, let’s now consider Section II. Here 
we read, “The existence that belongs to the whole composite also belongs to the soul 
itself, something that does not occur in the case of other forms, which are not subsistent.” 
According to Aquinas, the existence of the whole substance belongs to the soul itself. 
Assuming that, one naturally wonders: How can the existence of the whole belong to the 
soul without the soul being a substance? The answer reveals that Aquinas is at least an 
“Aristotelian dualist,” as Pasnau puts it (2002b, p. xvii). In short, the soul is a substance. 
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 In Question 75.2 of the Summa, Aquinas addresses the question of whether the 
human soul is subsistent. When briefly stating his position in the said contra, he quotes 
Augustine as giving an affirmative answer. Directly following, he concludes: “Therefore 
the nature of the human mind is not only nonbodily, but also a substance – that is, 
something subsistent” (ST 1a 75.2sc). Not everything that subsists is a substance, but if 
the soul is a substance then the answer to the question of whether it subsists is 
affirmative. As Pasnau (2002a, p. 225) points out in his commentary on this text, Aquinas 
prefers to call the soul a subsistent and is likely bringing his terminology in line with 
Augustine’s use of ‘substance.’ But Aquinas can do this without miscommunicating his 
view of the soul because according to his view the soul is both a subsistent and a 
substance. Pasnau (2002a, p. 225) explains: 
Strictly speaking, the two are not equivalent, and Aquinas always prefers to 
describe the human soul as subsistent. For something to be a substance, in his 
strict usage, it must not only subsist but also be the underlying subject of 
accidents (see I Sent.  23.1.1c, QDP 9.1c)…The soul does meet the second 
condition, and so does count as a substance, but Aquinas regards subsistence as 
the more basic notion. 
 Indeed, the soul is a unique form. According to this reading of Aquinas, the form 
of a particular type of material substance, a human person, is itself a substance (cf. 
Pasnau, 2012, p. 353).1 Moreover, according to Aquinas, it’s a rational (that is, thinking) 
substance (see ST 1a 75.2c & 75.6c).2 To boot, it’s a subsistent that can exist apart from 
the matter it en-forms—i.e. the body (see Brown, 2005, p. 103). That the soul is capable 
																																																								
1 Howard Robinson (2016, section 1.2) seems to likewise interpret Aquinas. For a 
different view on whether the soul is a substance according to Aquinas, see Christopher 
M. Brown (2005, pp. 55-57).  
2 As I’ll discuss in Chapter 7, according to Aquinas’s view of cognition there’s a role for 
the brain (see ST 1a 75.2 ad 3, 1a 89.1c). Nevertheless, he thought “the human being 
thinks, through the soul” (ST 1a 75.2 ad 2).  
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of such is made clear in the sentence directly following Section II of our guiding text. 
Having just said the existence of the whole composite belongs to the subsistent soul, 
Aquinas writes: “And for this reason the human soul continues in its existence after the 
body is destroyed, whereas other forms do not” (ST 1a 76.1 ad 5). Aquinas believed the 
soul’s natural state is to be embodied, that is, to be en-forming the body (see ST 1a 76.2 
ad 6). Yet, he also thought it could exist unembodied between bodily death and being 
bodily resurrected. 
 To be clear, my aim is to defend a Thomistic view of the soul, not a view of the 
afterlife. I, too, think human souls persist after bodily death and before bodily 
resurrection (albeit not for the same reasons as Aquinas).1 Nevertheless I describe 
Aquinas’s view of the afterlife, specifically what theologians call the intermediate state, 
in order to further clarifying the nature of the soul, on Aquinas’s view. In order to 
embrace neo-Thomistic hylomorphism one need not embrace Aquinas’s view of the 
afterlife.  
 Given the description of the soul thus far and that mainstream contemporary 
philosophy consists of various versions of materialism, as Searle (1992, p. xiii) put it, 
Aquinas is clearly outside orthodoxy. Worse yet, it seem he’s committed an unpardonable 
transgression by crossing the line into substance dualism. However, two superlative 
Aquinas scholars that I’ve relied on – Robert Pasnau and Eleonore Stump – are reluctant 
to place Aquinas in the substance dualist camp.2 Pasnau (2002b, p. xvii) admits he’s a 
dualist but makes it very clear he’s not the same type of substance dualist as Plato and 
Descartes (see also Pasnau, 2002c, Ch. 2). Stump (2003, p. 212) seems willing to admit 
																																																								
1 I think such can be demonstrated on theological grounds, but not philosophical. 
2 See also Alfred Freddoso (2012, p. 6, footnote 5) and James Madden (2013, Ch. 8). 
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“…Aquinas seems clearly in the dualist camp somewhere…” Yet, according Stump’s 
(2003, p. 212) interpretation of Aquinas, the soul is subsistent but not a substance 
according to Aquinas’s criterion for a substance.  
 Nevertheless she admits the soul can exist without the body on his view, which 
suggests it’s more like substance dualism than property dualism (2003, p. 212). She then 
suggests:  
Maybe we should invent a new genus subsistence dualism, under which substance 
dualism will be one species and Aquinas’s account of the soul another. But 
perhaps we need not be so fussy. It is clear that Aquinas’s account of the soul is 
more nearly allied with substance dualism than with property dualism; and if we 
do not take ‘substance’ in ‘substance dualism’ too strictly (if it can include 
subsistent things that are not complete substances), then we can count Aquinas 
among the substance dualists. In that case, we ought to categorize Aquinas as a 
non-Cartesian substance dualist and put him in the camp of those opposed to 
physicalism. 
That’s not a bad option. Given that the subsistent soul we’re talking about seems very 
much like what contemporary philosophers of mind would call a substance, whether or 
not Aquinas would according to his technical scholastic terminology. However, after 
describing this option, Stump (2003, pp. 212-216) apparently rejects it and goes on to use 
Aquinas’s positions as an example that reveals that the category lines between dualism 
and materialism/physicalism have been misdrawn.  
 I agree with Stump that we should question the current categorizations. And 
Aquinas’s view certainly challenges the contemporary characterization of dualism. But 
given the current categories, and the description of substance dualism I provided in 
Chapter 1, it seems undeniable that Aquinas is a dualist.1 According to Edward Feser 
																																																								
1 See Chapter 1 section 1.3. 
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(2009, pp. 162-163), Aquinas is a dualist indeed, despite the reluctance of some to admit 
it: 
In their zeal to emphasize the differences between Aquinas’s position and that of 
Plato and Descartes, some of his defenders have tended to insist that he was not 
only not a materialist, but not a dualist either. But this “pox on both houses” 
approach, motivated in part perhaps by a fear that contemporary philosophers 
might be too quick to dismiss Aquinas if he is labeled with the “D word,” is not 
very plausible. As we’ve seen, Aquinas held both that the intellect is immaterial 
and that the soul survives the death of the body. Surely that counts as dualism by 
most people’s reckoning, and certainly by the reckoning of most contemporary 
philosophers…Better, then, just frankly to acknowledge the fact, and to defend 
Aquinas’s position on its merits rather than pretend it is something it is not.  
I can’t help but agree that Aquinas is a card-carrying dualist, for better or worse. And 
defending his unique dualist position (or at least my interpretation of it) on its own merits 
is precisely what I intend to do in the next two chapters. But before doing so, it will be 
helpful to succinctly summarize the position I intend to defend.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to introduce a unique substance dualist position that 
originated with Aquinas. Using his thoughts as a guide, not as an infallible final 
authority, I’ve sketched out a position that I think is the most defensible substance dualist 
position. We can summarize it like so.  
Neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. A human person is a single substance that naturally 
consists of a substantial form that en-forms matter. The human soul is the 
substantial form that en-forms matter, constituting a human body. The soul and 
body stand in an en-forming relation. Thus each person’s body is fundamentally 
related to their soul via an en-forming relation, which is a non-causal grounding 
relation. The body is a unified biological organism consisting of matter unified by 
its form, the soul. The soul is a nonphysical rational substance that’s not identical 
to the body, which it en-forms. The soul has properties and powers and grounds 
the essential properties and powers of the person, including the body. 
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 The next two chapters are devoted to demonstrating that neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism is capable of overcoming substance dualism’s paramount problems. In 
other words, I aim to show that this oft forgotten dualist position can defeat dualism’s 
potential defeaters. In Chapter 6 I’ll argue that it provides a solution to the causal pairing 
problem. Subsequently, in Chapter 7, I’ll argue that it offers a good explanation of neural 
















Hylomorphism & the Causal Pairing Problem 
 
Now that the causal pairing problem and neo-Thomistic hylomorphism have been clearly 
presented, it’s time to apply the latter to the former. The pairing problem, as I argued in 
chapter three, is substance dualism chief problem regarding mental causation. At the root 
of the pairing problem is the charge that if substance dualism were true then mental 
causation would be incoherent since there’s no way for immaterial minds to be causally 
paired with their effects. The purpose of this chapter is to show that hylomorphism is a 
substance dualist position that’s immune to the pairing problem.  
 My primary aim is to show that hylomorphism offers a coherent explanation of 
why a particular mind is causally paired with its effects, and thus provides a solution to 
the pairing problem. This explanation (or account) of causal pairing capitalizes on the 
fundamental tenet of hylomorphism, that the soul is the form of the body. I’ll present this 
specific hylomorphic solution of mine in section 6.2. However, there are other alleged 
hylomorphic solutions to the pairing problem. Thus in section 6.1, we’ll reconsider the 
pairing problem and then I’ll explain two other hylomorphic solutions to the pairing 
problem in order to distinguish them from my own. At that point I’ll also offer my 
rationale for preferring my own hylomorphic solution to the pairing problem over and 
above these other alleged solutions. Before wrapping up section 6.1 I’ll give three 
preliminary critiques of Kim’s argument that don’t depend upon hylomorphism. After 
	
	 152 
explicating my hylomorphic account of causal pairing in section 6.2 I’ll respond to the 
two toughest objections to my account in section 6.3 just before concluding.   
6.1 Reconsidering the Causal Pairing Problem 
As demonstrated in chapter four, the causal pairing problem alleges that mental causation 
is metaphysically impossible for the immaterial minds of substance dualism.1 The nature 
of causation and the nature of immaterial minds supposedly preclude the possibility of 
mental causation. In this section, I’ll reconsider Kim’s argument for the pairing problem. 
First, a brief summary of the argument will be given. Second, I’ll discuss two 
hylomorphic responses that differ from my own hylomorphic response. My aim will be to 
distinguish the former from the latter and to provide rationale for why my response is 
preferable. Third, I’ll clarify which premises of Kim’s argument I’ll object to via my own 
hylomorphic response. Yet before presenting my response, which aims at providing a 
solution to the pairing problem, I’ll wrap up this section with three preliminary critiques 
of Kim’s argument.  
 Let’s summarize Kim’s argument for the pairing problem (cf. Kim, 2005; 2009). 
Of fundamental importance is the idea that causation requires a pairing relation between a 
cause and its effect. But unfortunately for substance dualism there is no possible relation 
that could pair an immaterial mind with an effect, argues Kim. After all, spatial relations 
are the only type of relation that could possibly pair causes with effects. Yet immaterial 
minds are not spatial, and thus cannot stand in spatial relations. And since spatial 
relations are the only type of causal pairing relations, immaterial minds can’t stand in 
																																																								
1 See Chapter 4 for a detailed explication of the pairing problem. 
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causal paring relations. Hence Kim concludes: mental causation is metaphysical 
impossible for immaterial minds. I’ve formally reconstructed Kim’s argument as follows: 
(1) For every case of causation there is a cause-effect pairing relation between 
cause and effect. 
 
(2) All cause-effect pairing relations require spatial relations. 
 
(3) An entity/event must be spatial to stand in any cause-effect pairing relation 
(from 2). 
 
(4) Immaterial minds are not spatial. 
 
(5) Immaterial minds cannot stand in any cause-effect pairing relation (from 3; 4). 
 
(6) Therefore, mental causation is impossible for immaterial minds (from 1; 5). 
 Neo-Thomistic hylomorphists might respond to Kim’s argument in various ways. 
Before moving on to consider my own line of response, let’s consider two noteworthy 
responses hylomorphists might give that differ from mine.  
6.1.1 Two Hylomorphic Responses 
The aim of this section is twofold. For one, I hope to clarify two potential hylomorphic 
responses that differ from mine in order to distinguish my hylomorphic response from 
these other two responses. Additionally, I’ll point out shortcomings pertaining to each 
response. These deficiencies provide rationale for preferring my response to these other 
two responses. However, let me admit that such shortcomings fall short of rendering 
these two responses as dubious dead ends. My aim is not to show that these other 
responses are irredeemably hopeless. Rather, my twofold aim is to distinguish them from 
mine and to warrant serious consideration of my proposed hylomorphic response.  
 The first response we’ll consider exploits the hylomorphic tenet that a human 
person is a single material substance. According to this response, the pairing problem 
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doesn’t arise given that a human person is a single substance. The second response claims 
that the soul is spatial via the body. Therefore, according to this second response, the soul 
meets Kim’s prerequisite of spatiality for causality.  
 One might wonder whether these responses are mutually exclusive. It seems to 
me that the hylomorphist can’t endorse both simultaneously. But if she finds that her 
preferred response fails, she can certainly consider endorsing the other response. In any 
event, however, I hope it becomes apparent that my hylomorphic response is preferable 
to each of these two hylomorphic responses.  
First Response: Single Substance 
 As was stated in the previous chapter, according to neo-Thomistic hylomorphism 
a human person is a single material substance consisting of a form and matter. The soul, 
according to this view, is a substance in itself that en-forms matter and thus there’s one 
material substance. While the body is not identical to the soul, it’s also not a distinct 
substance apart from the soul that en-forms it. Rather, there’s one substance – a human 
person – and the body is an aspect of that one material substance. Pope Francis, for 
example, is a single human person consisting of a soul that en-forms matter, which is 
Pope Francis’s body. Given this view of human persons, the hylomorphist can question 
the very grounds that prompt the pairing problem.  
 Recall from chapter four that Kim (2005, pp. 73-74) tees up his argument for the 
pairing problem by commenting on erstwhile arguments presented by historical critics of 
“Descartes’ interactionist dualism.” According to common renditions of this dualist view, 
the immaterial mind and material body causally interact with one another (Kim, 2005, p. 
77). Hence the infamous objection: The two substances – the immaterial mind and the 
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physical body – are of such different categories that it seems impossible for them to 
causally interact (see Kenny, 1968). As an argument against dualism this objection “is 
incomplete and unsatisfying…it only expresses a vague, inchoate dissatisfaction of the 
sort that ought to prompt us to look for a real argument,” writes Kim (2005, p. 74). He 
(2005, p. 74) asks: “Why is it incoherent to think that there can be causal interaction 
between things in ‘diverse categories’? Why is it ‘impossible’ for things with diverse 
natures to enter into causal relations with one another?”1 Notice the use of the plural 
‘things’ and the concern regarding how these things interact. This is Kim’s starting point.  
 The hylomorphist, however, isn’t obliged to start in the same place. Given the 
hylomorphic view that a human person is a single material substance, the hylomorphist 
need not start with things, plural. Rather, she begins with thing, singular. And since there 
is a thing, not things, you don’t have causal interaction between two things, according to 
hylomorphism (see Feser, 2009, pp. 166-167; Madden, 2013, p. 275). Instead you have 
an exercise of power by one thing with distinct aspects.  
 For example, imagine that my soul has a mental intention to run that leads to my 
legs striding forward. The mental intention to run and the movement of my legs are the 
intention and movement of the same material substance exercising its power to run. There 
are not two substances causally interacting, according to hylomorphism. Instead there’s 
one substance that exercises its power(s).  
 Neo-Thomistic hylomorphism differs from Cartesian dualism in a significant 
respect. Cartesian dualism says two substances – soul and body – causally interact. But 
according to hylomorphism, there is no such interaction. And given that there isn’t 
																																																								
1 Italics mine. 
	
	 156 
interaction between two substances, there is no reason to ask what causally pairs the two 
interacting substances. At least, that’s the central claim of this first response. 
 Put differently, the starting point of Kim’s argument for the pairing problem is 
available given Cartesian dualism, but unavailable given hylomorphism. This is 
problematic for Kim’s argument because he is ultimately trying to show that if substance 
dualism were true then mental causation would be incoherent. To do so, he starts with 
tenets of a dualist view and then tries to show how mental causation would be 
metaphysically impossible given such tenets. Kim’s rendition of Cartesian dualism 
supplies him with the tenets he needs for his starting point. For according to Cartesian 
dualism, two substances causally interact. However, neo-Thomistic hylomorphism 
doesn’t supply Kim with such premises. Because according to hylomorphism there is one 
substance exercising its powers, therefore there isn’t causal interaction between two 
substances. Nevertheless, Kim needs his starting point and therefore he needs the tenets 
that provide it. But hylomorphism doesn’t provide such tenets. Thus the pairing problem 
simply doesn’t arise given hylomorphism. Hence, it seems there is no pairing problem for 
hylomorphism. 
 That’s the first hylomorphic response. It clearly hinges on the hylomorphic tenet 
that a human person is one material substance. Given that tenet Kim’s starting point for 
generating the pairing problem is absent and the pairing problem doesn’t arise. So if the 
hylomorphist’s aim is to show that her position is consistent given her starting 
assumptions, which significantly differ from Kim’s, then this response is worthy of 
serious consideration. However, this first response may be unpersuasive to most 
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physicalist sympathizers since it highlights the different starting points, rather than 
highlighting common ground and then proceeding.  
 When it comes to persuasive power, the hylomorphist will be better off if she can 
grant some ground to Kim and still provide a satisfactory response. One aim of my own 
response, though not the primary aim, is to meet this desideratum. The hylomorphist that 
adopts my response can easily grant the validity of Kim’s argument in addition to his first 
and fourth premises, and then merely take exception with his second premise, which 
entails his third. In light of this, my hylomorphic response to the pairing problem has the 
potential to be more persuasive than this first response. In due course, I’ll present my 
response and the reader can judge for herself. But beforehand we shall distinguish a 
second hylomorphic response, which also differs from my own.  
Second Response: Spatial Soul 
 If the hylomorphist primarily wants to meet Kim on his own terms, one tempting 
response is to acknowledge the validity of his argument and accept all but one premise—
premise four. According to this premise, immaterial minds are not spatial. The 
hylomorphist that takes this route of rebuttal denies premise four since she thinks the soul 
is spatial via the body.  
 Yet, how can the hylomorphist say the soul is spatial via the body? Basically, she 
tries to capitalize on the idea that the body, which is spatial, is an aspect of the soul.1  
Given that the body is spatial and an aspect of the soul, she concludes that the soul is 
spatial since an aspect of it (i.e. the body) is spatial.  
																																																								
1 Some hylomorphists think the body is a mode of the soul rather than an aspect of the 
soul (cf. Moreland, 2015, p. 201). This response could be re-articulated accordingly.  
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 Recall that according to the hylomorphic view I outlined in the previous chapter, 
the soul is a substance in itself and it’s also the form of the body. The human soul en-
forms matter that’s the human body.1 Thus a human person is a particular type of 
substance, a material substance. The soul en-forming the body is a material substance 
since the substance includes en-formed matter. Yet it’s important to note that the matter 
is not a substance in itself apart from the form that en-forms it, i.e. the soul. After all, 
there’s only one substance, and that’s the soul. The en-formed matter, the body, is an 
aspect of the soul. Since the body is an aspect of the soul and the body is spatial, the soul 
is spatial since an aspect of it is spatial. In other words, the soul is spatial via the body.  
 If that’s true—if the soul is spatial—premise four of Kim’s argument is false. 
Consequently, premise five wouldn’t follow, and neither would Kim’s conclusion. In 
brief, the pairing problem says: spatiality is necessary to stand in causal pairing relations 
and since immaterial minds aren’t spatial they can’t stand in such relations. If the 
hylomorphist can justifiably deny Kim’s claim in premise four that immaterial minds 
aren’t spatial, it seems that she can undermine Kim’s argument for the pairing problem.  
 As a hylomorphist and as someone who is spatially located, I see the initial 
attraction of this route of response. For one, it seems obvious to me that I’m spatially 
located in Washington State at present, not in Antarctica. Secondly, it’s perfectly 
consistent with hylomorphism, and Aristotelian thought at large, to think our souls are 
spatially located where our bodies are. After all, according to hylomorphism, a person’s 
soul unites the parts of her body making it a unified object, so it’s fitting to think her soul 
is spatially located where her body is.  
																																																								
1 On this en-forming relation, see Chapter 5 section 5.1.6. 
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 Nevertheless, I doubt this second response can be successful. Suppose Kip’s hand 
rises as the result of his mental intention to raise his hand and flag a taxi. This response 
says Kip’s intention is causally paired with his hand rising because his soul is spatial; 
thus his soul’s intention stands in a spatial relation to the effect. However, the soul is 
spatial via the body, in the way described above. So according to this response Kip’s soul 
is causally paired with the effect of his hand rising because his soul is spatial since his 
body, an aspect of Kip, is spatial. According to this line of thought, it seems that some 
spatial part of the body stands in a spatial relation with the effect and that spatial relation 
explains the causal pairing relation. If that’s the case, ultimately the spatiality of the body 
is what explains the bodily effect (i.e. Kip’s hand rising). And we’ve just causally paired 
one spatial part of the body with another spatial part of the body.  
 Given that, we must ask: What causal work is the soul doing?  The answer seems 
to be: none. After all, the soul is spatial since an aspect of the substance – i.e. the body – 
is spatial. Simplistically put, the soul’s spatiality is the body’s spatiality. Thus it must be 
some spatial part of Kip’s body that stands in the spatial relation to the effect, and 
therefore stands in the causal pairing relation. But if it’s a spatial part of Kip’s body that 
stands on the ‘cause’ side of the cause-effect pairing relation, then a part of Kip’s body is 
doing the causal work, not Kip’s soul. So what causal work is the soul doing? It seems 
it’s not doing any causal work, if the tenets of this response are correct.1 But this response 
is supposed to explain how the soul, not a part of the body, is causally paired with effects. 
 At the end of the day, I think this second response fails because a part of the body, 
rather than the soul, ends up being the cause. Yet, the first response lacks persuasive 
																																																								
1 Kim (2000, Ch. 2) gives a similar argument against non-reductive physicalism. 
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power since it focuses on the different starting points; thus leaving the hylomorphist with 
little common ground upon which to reason with her interlocutors. Given the deficiencies 
of these two hylomorphic responses, I offer a different hylomorphic response to the 
pairing problem. In section 7.2 my hylomorphic response will be given. But before we 
consider it, I’ll offer preliminary reasons to doubt Kim’s second premise.   
6.1.2 Questioning the Necessity of Spatial Relations 
My explicitly hylomorphic response to the pairing problem will question Kim’s second 
premise, which says all cause-effect pairing relations require spatial relations. This 
premise is essential to Kim’s argument and entails premise three, which says that an 
entity/event must be spatial in order to stand in any cause-effect pairing relation. 
Basically I’ll try to show that, contra Kim’s second and third premises, hylomorphism 
can account for why a mental cause is paired with its effects without appealing to spatial 
relations. Yet before giving a particularly hylomorphic response to the problem, it will be 
helpful to weigh some general reasons to doubt that spatial relations are necessary to pair 
causes with effects. In this subsection such general reasons, which don’t depend on 
hylomorphism, will be given.  
 To begin with, I’ll consider Kim’s rationale for premises two and three. Secondly, 
I’ll point out an unstated assumption that Kim’s argumentation rests upon. Thirdly, two 
justified beliefs that are inconsistent with the idea that spatiality is necessary for causality 
will be brought to bear on the issue. At this point I’ll unearth a threat posed to premises 
two and three by Kim’s own view of qualia. Lastly, I’ll draw attention to a flaw regarding 




Kim’s Case for Premises 2 & 3 
 Let’s consider Kim’s justification for his second major premise, which entails his 
third major premise. The following is his rationale for the claim that all cause-effect 
pairing relations require spatial relations.  
2.1 In clear cases of physical causation, spatial relations account for cause-effect 
pairing relations. 
 
2.2 Besides spatial relations we do not know what could account for cause-effect 
pairing relations.  
 
2.3 Therefore, spatial relations are necessary for all cause-effect pairing relations 
(from 2.1 & 2.2). 
Note that 2.3 does not necessarily follow from 2.1 & 2.2, so we shouldn’t take this as a 
deductive argument. It’s either an inductive or abductive argument for the idea that 
spatial relations are necessary for cause-effect pairing relations. 
 Secondly, let’s note that Kim also gives justification for each of these sub 
premises. In support of 2.1, Kim (2005, pp. 78-79) offers an example of physical 
causation involving two guns, A and B. The guns are simultaneously fired and 
simultaneously cause the deaths of Adam and Bob. Spatial relations, such as the distance 
gun A is from Adam and its orientation toward Adam, explain why the firing of A caused 
Adam’s death. The same can be said for the firing of gun B causing Bod’s death. So Kim 
(2005, p. 79) concludes, “spatial relations seem to serve as the ‘pairing relations’ in this 
case, and perhaps for all cases of physical causation involving distinct objects.”1  
																																																								
1 Italics mine. The hylomorphist who responds to Kim’s argument by way of the first 
response considered above might want emphasize the words “involving distinct objects.” 
Since the hylomorphist could agree with Kim on this score and go on to point out that 
according to the hylomorphic view a person doesn’t consist of two distinct objects, but 
rather two distinct aspects of one substance. 
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 Yes, perhaps, spatial relations serve as pairing relations for all cases of physical 
causation. But this hardly supports the idea that spatial relations must “serve as pairing 
relations” for all cases of causation, including those involving immaterial causes. Hence 
the need for 2.2.  
 In support of this sub premise, 2.2, Kim (2009, pp. 32-33) offers the following 
line of reasoning: 
…I can state my fundamental assumption in general terms, and it is this: It is 
metaphysically possible for there to be two distinct physical objects, a and b, 
with…the same causal potential or powers; further, one of these, say a, causes a 
third object, c…Now, the fact that a, but not b, causes c to change must be 
grounded in some fact about a, b, and c. Since a and b have the same intrinsic 
properties, it must be their relational properties with respect to c that provide an 
explanation of their different causal roles vis-à-vis c. What relational properties, 
or relations, can do this job? The only plausible answer seems to be that it is the 
spatial relation between a and c, and that between b and c, that are responsible for 
the causal difference between a and b vis-à-vis c (a was in the right spatial 
relation to c; b was ‘too far away’ from c to exert any influence). At least, there is 
no other possible explanation that comes to mind.1 
The question is: Why did one physical object, rather than another physical object with the 
same causal powers, cause an event? Kim wants an explanation of what grounds the fact 
that a, but not b, caused a particular event. And he thinks this explanation must depend 
on a particular type of relation that the physical objects stand in. The only answer that 
comes to his mind hinges upon spatial relations.  
 However, if the question included immaterial souls (rather than physical objects) 
as the alleged causes, then another relevant relation might come to mind for those 
sympathetic to dualism. Perhaps, an immaterial mind is paired with bodily effects simply 
in virtue of the relation of unity between a person’s mind and body. For example, Smith’s 
mental intention could be causally paired with Smith’s hand rising because Smith’s soul 
																																																								
1 Bold mine.  
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is united to his body. Likewise, Jones’s intention might be paired with his hand rising 
since his mind is united to his body.  
 But the problem is that one’s soul and body are united via a causal relation, 
according to Kim’s reading of Descartes. So “the ‘union’ of a mind and a body that 
Descartes speaks of, therefore, presupposes mental causation” (2005, p. 77). Given this, 
Cartesian dualists would in effect be saying that Smith’s mind causes his body because 
his mind causes his body. This circular explanation won’t do. And supposedly there are 
no other relations that are good candidates for pairing causes with effects. Yet in causal 
cases involving physical objects spatial relations seem to pair causes and effects. So 
spatial relations are the only relations that could pair causes with effects, even when it 
comes to mental causation involving immaterial minds. At least that’s Kim’s rationale for 
premises two and three, which claim spatial relations are necessary for causal pairing 
relations and hence only spatial entities can stand in such relations.  
Unstated Assumption  
 Kim (2005, p. 87) ultimately concludes that if substance dualism were true, 
mental causation would be precluded by the “diverse natures” of mind and matter. Kim 
thinks that the natures of immaterial minds, if such exists, must be significantly different 
than the nature of matter. Given the diverse natures of physical substances versus 
nonphysical substances, it seems fitting to assume that the nature of causation involving a 
physical cause is probably different than the nature of causation involving a nonphysical 
cause. However, Kim assumes the opposite.  
 He assumes that the principles governing physical causation must also govern 
causation involving nonphysical causes. From the outset he presupposes that examples of 
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physical causation are paradigmatic for all causation, even causation involving 
immaterial substances. When Kim (2009, p. 32) attempts to prime the pump of our 
intuitions, he asks us to “consider an example of physical causation.” But why should we 
expect that causation between merely physical objects would provide us with a causal 
framework that applies to causation involving immaterial substance? After all, if 
immaterial substances are so different in nature from material substances, shouldn’t we 
expect the nature of causation involving immaterial substances to be different than the 
nature of causation involving merely physical objects? We should at least be open to the 
possibility.  
 Yet, Kim tacitly assumes that causation produced by nonphysical substances must 
mirror causation produced by physical substances. He assumes that causation involving 
immaterial minds will be based on the same principles as causation between merely 
physical objects. So after using his examples of physical causes to show us that spatiality 
is necessary in such cases, he concludes that spatiality is necessary in every case of 
causation. But without Kim’s unspoken assumption, the steps he takes to arrive at his 
conclusion are too hasty and unjustified. For causation between merely physical objects 
could be exactly as Kim describes it, and yet causation involving nonphysical substances 
could differ in nature. Put differently, Kim may have identified the essential principles 
and necessary conditions for physical causation, but that doesn’t justify the idea that 
causation involving immaterial minds must be based on the same principles and require 
the same conditions. Kim just assumes the latter.  
 At the very least, Kim owes us justification for his unstated assumption, which 
doesn’t fit well with the idea that physical and nonphysical substances are very different 
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in nature. Such justification may be hard to find apart from presupposing physicalism. 
Nevertheless, it’s needed. 
Inconsistent Beliefs 
 Some might think Kim’s claim that an entity must be spatial to stand in a causal 
pairing relation doesn’t demand much justification because it’s obvious. Indeed, for the 
materialist, it may seem obviously true. After all, there may be nothing else in her 
ontology that could possibly account for causation. However, the idea that spatiality is 
necessary for causality seems much less plausible when it’s shown to be inconsistent with 
justified beliefs. In this subsection I’ll point out two justified beliefs that seem to be 
inconsistent with the idea that entities must be spatial to stand in causal pairing relations. 
The first belief is classical theism. The second is Kim’s own belief about qualitative 
states of consciousness, coupled with the fact that pinpricks cause pain. I won’t here 
defend the justification of these beliefs. I’ll merely assume they’re justified. My aim is to 
point out that given certain justified beliefs, Kim’s second and third premises are not 
obviously true, but rather seem false.   
 To begin with, classical theism contradicts Kim’s claim about the necessity of 
spatiality. According to classical theism, God is nonspatial and the creator of the 
universe. As such, God is the cause of the universe and all of spacetime coming into 
existence.1 So according to theism, God is the nonspatial cause of the universe and 
spacetime. This clearly contradicts Kim’s claim that an entity must be spatial to be 
causally paired with an effect. Thus assuming that the theist’s belief is warranted (see 
																																																								
1 Some might quibble with this position on the basis that God is omnipresent and go on to 
infer that God must therefore be spatial. But even if such were so, it wouldn’t threaten the 
nonspatiality of God prior to the creation of all things including space. 
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Plantinga, 2000) or justified (see Swinburne, 1996), she can justifiably deny Kim’s 
second and third major premises (cf. Plantinga, 1984). After all, she’s justified in 
believing that there was a nonspatial cause of the universe and spacetime, and therefore 
she is justified in believing that a nonspatial entity can stand in a causal pairing relation. 
Clearly, I haven’t argued here that theistic belief is justified. Rather the point is: assuming 
theistic belief is justified, theists can justifiably deny Kim’s second and third premise.   
 Secondly, Kim’s own view of qualia seems inconsistent with his claim that 
spatiality is necessary for an entity/event to stand in a causal pairing relation. At the end 
of Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough, Kim (2005, p. 170) concludes that qualia are 
physically irreducible. Qualia are the felt sensations of what it’s like to be in particular 
mental states (see Shoemaker, 1995). For example, a state of pain caused by a pinprick 
feels different than tasting chocolate. The difference in feeling is a difference in qualia. 
The point that concerns us here is that Kim thinks qualia are physically irreducible. In 
other words, according to Kim, qualia are nonphysical mental states.  
 Recall that Kim thinks nonphysical minds would be nonspatial if they existed, 
given that they would be nonphysical. He also doesn’t think there is a way of locating 
such nonphysical minds in space that would help dualist overcome the pairing problem 
(see Kim, 2005, pp. 88-90). Now, assuming that Kim would consistently apply his 
thinking about nonphysical minds to nonphysical qualia, it’s fair to suppose that 
nonphysical qualia would be nonspatial according Kim’s view. Granted he doesn’t 
explicitly say this, but if there is an advantageous way for him to locate nonphysical 
qualia in space it seems dualist could do the same regarding nonphysical minds. Yet, 
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according to him dualist can’t do so, thus it seems that nonphysical qualia can’t be 
spatially located, according to Kim’s line of thought. 
 One might object that if qualia are properties rather than substances, then they can 
be spatially located where their bearers are. However, there are at least two considerable 
responses to this objection. First off, Kim’s commitments seem to exclude this solution. 
Kim claims that if souls were spatial, then spatial exclusion would apply to them and they 
couldn’t be co-located in the same space as their bodies (see 2005, pp. 89-90). He seems 
to think spatial exclusion applies to anything and everything that’s spatial. Assuming 
such a position, if qualia are spatial, then spatial exclusion applies to them in addition to 
their physical bearers. Consequently, qualia couldn’t be co-located where their physical 
bearers are any more than spatial souls could be co-located where their bodies are.  
 Thus, given Kim’s commitments, the prospect of locating qualia where their 
physical bearers are faces the same problem that Kim alleges Cartesian souls face. 
Granted, this is no fatal problem for qualia or souls. It’s likely that nonphysical qualia 
could be spatially located in relevant proximity to their physical bearers, if not in the 
exact location. And if mental causation does depend on such spatiality, then the necessary 
condition would be preserved. However, if such is possible for qualia with respect to their 
bearers, I see no reason why it couldn’t be possible for souls. In other words, if 
nonphysical qualia can be spatially located in some helpful way to preserve mental 
causation, then the same is probably true of souls.  
 This brings me to my second response. Kim makes no attempt to preserve the 
causal efficacy of qualia, and that’s what would motivate an attempt to locate qualia in 
space. In fact, he cuts the causal cord and surrenders nonphysical qualia, the irreducible 
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“mental residue”, to epiphenomenalism (2005, pp. 170-171). According to 
epiphenomenalism, there are sui generis mental properties that are causally impotent. 
Regarding nonphysical qualia, Kim says: “It has no place in the causal structure of the 
world and no role in its evolution and development” (2005, p. 171).  
 Kim’s willingness to give up on the causal efficacy of qualia is consistent with his 
aims. After all, if you allow nonphysical qualia to have causal jobs, you’re cracking the 
door open for other nonphysical aspects of reality to obtain causal jobs. To boot, that 
might take such jobs away from physical entities. “May it never be!” says the primacy of 
physics. Put differently, if nonphysical qualia can be causally efficacious that 
compromises the causal closure of the physical domain, which would compromise the 
primacy of physics (cf. Kim, 1993, pp. 209-210). By claiming that qualia are 
epiphenomenal, Kim avoids this possibility. Moreover, assuming that qualia are 
epiphenomenal, he has no need to explain how they’re spatial and thus capable of 
causation. In sum, Kim’s tenets imply that nonphysical qualia are nonspatial and he has 
no reason to locate them in space, but reason not to. 
 Kim’s tenets haven’t been haphazardly adopted; they’re needed to secure the 
pairing problem. However, they imply that nonphysical qualia are nonspatial. But here’s 
the rub: Qualia often stand in cause-effect pairing relations. For example, pinpricks often 
cause pain. And the felt sensation of what it’s like to be in pain is a qualitative state.1 
Thus, some qualia – i.e. states of pain – are caused by pinpricks. So nonphysical qualia, 
																																																								
1  Kim (2005, p. 170) does say “ordinary sensory concepts, like ‘pain’…have 
motivational/behavioral aspects in addition to qualitative/sensory aspects” and that the 
former aspects are functionalizable and thus reducible. But this qualifier doesn’t negate 
his prior claim: “Pain as a sensory quale is not a functional property” (2005, p. 169). 
Thus he thinks that a state of pain, as a quale, is a part of the mental residue that’s not 
functionalizable, and therefore, irreducible and nonphysical. 
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which Kim’s tenets suggest are nonspatial, stand in cause-effect pairing relations, albeit 
on the ‘effect’ side of the relation. But according to Kim’s second and third major 
premises, nothing can stand in a causal pairing relation if it’s not spatial. So it seems that 
if Kim is correct about the irreducibility of qualia, then qualitative states of pain caused 
by pinpricks refute his second and third major premises. 
 To conclude, Kim’s own view of qualia, coupled with the fact that pinpricks 
cause pain, provides reason to doubt Kim’s second and third major premises. For there’s 
a clear inconsistency between these premises and the nonspatiality of qualia, which is 
implied by Kim’s tenets that secure the pairing problem. Hence it’s not only that these 
premises seem false from the theist’s vantage point, Kim’s own view of qualia justifies 
doubt regarding these premises. Granted, those who don’t share Kim’s view of qualia 
will be unmoved by this point. However, the idea that qualia are irreducible is not 
without warrant and is gaining noteworthy traction in philosophy of mind (see Chalmers, 
1996; 2003; Kim, 2011, Ch. 10; Robinson, 2012).  
Non Sequitur  
 Lastly, Kim’s second major premise doesn’t actually follow from the justification 
he offers for it. His first sub-premise 2.1, says that we know that spatial relations pair 
physical causes with physical effects. His second sub-premise 2.2, says that we don’t 
know what other type of relations could pair causes with effects. What follows is: If there 
are nonphysical causes, we don’t know what type of relation would pair such causes with 
their effects. And that’s inconsequential for the prospect of nonphysical causes. After all, 
there are many facts about the world that we’re ignorant of and one such fact could be 
what type of relation pairs nonphysical causes with effects.  
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 Of course, Kim thinks that what follows from 2.1 and 2.2 is that all pairing 
relations necessarily require spatial relations. But that doesn’t actually follow. That 
would only follow if we necessarily know what type of relation would pair all causes 
with their effects. Yet it’s possible for there to be a causes-effect pairing relation(s) and 
something that pairs the cause with the effect, and yet we’re presently ignorant of what 
exactly that is. Basically, Kim’s conclusion only follows if we know, in every case of 
causation, what relation pairs the cause with its effect. However, we may not have such 
knowledge in certain cases of causation. And such lack of knowledge on our part would 
do nothing to affect the existence of causal pairing relations that we are yet to understand. 
All that would follow is that there’s more for us to learn.  
 Furthermore it may be that when the physicalist considers what type of relation 
could possibly pair a nonphysical cause with its effect, no other type of relation other 
than a spatial relation “comes to mind” (Kim, 2009, p. 33). However, for this 
hylomorphist another type of relation does come to mind – that is, an en-forming relation. 
The en-forming relation that the soul stands in to the body, according to neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism, provides the basis of my hylomorphic solution to the pairing problem. 
6.2 The Proposed Hylomorphic Solution 
In section 7.1 I distinguished two hylomorphic responses to the pairing problem that 
differ from my own hylomorphic response. I also gave reasons, which don’t depend upon 
hylomorphism, to doubt Kim’s rationale for his second major premise that says spatial 
relations are required for causes to be paired with effects. Now in this section I’ll give my 
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own unique hylomorphic response to the pairing problem.1 My response denies premise 
two, which entails premise three, of Kim’s argument and justifies such a denial by 
showing that the hylomorphist can appeal to an en-forming relation to account for causal 
pairing. In a nutshell, my proposed solution says a person’s soul is causally paired with 
her body via the en-forming relation that her soul stands in to her body.2 Given this, the 
hylomorphist can justifiably deny Kim’s second major premise, which entails his third, 
while agreeing with Kim’s first and fourth major premises.  
 This section will be entirely devoted to presenting and explaining the proposed 
hylomorphic solution. Following this section I’ll explicate and respond to the two most 
forceful objections to my hylomorphic account of causal pairing.    
6.2.1 En-forming Relation & Causal Pairing 
Recall that the causal pairing problem says that if substance dualism is true mental 
causation is metaphysically impossible. This impossibility is said to arise because 
nonphysical minds, or souls, are nonspatial. Such nonspatiality is critical because, 
according to Kim, spatial relations are the only relations that could possibly pair mental 
causes with effects. Thus nonphysical, nonspatial minds can’t stand in causal pairing 
																																																								
1 I’m grateful to those who gave this material a preliminary hearing at the Northwest 
Philosophy Conference in October 2015 and October 2016, as well as the Society of 
Christian Philosopher’s Pacific meeting in April 2017. To my knowledge, no one else has 
developed this route of response to the pairing problem. However, in a pre-published 
version of his chapter ‘In Defense of Thomistic-like Dualism’ that he sent me in March 
2017, J.P. Moreland commends the type of response I’m advocating here, though we 
describe the en-forming relation differently (see Chapter 7 section 7.5). Moreland’s 
chapter was published in the Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, edited by 
Jonathan J. Loose, et al. (2017). In the pre-published version, Moreland’s commendation 
was in a paragraph in section III.1 of his chapter. While Moreland doesn’t develop the 
response, I find his commendation confirming. That’s not to say, however, that he would 
fully agree with how I’ve developed, articulated, and defended the response. 




relations. Hence they’re disqualified from all causal work, including mental causation. 
That’s the problem. And it hinges on Kim’s second premise – all cause-effect pairing 
relations require spatial relations – which is true if, and only if, spatial relations are the 
only relations that can pair causes with effects. 
 The Cartesian dualist might be inclined to think that a causal pairing relation can 
be explained by appealing to a relation of mind-body unity. However, Kim makes a 
significant point that’s worth recalling. According to his reading of Descartes, Cartesian 
dualism says a person’s mind is united to their body via a causal relation (2005, p. 77). In 
other words, a mind-body relation of unity is explained by a mind-body causal pairing 
relation. Given that, if Cartesians try to explain a causal pairing relation between one’s 
mind and body by appealing to mind-body unity, they’ll rely on the very pairing relation 
that they’re attempting to explain.1 As Kim (2005, p. 77) points out, such an explanation 
“presupposes mental causation.” Consequently, Cartesians can’t appeal to mind-body 
unity to explain causal pairing. For mind-body unity itself is supposedly explained by 
causal pairing. Since the causal pairing relation is explanatorily prior to the relation of 
mind-body unity, the latter can’t be appealed to in order to explain the former. Hence the 
problem for Cartesian dualism, as Kim depicts it.  
 On the neo-Thomistic hylomorphic view that I presented in the previous chapter, 
there’s a very different account of mind-body unity. According to Aquinas (ST 1a 76.3c), 
Plato thought the soul is united to the body as mover to moved. This Platonic view is 
much like Kim’s description of the Cartesian account of mind-body unity. Aquinas (ST 
																																																								
1 It should be noted that the Cartesian might think that the causal pairing relation is 
fundamental and therefore doesn’t need a natural or metaphysical explanation. In that 
case, she wouldn’t give one and thus wouldn’t fall prey to Kim’s following refutation. 
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1a 76.1c, 76.6c, 76.7c) explicitly rejected Plato’s account (cf. Stump, 2003, p. 200) and 
postulated that the soul is “immediately united to its body as form to matter” (ST 1a 
76.7c). Simply put, the soul is united to its body as its form (ST 1a 76.6 ad 3).  
 The mind, or soul, is not united to the body via a causal relation. Rather, the body 
is en-formed matter, and the form that en-forms that matter is the soul. Therefore the soul 
stands in an en-forming relation to the matter of the body. The soul is the form of the 
body. As such the soul grounds the existence of the body as a unified biological organism 
of a particular kind (i.e. a human body). The soul, qua form, grounds the unity and 
essence of the body. Without the soul en-forming the body, the body wouldn’t exist. 	
 Let’s use Kim’s character examples Smith and Jones to illustrate the form-matter 
en-forming relation as it pertains to human persons. According to neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism, Smith’s soul en-forms his body. This means that Smith’s body is a 
unified entity and has the essential properties and powers it has, due to the form that en-
forms it – i.e. Smith’s human soul. The existence of Smith’s body depends on Smith’s 
soul en-forming it. If the matter of Smith’s body wasn’t en-formed by Smith’s human 
soul, his human body wouldn’t exist. Likewise, Jones’s body exists as a unified whole 
that’s his human body since his soul en-forms it. The existence of each person’s body is 
grounded by the human soul that en-forms it. Consequently each person’s soul is united 
to their body as the form of their body.  
 The critical point for our purposes is: each human soul stands in an en-forming 
relation to the matter of the body it en-forms. According to this hylomorphic view, the 
en-forming relation is the most fundamental relation the soul stands in to the body. 
Moreover, the soul is the form of the body before it’s the cause of bodily movements. But 
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let me be clear that I’m not speaking here of temporal priority, since that’s not my 
concern. The en-forming relation is explanatorily prior to any causal relation the soul 
stands in to the body that it en-forms. Given that, we might deduce that no causal relation 
would be temporally prior to the en-forming relation either. Nonetheless, what’s 
imperative is that the soul stands in an en-forming relation to the body explanatorily prior 
to any causal relation. 
 In light of this, let’s reconsider Kim’s (2005, p. 76) thought experiment involving 
Smith and Jones. Recall that these two unfortunate individuals are psychologically 
synchronized. Consequently, whenever Smith wills to raise his hand Jones wills to raise 
his hand too. As a result their hands rise simultaneously. This prompts Kim’s (2005, p. 
76) vital question: “So why is it not the case that Smith’s volition causes Jones’s hand to 
go up, and that Jones’s volition causes Smith’s hand to go up?” Put differently, why is 
Smith’s soul, and thus his volition, causally paired with the rising of his hand, not 
Jones’s?  
 The hylomorphist has an answer: Smith’s soul en-forms Smith’s body, not 
Jones’s; therefore Smith’s soul is causally paired with his body, not Jones’s. On this 
view, the fact that Smith’s soul en-forms Smith’s body explains why his volition is 
causally paired with his hand going up. Basically, his soul is causally paired with his 
body since his soul en-forms his body. On the other hand, Jones’s soul en-forms Jones’s 
body, therefore his soul is causally paired with his body.  
 It’s perfectly fitting that a particular body that’s en-formed by a particular soul 
would be causally paired with the soul that en-forms it. Indeed it would be extremely odd 
if Donald Trump’s soul en-formed his body but was causally paired with Theresa May’s 
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body that’s en-formed by May’s soul. To the contrary, if Trump’s soul en-forms Trump’s 
body, we would expect his soul to be causally paired with his body. Hence this 
hylomorphic explanation easily avoids being ad hoc. The hylomorphist is explaining 
causal pairing by appealing to the en-forming relation that’s absolutely fundamental to 
Aristotelian-Thomistic human ontology.     
 Another benefit of the hylomorphic account I’m offering is that it’s not circular. It 
doesn’t presuppose a causal pairing relation that allegedly accounts for mind-body unity 
in an attempt to explain a causal pairing relation, as Cartesians are accused of doing. For 
the en-forming relation that the soul stands in to the body is explanatorily prior to causal 
pairing relations. In the explanatory chain, Smith’s soul is united to his body as its form 
before the question of why his soul is causally paired with his body arises. The very 
existence of a person’s body depends on that person’s soul, which grounds the unity of 
the individual’s body as well as its nature. Given that, it’s fitting for a person’s soul to be 
causally paired with the person’s body. 
 To summarize, Kim’s second and third premises claim that only spatial relations 
can pair causes with effects and thus entities must be spatial to stand in causal pairing 
relations. I’ve objected by putting forth another relation that’s capable of pairing causes 
with effects. That relation is an en-forming relation. The neo-Thomistic hylomorphist can 
account for causal pairing by appealing to the en-forming relation the soul stands in to the 
matter of the body. Therefore, the hylomorphist can justifiably deny premises two and 






Now that my own hylomorphic response to the pairing problem has been given it’s time 
to address objections to it. In this section I will evaluate and respond to two objections. 
First, I’ll address the objection that my account simply pushes the pairing problem back 
one level of inquiry. Second, I’ll evaluate the charge that my hylomorphic explanation of 
causal pairing, like the Cartesian explanation, presupposes a causal relation. Surely these 
two objections are not the only objections to my account. Yet given limited space, I’ve 
chosen to focus on these two objections in order to sufficiently respond. And such 
requires ample space since these objections are the most threatening objections that have 
been brought to my attention.  
6.3.1 First Objection: Pairing Problem Reduxed 
The most common objection to my hylomorphic explanation of causal pairing is the 
charge that it simply pushes the causal pairing problem back one level of inquiry. 
According to this objection, my account explains why one’s soul is causally paired with 
her body, but now we’re left wondering why one’s soul en-forms her body. We started 
with a causal pairing problem; we’re left with an en-forming pairing problem. At least 
that’s the claim of this objection that charges my account with reduxing, or pushing back, 
the problem I set out to explain. My response is as follows. 
 To begin with, it’s important to notice that the initial question differs from the 
follow-up question. At the outset, the question is: What explains why soul X is causally 
paired with body Y? My hylomorphic answer is that soul X is causally paired with body Y 
because X en-forms Y. Given this, a different question arises: What explains why soul X 
en-forms body Y? In light of my response to the causal pairing problem, this follow-up 
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question arises. Notice, however, that the follow-up question is not the same as the initial 
question. The new question pertains to Aristotelian metaphysics generally, since all 
material substances consist of en-formed matter. The initial question, however, is 
germane to philosophy of mind. Since the two questions being asked at each level of 
inquiry are different questions that address different issues, it’s not true that the initial 
question is simply being pushed back. Rather, a different question comes into view in 
light of my hylomorphic explanation of causal pairing. 
 One might retort that it’s equally troubling that my account leads to a further 
question that differs from the initial one. However, the fact that my hylomorphic 
explanation does so isn’t necessarily problematic either. For such is true of most good 
explanations. When explanans explain an explanandum we often wonder what explains 
the explanans. For example, when we discovered that oxygen gets to our working 
muscles because red blood cells carry oxygen to them, we didn’t say “okay that’s the end 
of our inquiry, let’s stop asking questions.” Rather, our inquiry moved forward to 
investigate further questions, such as: Why do red blood cells, rather than other cells, do 
such? Given this, we could say that the physiologist who discovered the initial fact about 
red blood cells progressed our inquiry. It’s not a problem that the physiologist’s 
explanation raised further questions requiring further research. (Such is considered by 
many to be a theoretical virtue called fertility.) Likewise, the fact that my explanation 
brings to the fore a new question isn’t necessarily a mark against it. Many good 
explanations lead us to further questions. 
 Secondly, the question my hylomorphic explanation of causal pairing raises is a 
metaphysical question that all Aristotelians must deal with. The question ‘what explains 
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why soul X en-forms body Y’ is difficult to answer. However, anyone who thinks material 
substances consist of form and matter will have to wrestle with this question (and other 
related questions) as it pertains to the form and matter of any hylomorphic material 
substance (cf. Lowe, 2012, p. 235; Marmodoro, 2013; Rea, 2011). For example, we could 
ask what explains why form P en-forms tree Q, or what explains why form R en-forms 
frog S, and so on. As long as you have a form en-forming matter, you can ask what 
explains that fact. Therefore, the question my hylomorphic account leads to is a 
metaphysical question pertaining to standard Aristotelianism. Thus it’s every 
Aristotelian’s problem; it’s not a problem unique to my hylomorphic account of causal 
pairing.1 And lest one is tempted to think that makes it worse, it should be acknowledged 
that all competing metaphysical views have difficult questions to answer. So unless one 
simply doesn’t subscribe to any view that entails metaphysical doctrines, they will also 
have to face challenging metaphysical questions.  
 Thirdly, the question ‘what explains why soul X en-forms body Y’ can evoke a 
misleading caricature of the human person as a mereological aggregate consisting of two 
parts that are somehow united (cf. Marmodoro, 2013, pp. 5-6). Such a caricature is not 
consistent with the neo-Thomistic hylomorphic view I’m proposing. It’s worth reiterating 
that the body, according the hylomorphic view I’m advocating, is not an entity that’s 
united to the soul that is its form. There aren’t two substances being united. Rather, there 
is one material substance and an aspect of that substance is the body, which is en-formed 
matter. Recall that a human soul is a unique substantial form in the sense that it’s a 
substance in itself and in its natural state it en-forms matter; the en-formed matter is the 
																																																								
1 I’m indebted to Nikk Effingham for bringing this point to my attention. 
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body. Given that, we might say that the soul, in its natural state, is a substance that’s an 
en-mattered form.1  An ‘en-mattered form’ is simply a form that’s en-forming matter. It’s 
important to see that the body isn’t an entity in itself, which the soul then en-forms. On 
this view there is one material substance and the body exists as an aspect of that 
substance. 
 Since the body exists only as an aspect of the human person and it’s not an entity 
in itself without the soul that en-forms it, the question ‘what explains why soul X en-
forms body Y’ is misleading. After all, there isn’t a self-existent substance called the body 
that the soul then en-forms. Instead there is en-formed matter, and that is the body. The 
body is not a body without the form. So whenever you’re talking about the body, you’re 
talking about matter en-formed by the soul.  
 Let’s consider an imperfect example (which involves a different type of form) 
that’s nevertheless illuminating. The statue David could not be what it is without the form 
that is the shape of the statue.2 The statue doesn’t exist apart from its shape, so to ask why 
it has its shape is like asking why it is what is. Given this and that every explanatory trail 
must stop somewhere, lest an infinite regress ensue, the Aristotelian can justifiable say 
that it’s just a brute fact that the statue David has the shape it has and that there’s no 
natural physical or metaphysical explanation. Likewise, since a human body wouldn’t be 
what it is devoid of the soul that en-forms it, the same could be said of it and its form. For 
without the soul, there is no body to speak of according to hylomorphism. Therefore, it 
																																																								
1 I got the term ‘en-mattered form’ from Marmodoro (2013, p. 5). 
2 As previously mentioned (see 6.1), the common example of a statue and its shape has 
shortcomings when it comes to explaining the nature of a substantial form and a material 
substance. Nevertheless it can help us understand the specific point made here.   
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seems legitimate for the hylomorphist to claim that natural explanations stop here and it’s 
a brute fact that a particular soul en-forms a particular body. 
 Lastly, with the above having been said, let me note that the hylomorphist can 
give a supernatural explanation of why a particular soul en-forms a particular body if she 
endorses theism and one element of Aquinas’s theology of divine simplicity.1 Aquinas’s 
explication of the doctrine of simplicity implies that there are various facets of it (see ST 
1a 3.1-8). Nevertheless, it’s clear that Aquinas understood simplicity to at least include 
the idea that God is not composed of form and matter. It’s this idea that I wish to 
capitalize on here.  
 In his ‘Treatise On the One God,’ Aquinas writes: “it is impossible that God 
should be composed of matter and form” (ST 1a 3.2c). He thinks God is “…of His 
essence a form; and not composed of matter and form” (ST 1a 3.2c). One might think that 
if God consisted of form and matter something would have to explain why God’s form 
en-forms the matter it does (cf. ST 1a 3.7c). But given that God is not composed of form 
and matter, no such explanation is needed. Thus the explanatory trail of all hylomorphic 
objects can ultimately stop with God. Since God is not a hylomorphic object requiring the 
same type of explanation, it’s possible that God’s creative and sustaining will provides 
the ultimate explanation of why the form of any hylomorphic object en-forms the matter 
it does. The idea is that God, who is simple, willed and continues to will that each 
particular form shall en-form the matter it does with regards to all hylomorphic objects.  
 One might object: If you’re going to appeal to God, why not appeal to God 
directly to explain causal pairing relations? However, such an appeal would be premature 
																																																								
1 For an overview of Aquinas’s doctrine of simplicity, see Eleonore Stump (2012). 
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and therefore unjustified. According to theism, God is the ultimate explanation of the 
universe and all things in the universe. But that universe, which God created and sustains, 
is filled with natural explanations of natural phenomena.1 Given that, one should appeal 
to natural explanations insofar as there is reason to think there could be such 
explanations. However, it’s reasonable to appeal to a supernatural explanation when it’s 
reasonable to think there can’t possibly be a natural explanation. And since form and 
matter are most fundamental in the Aristotelian’s ontology, there is nothing more 
fundamental to appeal to as a natural explanation. Therefore, the theist can justifiably 
appeal to the supernatural explanation of God’s creative and sustaining will to account 
for why forms en-form the matter they do. Granted, materialists won’t find this line of 
thought convincing. Nevertheless, if there are hylomorphic objects, it seems to me that a 
metaphysically simple God provides a sufficient explanation of why forms en-form the 
matter they do.  
 To summarize this subsection, I’ve addressed the most common objection to my 
hylomorphic response to the causal pairing problem, which claims that my response 
simply reduxes the problem. First, I pointed out that the follow-up question my account 
brings us to is a different question than the initial question, and good explanations often 
lead to new questions. Then I mentioned that the follow-up question my account raises is 
germane to standard Aristotelian metaphysics; so it’s not a problem unique to my mind-
body hylomorphic position. Before making my final point I clarified that on 
hylomorphism the body doesn’t even exist devoid of a form, and therefore it’s fair to say 
there is no further natural explanation of why a form en-forms the body it does. Lastly, I 
																																																								
1 ‘Natural explanations’ here refers to physical and metaphysical explanations.  
	
	 182 
offered a supernatural explanation that exploits the theological doctrine of divine 
simplicity. Let’s now consider a second objection, which I think might be the strongest 
objection to my hylomorphic account of causal pairing.  
6.3.2 Second Objection: Presupposed Causal Relation 
Recall that a key charge against the Cartesian dualist is that she can’t explain mind-body 
causal pairing by appealing to mind-body unity, since she explains such unity via a causal 
relation. Such an explanation would presuppose and depend on the very relation it is 
supposed to explain (see Kim, 2005, p. 77). The same problem besets my hylomorphic 
explanation of causal pairing, according to this second objection. After all, says my 
interlocutor, the en-forming relation that I appeal to in order to explain causal pairing is 
itself a causal relation.  
 The objection is fairly straightforward and can be put as follows. My hylomorphic 
account says soul X is causally paired with body Y since X en-forms Y; therefore it hinges 
on an en-forming relation that is itself a causal relation. And since the en-forming relation 
appealed to in order to explain the causal pairing relation between X and Y is itself a 
causal relation, it presupposes the pairing relation it’s meant to explain. Therefore, 
according to this line of reasoning, my account falls prey to the same charge leveled 
against Cartesian dualism because it too presupposes the very pairing relation it allegedly 
explains.  
 That’s the objection and it faces a fatal dilemma. Either the key premise – the en-
forming relation is a causal relation – is false, or else the objection commits the fallacy of 
equivocation. Regarding the former possibility, if efficient causation is the only type of 
causation, the necessary premise is false. But if the premise is true then there are at least 
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two types of causation and two corresponding senses of ‘cause’ that the objection 
equivocates between. Either way, the objection is fatally flawed. Let’s consider each horn 
of the dilemma in turn, beginning with the possibility that the key premise is false. 
 In Aristotle’s day he could claim in Physics “…things are called causes in many 
ways…” (195a 4). Hence his infamous four causes: material cause, formal cause, 
efficient cause, and final cause.1 Most moderns, however, disagree with Aristotle’s 
conception of causation. Although an Aristotelian view of causation was commonly held 
prior to the 17th century, during the time of Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon a shift 
pertaining to our understanding of causality began to take place (see Gilson, 2009, pp. x-
xi). Today there’s a “…modern general conceptual commitment that only efficient causes 
are causes” (Marmodoro, 2014b, p. 221). The modern view of causation denies formal 
causality. 
 Thus the modern view of causation entails that the key premise of this second 
objection – the en-forming relation is a causal relation – is false. After all, if the en-
forming relation is a causal relation, it’s not one of efficient causation, but rather one of 
formal causation. Momentarily I’ll clarify the distinction between efficient and formal 
causality. But for now, the main point is: given the modern view of causation, the en-
forming relation cannot be a causal relation since causal relations must be efficient causal 
relations according to the modern view, not formal causal relations. Yet, if the en-
forming relation is a causal relation, it’s one of formal causation, not efficient causation. 
Simply put, if the modern view of causation is correct, the en-forming relation isn’t a 
causal relation and the key premise of this second objection is false.  
																																																								
1 For an introductory explanation of Aristotle’s four causes, see (Shields, 2014). 
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 To clarify the difference between efficient causality and formal causality, let’s 
consider an example of a particular human embryo E coming into existence. To make 
things easier we’ll assume, contra Aquinas, that a human soul is present from the moment 
of conception.1 So in this example we’re assuming that E is en-formed by a human soul 
from the moment it begins to exist. If we wished to give an Aristotelian explanation of 
E’s origination, we “would wish to know what it is, what it is made of, what brought it 
about, and what it is for” (Shields, 2014). These aspects of our inquiry would 
approximate to Aristotle’s four causes. Since we need only clarifying the distinction 
between two types of causes – formal and efficient – I’ll focus only on ‘what it is’ and 
‘what brought it about.’  
 The formal cause of E explains what E is; the efficient cause explains what 
brought E about. Thus, the efficient cause is a sperm fertilizing an egg. Had that not 
happened, E wouldn’t have come to be. But without the formal cause E wouldn’t exist as 
the type of thing it is. The formal cause is what explains why E is a human embryo. And 
what explains why E is a human embryo is that it’s en-formed by a form of a particular 
type, namely the form of a human person – i.e. a human soul.  
 The formal cause explains why E is a human embryo since the form of the 
embryo grounds its unity and essence, and thus its existence. The form grounds the 
essence of the embryo since the essence is determined by the type of form that en-forms 
it. Accordingly, the characteristic physical properties the embryo develops depends on 
the form, but the development happens via the means of biological causes that do the 
efficient causal work, which the form does not do (see Chapter 7 section 7.5). The form 
																																																								
1 Aquinas thought an embryo first has only a sensory soul and then later comes to have a 
human intellective soul (see ST 1a 76.3 ad 3).  
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grounds the unity of the embryo, as all the material parts of the embryo depend for 
existence on the same form. Such unity of a substance that’s grounded by its substantial 
form is very different than, say, the unity of a group of pencils united by a rubber band 
squeezing them together. Such squeezing would be efficient causation, not formal 
causation.  
 Of course, many moderns will hear my explication of formal causation and say: 
that’s not causation! I agree. That’s why I described the en-forming relation as a non-
causal explanatory relation of grounding in the previous chapter (see section 5.1.6). But 
given that the en-forming relation is not a causal relation the key premise of this second 
objection is false. And given that its key premise is false, the objection fails. That’s the 
first horn of the dilemma that the objection faces.  
 Perhaps, however, some will think there are multiple types of causation and 
formal causality is one type of causality in addition to efficient causality (e.g. Ellis, 2009, 
pp. 77-78). But if that’s true, the objection equivocates between two senses of ‘cause,’ the 
two senses being efficient cause and formal cause. This is the other horn of the dilemma.   
 If it’s true that the en-forming relation is a causal relation, it’s a relation of formal 
causality, not efficient causality (cf. Marmodoro and Page, 2016, p. 16). Therefore, if my 
account appeals to a causal relation to explain a causal relation, then it appeals to a 
relation of formal causality to explain a relation of efficient causality. As a result, it’s 
false to claim that my account presupposes what it’s meant to explain, for it presupposes 
a different type of causal relation than the one it explains. The objection only appears to 
be successful because it equivocates between two senses of ‘causal relation.’   
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 So to summarize, this second objection faces a fatal dilemma. If it’s true that there 
is only efficient causation, which is what the modern view of causation says, then the key 
premise of the objection is false. But on the other hand, if the key premise is true then the 
objection fallaciously equivocates. Either way, it seems that this second objection is 
fatally flawed.  
6.4 Conclusion 
The causal pairing problem is dualism’s chief problem pertaining to mental causation. In 
this chapter I’ve tried to show that there is a substance dualist position – neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism – that provides a solution to the pairing problem. According to the 
hylomorphic solution I’ve proposed, a person’s soul is causally paired with her body 
because her soul en-forms her body. So for example Hillary Clinton’s soul stands in a 
causal pairing relation with her body because her soul stands in the more fundamental en-
forming relation to her body. Given that Clinton’s soul is the form of her body, it’s fitting 
that her soul is causally paired with her body, rather than say, Barack Obama’s body.  
 This chapter brings us halfway to demonstrating that neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism is a substance dualist position capable of overcoming the two paramount 
objections to dualism. We have now dealt with the first objection by demonstrating that 
hylomorphism can overcome the causal pairing problem. In the next chapter I’ll apply 








Hylomorphism & Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
 
Since discussing neural correlates of consciousness in Chapter 2, we’ve covered much 
terrain. Our focus on objections to substance dualism took us into mental causation in 
chapters three and four. Dualism’s chief problem regarding mental causation – the causal 
pairing problem – became our focus. After introducing neo-Thomistic hylomorphism in 
the fifth chapter, I argued it’s immune to the causal pairing problem in the previous 
chapter. Now in this chapter, our focus will return to neural correlates of consciousness 
(for brevity NCC), upon which rests the second chief objection to dualism.  
 Recall that in Chapter 2 I introduced the subject of NCC, discussed what exactly 
they are, how we identify them, and most importantly: what they imply. As discussed in 
some detail, neural correlates themselves don’t entail any particular view of the mind (see 
section 2.3). As leading NCC researcher, Christof Koch (2016), pointed out to me:  
Note that the NCC themselves are neutral from the point of view of 
physicalism/materialism or one of the various shades of dualism. Under any 
reading, consciousness will have physical correlates.  
Given that, one can’t undermine dualism by simply pointing to neural correlates. 
Philosophical argumentation is also needed in order to show that the correlations imply 
dualism is false; hence the simplicity argument for the identity theory. In the remainder 
of the second chapter, I presented and critically analyzed the simplicity argument and 
found it insufficient to undermine dualism.  
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 My aim in this chapter is to show that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism is not only 
consistent with NCC, but also provides a good explanation of NCC. To accomplish this I 
will build upon the work of other Aristotelian and Thomistic hylomorphists. Since I’m 
not the first Aristotelian sympathizer to explore the new world of modern neuroscience, 
my goal is simply to advance the exploration.1  
 To begin with, in section 7.1 I’ll give a very brief historical sketch of 
contemporary discussions pertinent to hylomorphism and neural correlates of 
consciousness. Although there are both materialist and dualist leaning hylomorphists, my 
focus will be toward the dualist side in order to clarify the context surrounding my own 
hylomorphic account of NCC. This first section will also serve to clarify my objective 
and the nature of my proposed hylomorphic explanation of NCC. The following four 
sections focus on explicating the conceptual foundation for the proposed hylomorphic 
model.  
 While my primary aims are not exegetical, sections 7.2 and 7.3 introduce and 
explain principles derived from the work of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Section 
7.2 introduces relevant ideas regarding Aristotle’s ontology of powers. Section 7.3 
discusses the dependence of the mind on the body, a principle evident in Aquinas’s 
Treatise on Human Nature. Applying principles gained from Aristotle and Aquinas, in 
section 7.4 I’ll explicate what I call ‘mind-body powers.’ The explanation of the 
conceptual framework situating the proposed hylomorphic account is finalized in section 
7.5, which discusses the grounding for biological regularities like NCC. Section 7.6 
																																																								
1 The list of predecessor includes: De Haan (forthcoming; 2014); Lowe (2000); J.P. 
Moreland (2016); Oderberg (2005); Oomen (2003). See also (Ellis, 2009, p. 78) and 
(Penfield, 1975, p. 81). 
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applies the principles clarified in prior sections to construct the proposed neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphic explanation of NCC.  
7.1 Some Recent Hylomorphic History 
A decade and a half after Francis Crick and Christof Koch (1990) instigated the 
contemporary search for neural correlates of consciousness, David Oderberg (2005, p. 
90) claimed: “for the hylemorphic dualist, such correlations are only to be expected since 
persons as embodied beings require corporeal activity in order to interact with the 
world.”1 If the mind depends on the body to fulfill the functions of a human person, then 
there will be neural correlates of mental activity, Oderberg reasoned. Recently, J.P. 
Moreland has (2016, pp. 116-119; cf. 2017) contributed to this line of thought and argued 
that a Thomistic-like version of hylomorphism entails NCC.  
 Moreland (2016, p. 116) arrives at his conclusion by appealing to concepts he 
believes reflect two versions of “Aristotelian-style dualism.” One is what Moreland 
(2016, p. 119) calls Organicism, according to which the structure and function of body 
parts are determined by the functional demands of the soul that’s “the first efficient cause 
of the body’s development.”2 As it stands, this principle is not part of my explanation of 
NCC in what follows. As I’ll discuss in section 7.5, I agree with Moreland that the soul 
determines the structure and function of the body’s parts; that much is standard 
Aristotelianism and part of my hylomorphic explanation of NCC. However, I deny the 
idea that the soul is an efficient cause of the body’s development. In section 7.5, the 
reason for my denial will be discussed.  
																																																								
1 ‘Hylomorphism’ is often spelled ‘hylemorphism.’ Oderberg follows the latter spelling. 
2 Italics mine. 
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 The other principle Moreland appeals to – mind-body dependence – is vital to my 
own explanation, yet I elaborate on it significantly. Moreland (2016, p. 117) appeals to 
this principle held by the late medieval Aristotelians as it’s articulated by Dennis des 
Chene (2000, p. 71):  
…by its nature [the human soul] presupposes union with a body, and moreover 
with a particular kind of body, a body with organs, in order to exercise all its 
powers – even reason insofar as reason needs the senses to give it material for 
abstraction.  
The basic idea is that there’s a relation of dependence between the mind and the body, 
and the mind relies on the body to manifest its powers. According to the late 
Aristotelians: “Even the intellect requires, so long as the soul is joined with a body, a 
certain disposition of the brain” (des Chene, 2000, p. 96; see Moreland, 2016, p. 117).  
 As I’ll discuss in section 7.3, the idea that the body is integral to the soul’s 
functions is evident in Aquinas’s writings (e.g. ST 1a 77.8c). The late Aristotelians 
concurred, and the same is true of many Aristotelian leaning thinkers today. Both John 
Haldane (1998, pp. 271-272) and E.J. Lowe (2006, pp. 11-19) seem to embrace this idea 
when discussing the relationship between mental intentionality and neurophysiology.1 
And in the context of the contemporary debate about causal overdetermination, naturalist 
leaning hylomorphist, William Jaworski’s (2016, p. 281) appeals to this concept to show 
that mental and bodily causes are both necessary and thus there’s no overdetermination 
(see section 7.6).2  
 According to Oderberg (2005, p. 90) and Moreland (2016, p. 117), this idea that 
the soul relies on the body to exercise its powers suggest that we should expect neural 
																																																								
1 To be clear, while Lowe is Aristotelian leaning he does not endorse hylomorphism.  
2 According to the problem of overdetermination, irreducible mental causes are moot 
because physical causes do all the causal work (see Chapter 3 section 3.2). 
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correlates of consciousness. Moreland (2016, p. 117) moves from the idea of mind-body 
dependence to the conclusion that NCC are entailed. Oderberg and Moreland’s objectors 
will allege that their reasoning is too hasty since the dependence of the mind on the body 
doesn’t necessarily explain or entail patterned processes at the neuronal level, such as 
NCC.1 As Moreland (2016, p. 126) acknowledges, there’s more to be said. Additional 
premises are needed. Details must be filled in.  
7.1.1 The Present Objective 
I intend to progress this line of thought by filling in details. My aim is to give a detailed 
hylomorphic explanation of NCC. My proposed explanation will include the mind’s 
dependence on the body referenced by Oderberg and Moreland, but I’ll go beyond 
Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy of mind and anchor my hylomorphic explanation 
of NCC to fundamental principles in Aristotelian metaphysics of causation.  
 I’ll take what I’ve learned from Aristotelian leaning philosophers – such as David 
Oderberg, John Haldane, J.P. Moreland, E.J. Lowe, Anna Marmodoro, and William 
Jaworski – and employ those ideas I agree with in order to present a more robust 
hylomorphic explanation of NCC. At certain points I’ll agree; at certain points I’ll 
disagree. At other points I’ll partly agree and modify ideas as I see fit. And at times I’ll 
arrive at the same conclusion, but via a different route. Regardless, the goal is to stand on 
the shoulders of my predecessors and build upon their work in order to produce a more 
detailed and satisfying hylomorphic explanation of NCC. 
																																																								
1 It’s worth noting that dualist critic, Jaegwon Kim (2005, p. 124) acknowledges that 
some substance dualist views entail NCC. If that’s true of any dualist view, it’s true of a 
Thomistic version. Furthermore, to secure his conclusion Moreland can also appeal to 
organicism and the soul being holenmerically present to the body and an aspect of the 
body (see Moreland, 2017, sections I.2.2 & III.2). However, my neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism doesn’t include organicism as described by Moreland (see section 7.5.1).  
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 As I pointed out in Chapter 2 (see section 2.4.3), substance dualism is not an 
empirical theory or hypothesis and dualists do not claim that dualism is true because it’s 
the best empirical theory of neuroscience data (cf. Moreland, 2011b, p. 33). Rather 
dualists typically think dualism is justified on philosophical grounds and not on the basis 
of empirical data from neuroscience (see Chapter 1). So how can I be consistent and now 
argue for dualism by giving a hylomorphic explanation of NCC? 
 For one, my overall aim is not to argue that substance dualism, or specifically 
neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, is true. My objective is more modestly to defeat two 
potential defeaters of substance dualism. One potential defeater was dealt with in the 
previous chapter regarding the causal pairing problem. In this present chapter, I hope to 
defeat the other potential defeater I’m concerned with that fundamentally relies on NCC.1 
I am not arguing that dualism, or my hylomorphic view in particular, is true because it 
provides the best explanation of neural correlates. My claim is that substance dualists 
who adopt neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can give a good explanation of NCC that’s 
perfectly consistent with fundamental principles in Aristotelian philosophy of mind and 
metaphysics. If that’s true, a paramount potential defeater of dualism is defeated, or at 
least deflated.  
 Furthermore, and more importantly, my hylomorphic explanation of NCC is not 
an empirical scientific theory. It’s a metaphysical explanation of neural correlates of 
consciousness, not a neuroscientific or physical explanation.2 As will become clear, my 
hylomorphic explanation of NCC is anchored in Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysical 
																																																								
1 For a detailed explication of this objection, see Chapter 2. 
2 On the value of metaphysical explanations or analysis, see Tahko (2012, pp. 37, 39, 40-
42), Laudan (1977, Ch. 2), Lowe (1998, p. 9), and Ellis (2014). 
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principles regarding causal powers and how the mind manifests its powers. It provides a 
coherent metaphysical framework for understanding NCC that also motivates further 
NCC research (cf. Moreland, 2017, section I.2.1). Given such a framework, we can seek 
to further understand the physical details of neural correlates empirically by means of 
modern neuroscience, which is invaluable for such a task.  
 The next four sections explicate Aristotelian-Thomistic principles that provide the 
conceptual framework for the proposed account of neural correlates of consciousness. 
With that framework in place, I’ll present my neo-Thomistic hylomorphic model of NCC.    
7.2 Aristotelian Powers Ontology 
When introducing my neo-Thomistic hylomorphic position in Chapter 5 I mentioned two 
desiderata, albeit competing desiderata. The first is that the view be as minimal as 
possible, in that it commit adherents only to tenets that are essential. I want it to be 
possible to adopt the view without becoming a full-blown Aristotelian on every 
metaphysical topic. With that said, the second desideratum is for the proposed 
hylomorphic model to be as defensible as possible and as capable as possible of 
overcoming serious objections. Sometimes a more minimal version of a position is more 
defensible because there’s less to defend. But sometimes a more robust version is more 
defensible. A common reason for this is that additional tenets can allow a view to explain 
more phenomena, or give a view more explanatory power.  
 To overcome the pairing problem in the previous chapter, we only needed the 
most fundamental tenet of hylomorphism that says the soul is the form of the body. In 
this chapter, however, I’m going to put Aristotelian powers to work in my account of 
NCC. To do so, I’ll need to commit to certain Aristotelian concepts regarding powers. In 
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this section I’ll clarify and explain such concepts. Throughout this section I’ll rely 
heavily on Anna Marmodoro’s (2014a) reading of Aristotle with regards to powers. In 
due course, the concepts I glean from Marmodoro’s interpretation of Aristotle will be 
applied to my neo-Thomistic hylomorphic account of NCC.    
7.2.1 Powers 
Aristotle thought objects have powers. According to Aristotelian metaphysics a power is 
the capacity to produce change or undergo change (see Marmodoro, 2014a, p. 13).1 In 
Metaphysic (V 12), Aristotle provides this general definition: 
Capacity [i.e. power] then is the source, in general, of change or movement in 
another thing or in the same thing qua other, and also the source of a thing’s being 
moved by another thing or by itself qua other. 
Aristotle here characterizes a power as a source of change. It’s important to notice that 
this source of change includes that which brings about change and also that which 
undergoes the change (Marmodoro, 2014a, p. 12).  
 The capacity to bring about change is the active power, whereas the capacity to 
undergo change is the passive power. Active powers are what they are due to the type of 
change they can produce and passive powers are what they are due to the type of change 
they can undergo. Both types of powers have two potential states. A power can be 
manifested, or in other words ‘activated’ or ‘exercised.’ But a power can exist even when 
it’s not being manifested in a state of potentiality, according to the Aristotelian powers 
ontology I’m endorsing. So for example, an ordinary bowling ball has the power to roll 
whether or not it’s currently rolling. When it is rolling, its power to roll is manifested. 
																																																								
1 Klaus Corcilius (2015, pp. 32-33) makes the point that dunamis, according to Aristotle, 
also applies to the ability to be. Regardless, my account of NCC focuses on powers as the 
capacity to produce change.    
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When it is not rolling, it still has the power to roll, but the power is in a state of 
potentiality. Because the bowling ball has the power to roll even when it’s sitting still on 
a ball rack, it makes sense for the bowler to take it off the rack and try to roll it down the 
bowling isle.  
 A unique feature of Aristotelian powers is that active and passive powers depend 
on one another for their manifestation; that is, active powers depend on passive powers 
and passive powers depend on active powers (Marmodoro, 2014a, p. 13). “Aristotle 
defines an active power as one that exercises its powerfulness on a corresponding passive 
one” (Marmodoro, 2014a, p. 13). To use Aristotle’s well-known example of a teacher and 
learner, the manifestation of the teacher’s active power to teach depends on the learner’s 
passive power to learn. If the learner doesn’t manifest the passive power to learn, the 
teacher’s active power to teach won’t be manifested.  
 Furthermore, the teacher’s active power to teach is manifested or actualized in the 
learner, who is taught by the teacher. Aristotle explains in Physics (III 3): 
It is not absurd that the actualization of one thing should be in another. Teaching 
is the activity of a person who can teach, yet the operation is performed in 
something—it is not cut adrift from a subject, but is of one thing in another. There 
is nothing to prevent two things having one and the same actualization (not the 
same in being, but related as the potential is to the actual). 
The manifestation of the active power to teach is realized in the manifestation of the 
passive power to learn, and in this way the manifestation of the active power 
ontologically depends on the passive power (see Marmodoro, 2014b, pp. 243-244). 
Another example that illustrates this point is a hot metal pot’s power to heat the water it 




 Now, running with this example I want to make a point about some complexity 
regarding active and passive powers. To do so, I’ll make the example more complex, but 
also more realistic. Suppose the metal pot is heated by a hot stove plate so that the surface 
of pot reaches 150°C. Let’s also assume that the water in the pot initially had a 
temperature of 5°C, but since the surface temperature of the pot has risen to 150°C the 
temperature of the water rises. In this scenario, which is still relatively simplistic 
compared to many causal instances in nature, things have become quite complex.  
 The hot stove plate is manifesting its active power to heat the pot. The pot is 
manifesting its passive power to be heated as well as its active power to heat the water. 
And anyone who has ever heated a metal pot with cool water in it knows that it takes 
longer than heating an empty metal pot because the water acts on the pot as a cooling 
agent. So the water is also manifesting its active power to cool the pot, which is 
manifesting its passive power to be cooled. And as the water affects the pot’s surface 
temperature, we can reasonably assume that this cools the hot stove plate, however minor 
the cooling effect may be. The picture that’s emerged here is one where the stove plate, 
the pot, and the water are all acting on one another and being acted on by one another. In 
other words, each item involved is manifesting active powers and passive powers 
simultaneously and there’s mutual causation taking place.   
 Is this problematic for Aristotelian powers? Well, as Marmodoro (2014a, p. 41) 
points out, “Aristotle acknowledges, for example in Physics (202a5-12), that in most 
causal interactions in nature the change is mutual.” While our complex example isn’t 
simple, it better represents the causal complexity in nature, which is even far more 
complex than this example illustrates. Yet what is still taking place, despite the 
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complexity, is that things with active powers are producing change and things with 
passive powers are being changed. And despite the complexity of real causal cases, 
simplistic examples have their place. Simple examples help us understand the concepts 
involved, even if they don’t accurately capture the complexity of exactly how they’re 
involved in the reality of nature in all its complexity. I have already given such simplistic 
yet effective examples, and will continue to do so.1 The reader can safely assume that the 
reality of causation is more complex than the examples, while the general concepts being 
conveyed are thought to nevertheless apply in all the realistic complexity.  
 To recap, according to Aristotelian metaphysics powers are a real objective 
feature of the world and things have powers.2 Some powers are active and some are 
passive. An active power is the capacity to produce change in something, whereas a 
passive power is the capacity to undergo change. The manifestation of active powers 
depends on the manifestation of passive powers, and vice versa. Certain active powers 
depend on certain passive powers for their manifestation. In other words, Aristotelian 
powers “…depend for their activation on the activation of their mutual partner-powers” 
																																																								
1 Such practice is common in all areas of study. For example, many of us might be 
surprised to learn that a neuron’s axon can be a meter long because all the example 
images of neurons we’ve seen scale the image for teaching purposes. As a result the axon 
usually appears to be only about two to three times longer than the width of the cell body. 
While these images are useful for teaching, we have to keep in mind that things are more 
complex. 
2 Powers are irreducible, according to this view. Contra Hume (2007, p. 55), powers on 
the Aristotelian view are not a mere projection of ours about reality, but rather powers are 
objective features of reality (Mayr, 2016). Entities in the world have powers that cannot 
be reduced to non-powers. Following Ryle (1949, p. 31), attempts have been made to 
reduce powers (or dispositions) by giving a conditional analysis of our statements about 
powers or by reducing powers to non-power properties (cf. Choi and Fara, 2016; Mayr, 
2016). According to the Aristotelian powers ontology I’m advocating, such reductivist 





(Marmodoro, 2014a, p. 32). The following tenet offers a succinct summary of the most 
important content discussed in this section.   
Interdependent Partner-Powers (IPP): Things have active and passive powers. 
The manifestation of an active power ontologically depends on the manifestation 
of its corresponding passive power, and vice versa.  
In due course, I’ll apply this concept regarding corresponding (or, correlated) active and 
passive powers to neural correlates of consciousness. But before doing so, I need to 
introduce the idea of mind-body dependence and then what I shall call ‘mind-body 
powers.’  
7.3 Mind-Body Dependence 
To account for NCC I’ll employ another principle that’s distinct from IPP, but in a sense 
an application of it applied to the manifestations of mental and bodily powers. Simply 
put, the idea is that the soul manifests its powers via macro body parts (e.g. organs) and 
micro body parts (e.g. cells) that are organized and structured in certain ways to manifest 
certain powers. This principle has exegetical origins in the works of Aquinas, and in this 
subsection I’ll briefly go over some key texts to point this out. However, since my focus 
is not exegetical, my hermeneutical work will be minimal. Before concluding this section 
I’ll hone and clarify the aforementioned tenet.  
 As one reads Aquinas it’s easy to see that he thought powers of the human soul 
rely on the body. Aquinas (ST 1a 76.8c) makes it clear that powers of the soul are 
manifested through bodily organs and even located in such organs. Given this, he thought 
certain powers cease being exercised when the body ceases. According to Aquinas (ST 1a 
77.8c), these powers “virtually remain in the soul” but their manifestation depends on the 
body, “for the action of such capacities occurs only through a corporeal organ.” And it’s 
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not as though any organ will suffice to carry out any power. Rather certain parts of the 
body exist to carry out certain powers of the soul, and are thus structured accordingly. 
The power to see, for example, depends on the eyes, which are structured accordingly 
and the power to run depends on the legs that are also structured accordingly.  
 The idea that certain powers of the soul are in and manifested through corporeal 
organs that are structured to carry out such powers can be applied to the micro level of 
cells as well. Granted, Aquinas didn’t apply it in this way, but given that he allowed 
empirical findings to inform his philosophical positions, I think he could’ve developed 
this principle in such a way if he knew what we now know from microbiology. And when 
the principle is so modified it suggests that there would be nerve cells (i.e. neurons) that 
manifest certain powers that ultimately belong to the soul. 
 So far so good, when it comes to most powers, those familiar with Aquinas’s 
work might say. However, they might continue, rationality is trickier. Like Aristotle, 
Aquinas considered rationality to be definitive of humanity.1 And he made a case for the 
immortality of the soul that relies on the power of rationality (see ST 1a 75.2c, 75.3c, & 
75.6c). He argued that the human soul is immortal and continues to exist after bodily 
death and before the resurrection of the body because it has its own operation 
independent of the body – i.e. rational cognition. In other words, Aquinas thought the 
soul is immortal because the manifestation of rationality didn’t require a bodily organ 
(Pasnau, 2002b, p. xvii).  
 It’s easy to misunderstand Aquinas at this point. In light of Aquinas’s prevalent 
acknowledgement of the body’s integral role in the manifestation of the soul’s powers, 
																																																								
1 This idea is seen throughout their works regarding human nature. For an example in 
Aristotle, see Metaphysics (I 1); for Aquinas, see (ST 1a 75.4 ad 1). 
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one expects to see the same regarding rationality. But in several places Aquinas seems to 
suggest that the body plays no role in rational thought (e.g. ST 1a 76.1c, ad 1). However, 
I don’t think this is Aquinas’s position because in other places he clearly affirms the role 
of the body in the exercise of rational thought. For example, Aquinas (ST 1a 84.4c) 
writes: 
But a body seems necessary for the intellective soul above all for its proper 
operation, which is to understand. For the soul does not depend on the body for its 
existence. But if the soul were naturally suited to receive intelligible species 
solely through an influx from certain separate principles, and if it did not take in 
species through the senses, then it would not need a body in order to understand 
and so it would be pointless for it to be united to its body.  
 This passage makes it hard to deny that Aquinas thinks the body plays a role in 
understanding. And in another place Aquinas even seems to pinpoint the brain as the 
organ of thought. After saying that “…capacities do not exist on account of organs, but 
organs on account of capacities” in Question 78 article 3, in the next article Aquinas (ST 
1a 78.4c) says that physicians have assigned a definite organ to “particular reason,” that 
organ being “the middle part of the head.” Robert Pasnau (2002a, p. 283) comments that 
Aquinas followed the contemporary science at the time in holding that the four internal 
senses are in the brain.1 Given this, it’s not surprising that Aquinas thought that damage 
to the organ relevant to understanding impedes understanding (ST 1a 84.7c). 
 So how can we make sense of Aquinas apparently contradictory affirmations? On 
the one hand, it seems that he is saying human rationality is manifest independently of the 
body. Yet on the other hand, he seems to affirm that the body plays a role in rational 
thought. I think Aquinas’s view can be summarized as follows: The soul has an 
																																																								
1 The four internal senses are: common sense, imagination (i.e. phantasia), cogitative 
power, and memory (Pasnau, 2002a, p. 281). 
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independent operation in that it does not metaphysically necessitate a bodily organ, 
although its natural operation uses a bodily organ that’s necessary in this natural sense.  
 This reading finds textual support where Aquinas says that the soul thinks through 
what he calls phantasms (or, sense images) that depend on the body. So for example, 
Aquinas (ST 1a 89.1c; cf. 75.7 ad 3) writes:  
Therefore with respect to the mode of existence by which the soul is united to a 
body, the appropriate mode of understanding for the soul is to turn toward the 
phantasms of bodies, phantasms which exist within bodily organs. But once it has 
been separated from its body, the appropriate mode of understanding for the soul 
is to turn toward intelligible things straightaway—just as is appropriate for other 
separate substances. So turning toward phantasms is, for the soul, its natural mode 
of understanding, just as being united to a body is natural. But being separated 
from its body is foreign to the character of its nature, and understanding without 
turning toward phantasms is likewise foreign to its nature. So it is united to a body 
in order to exist and operate in keeping with its nature.  
Simply put, it seems there’s a sense in which the defining capacity of humanity – i.e. 
rationality – does not necessitate the body for its operation and there’s a sense in which it 
does. Regarding the former sense, it’s metaphysically possible for the soul to manifest 
rational thought apart from the body. However, regarding the latter sense, the soul is 
naturally en-forming a body through which the human soul’s defining capacity is 
manifested through, but in an indirect way involving phantasms.  
 Clearly, there’s much more to say about how to interpret Aquinas. Since that’s not 
my focus, let me simply clarify the principle I’ll glean from Aquinas’s thought and apply 
in my account of NCC. That principle is that powers of the soul are located in certain 
bodily organs that are structured in such a way to manifest such powers. This idea 
coupled with IPP informs the following principle that I’ll employ in my neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphic account of NCC. 
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Mind-Body Powers (MBP): There are mental powers of the soul and physical 
powers of the body that are interdependent partner-powers. The natural 
manifestations of active powers (whether mental or physical) ontologically 
depend on the manifestation of passive powers (whether mental or physical), and 
vice versa.  
Before applying this tenet regarding mind-body powers to NCC, I’ll explain it further in 
the following section. Then I’ll present my hylomorphic account of NCC that capitalizes 
on the notion of mind-body powers.  
7.4 Mind-Body Powers 
According to neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, human persons have mental powers and 
physical powers of the body that are interdependent partner-powers. I’ve dubbed such 
powers: mind-body powers. My hylomorphic account of NCC critically relies on these 
powers for its explanatory power, so it will be helpful to clarify in this subsection exactly 
what these powers are. 
7.4.1 Interdependence 
It’s easy to imagine powers of the body that can be manifested apart from mental powers. 
For example, my body is digesting my lunch without the exercise of mental powers. And 
we can imagine a mental power that manifests without depending on a bodily power. For 
example, we can imagine a mind perceiving God in the intermediate state after the death 
of one’s body and before what Christian theologians refer to as the general resurrection.  
 Such powers, whether or not they exist, are of no concern to me here. Rather, I’m 
interested in powers of the body and mind that naturally require mutual manifestation, or 
co-manifestation. Put differently, my focus is mental and physical interdependent partner-
powers, which I call mind-body powers.   
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 To illustrate the concept of mind-body powers let’s use an example of a voluntary 
act of running undertaken by Olympic gold medalist, Allyson Felix. Let’s keep things 
simple and stipulate that the voluntary act of running relies on the mutual manifestation 
of the following partner-powers. Felix manifests a mental active power: (M-Power) 
choosing to run. As a result, she manifests passive bodily powers: (B-Power) neurons 
fire, muscles contract, and her legs stride one in front of the other. In actuality things are 
much more complex, especially on the physiological level. (The bodily physiological 
powers will include countless manifestations of active powers and passive powers as well 
as powers that are both active and passive.) But our example need not include all the 
nuances to illustrate the key idea regarding mind-body powers. And that is, both M-
Power and B-Power are needed for this voluntary act of running undertaken by Felix.  
 The reason neurons start firing and ultimately Felix’s legs begin striding forward 
is because she chose to run, and because she chose to run the manifestation of B-Power is 
part of a voluntary act of running. In this way the manifestation of B-Power ontologically 
depends on the manifestation of M-Power, choosing to run. Yet it’s also true, according 
to my account, that M-Power could not be manifested without B-Power. Granted, Felix 
could manifest the power to intend to run without the correlated B-Power, but intending 
to run is not the same as choosing to run. One can only choose to do something that she 
has the choice to do, and she only has the choice to do x if she can do x. B-Power makes 
it possible for Felix to run and thus possible for her to choose to run. So in this way the 
power to choose to run – that is, M-Power – ontologically depends on B-Power. 
 Aquinas once made a similar claim. According to Aquinas (ST 1a 76.4 ad 2), the 
soul moves the body “…through its potential for producing movement, the actualization 
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of which presupposes a body.” The soul has the power to move the body, but this power 
can’t be manifested without a body. But notice that Aquinas writes that the power to 
move the body presupposes a body, not this particular body or that particular body. A 
body will do. Getting back to our example, Felix need not have the exact physiological 
makeup that she in fact has in the actual world in order to have and manifest M-Power. 
She could have had a different physiological makeup with different physical powers that 
still resulted in legs striding forward as a result of the manifestation of M-Power. This is 
important because it allows for multiple realizability, which will be applicable in section 
7.5.  
 Our example involves an active mental power. However, we could have given an 
example with a passive mental power, such as a pinched nerve being the active power 
that changes one’s felt experience to a state of pain. There can be active mental powers 
and active bodily powers. Likewise, there can be passive mental powers and passive 
bodily powers. Regardless of whether an active power is physical or mental, its 
manifestation ontologically depends on the manifestation of its correlate passive partner-
power. Likewise, mental and physical passive powers depend on correlated active 
powers. These interdependent mental and physical bodily partner-powers are mind-body 
powers.  
7.4.2 Ontological Extension 
Now, it’s tempting to picture in our minds an external relation relating an active power to 
its correlated passive power. However, my hylomorphic account includes an Aristotelian 
concept eluded to above and summarized well by Marmodoro (2014b, p. 244): 
…The causal interaction of the active and the passive powers is not reified by 
Aristotle as a relation, but as an ontological extension of the agent onto the 
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patient. Aristotle does not posit a relation between active and passive powers to 
explain the mechanism of causation, but treats the active power as ‘extending’ 
onto the passive one, not through a relation but by ‘spreading itself’ onto the 
patient – by making the patients constitution part of the agent’s own constitution; 
by having the patient as the ground of realization of the agent’s own causal 
power. 
The manifestation of the passive power is a constituent of the active power’s 
manifestation. The manifestation of the active power comes to be completely realized in 
the manifestation of the passive power.  
 Recall Aristotle’s example of the teacher and the student. For the teacher to 
manifest her power to teach, the student must manifest her power to learn. If the student 
doesn’t learn the teacher doesn’t teach. The act of teaching is partly realized in the 
student’s act of learning. More precisely, the teacher’s active power to teach is partly 
realized in the manifestation of the student’s passive power to learn. The teacher’s power 
to teach is not reducible to the student learning, but the manifestation of the student’s 
power to learn is a constituent of the manifestation of the active power to teach. 
 Returning to our example of Allyson Felix’s voluntary act of running, her act of 
choosing to run is realized in neurons firing, muscles contracting, and legs striding 
forward. That is, the manifestation of Felix’s M-Power is realized in the manifestation of 
B-Power. That doesn’t mean M-Power is reducible to B-Power. But it does mean that the 
manifestation of B-Power is a constituent of the manifestation of M-Power. Since B-
Power’s manifestation is a constituent of M-Power’s manifestation, the manifestation of 
M-Power ontologically depends on the manifestation of B-Power.   
 The account of causal pairing I gave in the previous chapter is substantiated by 
the ontological dependence between a person’s active and passive powers in cases of 
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mind-to-body causation or body-to-mind causation. Marmodoro (2014a, pp. 46-47) 
comments on Aristotle’s account of active and passive power interdependence:  
Aristotle puts flesh on the bones of his account of dependence between active and 
passive powers in a causal pair during their activation. During the causal 
interaction, the mover moves in actuality, and the moveable is actually moved. 
These two actualities are not casually coincident. The occurrence of the first 
requires the occurrence of the second. 
The active power is causally paired with the passive power because the manifestation of 
the active ontologically depends on the co-manifestation of the passive.  
 In the case of Felix’s voluntary act of running the manifestations of M-Power and 
B-Power are at one level of explanation causally paired via their ontological dependence 
on one another. At this point, one could ask what explains this relationship of ontological 
dependence. That is, why do Allyson Felix’s mental powers ontologically depend on her 
body powers rather than, say, Michael Johnson’s body powers? This is just a rendition of 
the causal pairing problem. Thus the answer brings us back to my explanation of mind-
body causal pairing developed in the previous chapter: Felix’s soul en-forms her body not 
Johnson’s body, therefore her mental powers are paired with her body power, not 
Johnson’s. 
7.4.3 Requisite Physical Properties 
Two ducks recently flew past my office window. I would really like to fly like a duck on 
my own strength without the aid of technology such as a plane or wingsuit, but I will 
never be able to do so. Flying like a duck is simply impossible for me. The reason is 
obvious: Ducks have a different type of body with different body parts capable of 
manifesting different bodily powers. And certain actions require bodily powers 
manifested by body parts with sufficient physical properties.  
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 A critical tenet of the hylomorphic view I’m advocating is that certain types of 
mental powers require certain types of bodily powers, and vice versa. Moreover, certain 
types of bodily powers require certain types of bodily features. So in other words, certain 
types of mental powers cannot be naturally manifested apart from the manifestation of 
certain types of bodily powers that require certain types of physical characteristics in the 
body. The manifestation of Felix’s mental power to choose to run requires the bodily 
power to stride forward with one’s legs. And this bodily power to stride forward requires 
a type of physical bodily feature, namely legs. Felix could have various types of legs and 
still run, but she does need legs of some type.  
 It seems that this concept is at home in Thomism. Aquinas thought that the human 
soul has a variety of powers and therefore the human body must have a variety of powers 
so that the soul’s various powers could be manifested. In Question 76 article 5 of the first 
part of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas addresses the question: What type of body should 
have the human soul as its form? In this context, Aquinas (ST 1a 76.5 ad 3) writes the 
following about the human soul, or as he calls it, the intellective soul: 
For although it [i.e. the intellective soul] is one in essence, nevertheless, due to its 
perfection, it has multiple powers. Hence for its various operations it needs 
various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. This is why we 
see that perfect animals have a greater diversity of parts than do imperfect 
animals…1 
Notice that Aquinas moves from the powers of the soul to the powers of the body to the 
parts of the body. To manifest its various powers the soul needs various bodily powers, 
which themselves require certain bodily parts.  
																																																								
1 Italics mine. 
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 If the powers of the soul could be manifested with the co-manifestation of just any 
body power using just any body part, then any type of body would do and there would be 
no need for a variety of bodily powers and bodily parts. You could just have the soul 
manifest its powers through any bodily power in any body part. So if any body part 
would do, you would only need one part or at most one type of part. But according to 
Aquinas, the human soul requires a body of a certain type, namely one with a variety of 
bodily parts with various bodily powers. Such a body is needed because the soul’s 
various powers depend on the co-manifestation of certain bodily powers and not just any 
bodily power, according to Aquinas. And particular bodily powers require the body to 
have certain types of physical features. So the body’s form, that is the soul, and the soul’s 
powers determine the characteristics of the body.  
 This idea that the soul’s powers require certain bodily powers and thus certain 
bodily parts was applied by Aquinas on the macro level of bodily organs. For example, 
he (ST 1a 54.5c in Stump, 2003, p. 199) wrote: “In our soul there are certain powers 
whose operations are exercised by means of corporeal organs, and powers of this sort are 
acts of certain parts of the body, as vision in the eye and hearing in the ear…”1 This is 
just one example where Aquinas applies this idea that the soul’s powers rely on bodily 
powers that use certain types of bodily parts to the level of organs (ST 1a 76.8c, ad 4, ad 
5). However, this same concept can be applied at more micro levels, which is what I aim 
to do in the next section. Yet before doing so, let’s state the basic principle as clearly as 
possible.  
																																																								
1 Italics mine.  In this passage Aquinas goes on to say that the intellect and will don’t rely 
on a bodily organ (cf. ST 1a 76.5 ad 2). For an explanation of how this can be consistent 
with his statements suggesting that rationality relies on the body, see section 7.2 above.  
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Requisite Physical Properties (RPP): From macro to micro levels, body parts 
must have sufficient types of physical properties in order to naturally manifest the 
bodily powers that co-constitute mind-body powers.  
 Without legs of some type, Allyson Felix can’t choose to run. Without a voice of 
some kind, I can’t literally speak what’s on my mind. Without sensory organs, one can’t 
feel a pinprick. Certain types of bodily organs that have certain physical properties are 
needed to manifest certain mental powers, according to Aquinas. Due to advances in 
microscopes and imaging technology in general since Aquinas day (1225-1274 A.D.), 
today we know much more about the body beyond the level of organs. In the light of 
modern science, we can apply Aquinas’s line of thought about requisite physical 
properties to micro levels of bodily composition. From macro to micro levels, we can 
infer, body parts with certain physical properties or types of properties are needed in 
order to manifest certain bodily powers that are interdependent partner-powers of mental 
powers. The basic idea is that mind-body powers require certain types of physical 
properties at every level of bodily composition. So it’s true from the macro level of body 
parts that includes arms and ears to the most micro, sub cellular level.  
 The requisite physical properties can pertain to anything physical, from structure 
to complexity, to electrical charge, to a certain chemical composition, and so forth. The 
physical properties might be something very specific or simply a type of physical 
characteristic, such as eyes of some type that allow one to see. Of course, we’ll want to 
know what bodily powers and physical properties the body must have and why it must 
have them in order for mental power X, Y, or Z to be manifested? And this is where the 
empirical sciences, such as neurobiology and neurophysiology, can be invaluable. 
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 In any event, the key concept for our purposes is that the natural manifestation of 
mental powers requires the co-manifestation of certain bodily powers that require certain 
types of physical properties at every level of the body’s composition. This concept, which 
I think is an aspect (or at least implication) of Thomistic thought, can help us account for 
NCC. Yet before constructing my account of NCC, I must specify one last principle of 
neo-Thomistic hylomorphism that pertains to the form of the human body grounding its 
biological regularities.    
7.5 From Form to Biological Regularities 
One thing about NCC that invites an explanation is the regularity with which particular 
neural processes correlate with certain types of mental states throughout a species. 
Consider the famous (but perhaps mistaken) example of firing C-fibers and the mental 
state of pain. It’s not just that C-fibers fire in Mary’s brain when she is in a state of pain, 
but that C-fibers fire in John’s brain, Eleonore’s brain, Cecilia’s brain, Juan’s brain, and 
Aryn’s brain when each is in pain, and the list goes on and on. There is, according to this 
standard example, a regular consistency of the NCC throughout the human species. Such 
consistency is a standard feature of NCC and entailed by what it means to be an NCC.1 
It’s the consistency of correlations across a species that makes it possible to map a 
particular type of brain, such as the mouse brain or the human brain (see brain-map.org).  
 My proposed hylomorphic account of neural correlates will explain the consistent 
regularities of NCC across the human species by appealing to the idea that all humans 
have the same type of form. And that form, according to the account, determines the 
																																																								
1 See Chapter 2, specifically section 2.1. 
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sameness (or regularity) of biological structures and process in the body at the macro and 
microbiological levels.1 In this section I’ll briefly describe this idea.  
 To begin with I’ll clarify how my view is consistent and inconsistent with J.P. 
Moreland’s organicist view. We both agree that the human soul, the form of the human 
body, determines the biological structure and processes of the body from the macro to the 
micro level. What we disagree on is whether the form of the body does this via efficient 
causation. As I’ll explain, this is relevant to my account of causal pairing that I gave in 
the previous chapter. After making this clarification, the position I’m endorsing will be 
explicated further. Before concluding this section, I’ll clarify how my view is consistent 
with neuroplasticity, which is the nervous system’s capacity to reorganize its structure, 
function, and connections in response to internal and external stimuli (see Cramer et al., 
2011; Owen, 2016). After this section, in section 7.6, the primary aim of this chapter will 
be in center focus – that is, to propose a hylomorphic account of NCC. This section is the 
final step in establishing the conceptual foundation for the proposed account. 
7.5.1 Regularities Without Organicism  
As mentioned in section 7.1, J.P. Moreland (2016, pp. 116, 118-119) argues that his 
Thomistic-like dualism entails NCC by appealing to organicism. According to 
Moreland’s (2016, p. 119) description of organicism, the structure and function of body 
parts are determined by the functional demands of the soul that’s “the first efficient cause 
of the body’s development.”2  
																																																								
1 My view sounds similar to William Jaworski’s (2016), but our views differ in that he 
seems to think the form is the structure, whereas I think the form is distinct from the 
structure it determines. 
2 Italics mine. 
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 There is significant common ground in this area between Moreland’s view and 
my own, but also an important difference. I agree with Moreland that the soul is the form 
of the body and that as such it determines the structure and function of the body. I also 
agree that the functional demands of the soul play a role in this determination (see 
Moreland, 2016, p. 119). Furthermore, I agree with Moreland’s (2017, section I.2.2) 
claim that the form provides the information for the body’s organization and structure 
like a blueprint provides the organizational and structural plan of a building. We also 
seem to agree that the form of the body determines information in DNA that guides the 
development of the body (cf. Moreland, 2017, section I.2.2).  
 However, I disagree with Moreland’s claim that the soul is the first efficient cause 
of the body’s development. If I agreed with Moreland on this point then I would 
undermine my proposed solution to the causal pairing problem in the previous chapter. 
My proposed solution explains a relationship of causal pairing between the soul and body 
during efficient causation by appealing to a more fundamental relation the soul stands in 
to the body, i.e. an en-forming relation. But if that en-forming relation includes efficient 
causation, I can’t appeal to it in order to explain soul-body causal pairing relations of 
efficient causation (see Chapter 6 section 6.3.2). Thus I disagree with the idea that the 
soul is the first efficient cause of the body’s development.  
 So my position does not include Moreland’s organicism as he articulates it. But 
according to my view, the form still ultimately grounds the biological regularities of 
organization and biological structure and processes across a species. A key difference is 
that this determination doesn’t involve the form as an efficient cause of the body’s 
development. I would echo the words of John Haldane (1998, pp. 275-276): 
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I wish to maintain that form may be a determinant of the substantial nature, 
including the characteristic activities, of a substance without that being a matter of 
efficiently constraining the location and behavior of basic particles…what form 
brings is order, but it does not do so by pushing things this way or that. Its 
existence is testified to not by force detectors but by the fact that what exists, and 
how existents act, exhibit natural order.  
The idea is that forms determine natural order by determining the standard features and 
activities of substances, but they do not do this via efficient causation.1  As I’ll explain in 
the following subsection, I think the substantial form determines the standard biological 
structures and processes across a species, but the efficient causation of their development 
is merely biological causes.  
7.5.2 Same Form, Same Biology 
There are countless biological regularities in our world. Examples are easy to come by: 
dogs naturally have four legs, tadpoles become frogs, North American bull elk have 
antlers that they annually shed, and the list goes on and on. The type of biological 
regularity we’re concerned with at present is the sameness in structure and function of 
biological body parts across a species, from the macro to the microbiological level. An 
example of a macro biological regularity would be the sameness in structure and function 
of the human heart throughout the human species. An example of a microbiological 
regularity would be the common information encoded in DNA throughout the human 
species.  
 According to hylomorphism such regularities across a species are ultimately 
grounded in the fact that the members of the species have the same type of form. The idea 
is that there are the same biological structures and processes on the macro level and 
																																																								
1 See also Marmodoro and Page (2016, p. 16). They likewise emphasize that a substantial 
form is not an efficient cause.  
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micro level across a species because there’s the same type of form en-forming the 
individual members of that species. Assuming these regularities are biological laws, I 
agree with Alexander Pruss’s (2013a, p. 131) thesis that such laws of nature are grounded 
in forms.1 Substantial forms ground the essential properties and powers of the organisms 
they en-form, which determines the developmental parameters of the organism (cf. Pruss, 
2013a, p. 131). This guides the patterns of biological development that produce organized 
structures with standard functions via biological causes, which are the efficient causes of 
such development. Given that, I can say with Aquinas (ST 1a 76.5c) that “…the reason 
why matter is such as it is must be drawn from the form, not vice versa.” 
 According to this view, on one level there’s the form that determines the structure 
and standard function of the organism. On another level there’s the biological processes 
of development that are the efficient causes that produce the structures and standard 
function of the organism’s biological parts. A helpful analogy might be train tracks and 
the trains that run on the tracks. The tracks fix where the train moves like the form 
determines the body’s development. But the form is not the efficient cause of the body’s 
development, and similarly the train tracks are not what cause the train to move down the 
tracks. The train engine is what causes the wheels to turn, the effect of which is the 
train’s movement down the tracks. And this is analogous to the efficient biological causes 
producing the biological structures with standard functions.  
 For further illumination let’s consider an example pertaining to the Integrated 
Information Theory of consciousness (for brevity IIT). According to IIT, the physical 
																																																								
1 We may disagree, however, on exactly how laws are grounded in the form. I don’t think 
the grounding relation is in any sense a relation of efficient causality and if Pruss thinks 
otherwise, that’s a significant difference. 
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substrate of consciousness is an integrated structure in the central nervous system that 
exhibits maximal intrinsic cause-effect power (Tononi et al., 2016, p. 450). In view of 
that, a unified neuronal structure manifesting an integrated network of causal inputs and 
outputs would be a physical prerequisite for maximal consciousness.  
 This idea of the physical necessity of a sufficient neuronal structure is consistent 
with the principle explicated in the previous section – that is, RPP.1 Let’s assume it’s 
correct and that there are three possible structures sufficient for maximal consciousness in 
humans. Suppose there’s StructureI, according to which the conscious state of tasting 
chocolate correlates with firing X-fibers. There’s StructureII, according to which tasting 
chocolate correlates with firing Y-fibers. And there’s StructureIII, according to which 
tasting chocolate correlates with firing Z-fibers. Each structure will have X, Y, and Z-
fibers; it’s just that pain has different NCC depending on the structure.  
 It’s possible, according to this example, for tasting chocolate to correlate with 
firing X, Y, or Z fibers. But suppose that a healthy human’s central nervous system 
always has StructureI. This biological regularity has the same fundamental natural 
explanation that countless biological regularities have according to hylomorphism. The 
presence of Structure1 in nervous systems across the human species is fundamentally 
explained by the fact that each human has the same type of substantial form. According 
to hylomorphism, the ultimate natural explanation of the sameness throughout the species 
is that each member of the species has a human form. And the form grounds the essential 
																																																								
1 Some proponents of IIT identify consciousness with the physical structure manifesting 
the causal inputs and outputs, and that would be inconsistent with my position (cf. Fallon, 
section 3.c). Yet the idea that such a physical structure is needed to naturally manifest a 
maximal level of human consciousness is perfectly consistent with my view, which I 
think could actually lend support to the idea. 
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properties and powers of the body, which determines that the body develops to have a 
particular structure with certain functions or processes.  
 Even though StructureII and StructureIII are also sufficient for maximal human 
consciousness, the regularity of StructureI in human bodies grounded in the human form 
benefits the species. It guarantees that each individual human will have a structure 
sufficient for maximizing consciousness. In this way it’s advantageous for human persons 
to have a form that grounds the body’s essence, which determines the organized structure 
and function of the body from the macro to the microbiological level. Even though there 
are other possible structures that could maximize human consciousness, it’s beneficial 
that the human form guarantees that one of these possible structures in particular will be 
manifested in individual members.  
7.5.3 Consistency with Neuroplasticity 
It is well known that traumatic brain injuries that affect brain structure can impair mental 
capacities. This supports the idea of a correlation between neuronal structure and 
conscious capacities. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, we also know that due to the 
neuroplasticity of the brain it can undergo traumatic injuries affecting its structure and 
adapt so as to retain or regain mental capacities that typically rely on damaged brain 
regions (see Cramer et al., 2011; Goodrich et al., 2013; Munoz-Cespedes et al., 2005).  
 In light of this, let’s continue our example regarding structure and NCC and add a 
character, Mr. Macintosh, who doesn’t like to wear a helmet while downhill mountain 
biking. As a healthy adult Macintosh’s central nervous system has StructureI, according 
which the conscious state of tasting chocolate correlates with firing X-fibers. But after a 
hard crash on his downhill mountain bike Macintosh’s central nervous system loses 
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StructureI and the brain area where X-fibers are located. Consequently, he no longer has 
the NCC of tasting chocolate that he once had as a healthy adult manifesting StructureI. 
However, suppose his brain adapts accordingly and he regains his ability to taste 
chocolate and Y-fibers become the new NCC of his conscious state of tasting chocolate. 
 This type of scenario is possible. Such a possibility might at first seem 
incompatible with the Aristotelian idea that the form of the human body determines that 
its parts will have particular structures and functions. However, the compatibility of the 
hylomorphic view I’m endorsing and the neuroplasticity of the brain becomes more 
apparent in light of the idea that the form of the body also determines what’s possible and 
impossible for the biological organism it en-forms. For example, since I’m a human soul 
that naturally en-forms my body, it’s impossible for me to be naturally disembodied.1 
That’s one example of a form determining impossibility.  
 Yet, the same form determines possibilities, some of which will never be 
manifested. The same form, a human soul, grounds the possibility that I could learn 
German. This possibility, however, will likely never be actualized. I would like to know 
German, but learning a new language is difficult and it takes time that I would prefer 
devoting to learning Greek or Latin. So I’ll never learn German, but it’s possible that I do 
so. This is an example of a possibility grounded in a form.  
 Bringing this back to our example with Mr. Macintosh, the form of his body 
determined that his central nervous system develop Structure1 prior to his bike accident. 
Given this, his conscious state of tasting chocolate correlated with firing X-fibers, which 
																																																								
1 This is not incompatible with the Christian doctrine of the intermediate state, which 
Aquinas held. The impossibility of naturally existing in such a state does not entail an 
impossibility of unnaturally existing in such a state. Moreover, the idea that such a state 
is unnatural can support the doctrine of the general bodily resurrection.  
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is true amongst all healthy adult humans (we’re supposing for this example). However, 
the form of his body also grounds certain possibilities that may or may not be actualized. 
One of these possibilities is that under certain conditions, such as his loss of X-fibers, 
Macintosh’s mental state of tasting chocolate will correlate with firing Y-fibers. Like the 
regularity of healthy adults having Structure1, this alternative possibility is grounded in 
the type of form that en-forms Macintosh’s body, which is a human form. Macintosh’s 
loss of X-fibers results in this possibility being actualized. 
 Alternative possibilities such as this that are grounded in the form benefit the 
species as they allow individual members of the species to adapt and overcame ailments. 
It’s similarly to a Boeing engineer designing a Boeing-747 airplane according to a 
standard plan with standard exits, but also with some possible alternative exits in case 
something becomes amiss. Even if the engineer could design the plain in several different 
ways with equally effective exits, a sufficient level of efficiency is guaranteed by having 
a standard structure. And it’s good for the standard design to have backup possibilities 
built in, in case something goes wrong. 
 To summarize this section, I’ve sketched out a fundamental account of biological 
regularities across species that’s part of the neo-Thomistic hylomorphism that I’m 
advocating. According to this account the form of the body is not an efficient cause of the 
body’s development. Yet it does ground biological regularities such as macro and 
microbiological structures and functions in the human body throughout the human 
species. The efficient causes of the body’s development are biological causes in the 
organism that accord with the essence of the organism, which is determined by the type 
of organism it is – i.e. a human body. Although the type of organism it is hinges on the 
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type of form it has – i.e. the form of a human body. Thus fundamentally, and most 
importantly, the biological sameness across a species is grounded in the sameness of form 
across the species. I offer a summation of the primary take away in the following 
principle. 
Forming Biological Regularities (FBR): The form of the human body 
fundamentally determines biological regularities in the body throughout the 
human species, such as macro and microbiological structures and functions of the 
body’s constituent parts. Thus the same type of form en-forming individual 
human bodies grounds such biological regularities across the species. 
 With this principle in place, the conceptual framework for my hylomorphic 
account of NCC is finalized. In section 7.2, I introduced the principle of interdependent 
partner-powers (IPP), according to which things have active and passive powers that co-
manifest. I built upon this principle in section 7.3 in order to present the idea of mind-
body powers (MBP). According to MBP, there are mental powers of the soul and 
physical powers of the body that are interdependent partner-powers. Regardless of 
whether the active power is mental or physical, its natural manifestation depends on the 
manifestation of its passive partner-power, and vice versa.  
 Section 7.4 focused on further explicating mind-body powers. Out of this 
explication came the principle of requisite physical properties (RPP). This principle says 
that from the macro to micro levels, body parts must have sufficient types of physical 
properties to naturally manifest bodily powers co-constituting mind-body powers. And 
the standard physical properties of body parts manifesting such bodily powers are 
determined by the form of the body, according to the position I’ve articulated in this 
section. Now that the conceptual framework is in place, I can propose my hylomorphic 
model of NCC. 
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7.6 A Hylomorphic Account of NCC 
In this section I’ll construct my neo-Thomistic hylomorphic account of NCC. It 
fundamentally relies on the concept of mind-body powers and the requisite physical 
properties for their manifestation. While my hylomorphic account is dualistic it shares 
commonality with non-dualist Aristotelian accounts of human action. Consider, for 
example, how William Jaworski’s (2016) hylomorphic view avoids causal 
overdetermination, the worry that physical causes do all the causal work and irreducible 
mental causes don’t truly make any causal contribution. With this problem in mind, 
Jaworski (2016, p. 281) clarifies the distinct roles of the mental and the physical:  
Beliefs and desires cause or contribute to actions in one kind of way—they 
rationalize actions—and neural events cause or contribute to actions in a different 
kind of way—they trigger muscular subsystems involved in actions.1 
The mental cause is not reducible to the physical cause and both are needed. Since the 
action requires both the mental and the physiological causes, there’s no 
overdetermination.  
 I share common ground with Jaworski’s account of mental causation at significant 
points. However, there are key noteworthy differences. First, Jaworski is addressing the 
problem of causal overdetermination, whereas I am addressing the issue of NCC. 
Secondly, and more significantly, he’s defending a non-dualist hylomorphic view, 
whereas my position is a version of dualism. Nevertheless Jaworski’s hylomorphic 
account of human action is similar to my hylomorphic account of NCC in the following 
way: both claim that the mental and the physical make distinct yet interdependent causal 
																																																								
1 Cf. Donald Davidson (1963). 
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contributions. Here I think we share common ground with Haldane (1998, pp. 271-272), 
Moreland (2016, p. 117), and Oderberg (2005, p. 90), as mentioned in section 7.1. 
 What I call ‘mind-body powers’ are interdependent mental and physical partner-
powers. To account for NCC, I’ll employ this concept and the idea that bodily powers 
require physical properties. To begin with, the proposed account will be illustrated 
through an example involving a bee sting, in which the relevant mental power is passive. 
Then to elucidate the proposed account I’ll explicate it in the light of David Chalmers’s 
definition of an NCC. Before concluding a second example will be given, this time 
involving an active mental power as someone signs a check.  
7.6.1 Example Involving Passive Mental Power 
To illustrate how mind-body powers apply to NCC, let’s start with considering the felt 
sensation (or qualia) that Freddy feels when a bee stings his foot. Freddy’s mental state – 
the vivid feeling of a bee sting – is irreducibly mental, but it’s not without requisite 
physical causes. When Freddy feels the bee sting his mental power to feel such is 
manifested because the body exercised certain physiological powers. In fact, the 
manifestation of his mental power in this case requires the co-manifestation of certain 
physical powers of the body. It would not genuinely be the feeling of a bee sting if there 
were not a physical stinger that penetrated Freddy’s skin and injected melittin that caused 
physiological reactions, which in this case include firing synapses sending an electrical 
signal to a region in his brain. Without a bee stinger and the resulting physiological 
reactions, perhaps he could have a “phantom” sensation of a bee sting, but it would not 
genuinely be the felt sensation of a bee sting.  
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 For Freddy to feel a bee sting his mental power to feel such must be manifested. 
But it also must be the result of physical events in his body as certain physiological 
powers are manifested. This is where mind-body powers apply. There’s a required co-
manifestation of the mental power Freddy has to feel a bee sting (MPsting) and the bodily 
physiological powers (BPsting). This co-manifestation of powers entails a correlation 
between the manifestation of the mental power and the bodily physiological powers. 
Thus we could expect correlations between mental events when the mental powers are 
manifested and physical events when the corresponding bodily powers are manifested (cf. 
Moreland, 2016, p. 117; Oderberg, 2005, p. 90). After all, the mental and physical powers 
are interdependent partner-powers. So the concept of mind-body powers leads us to 
expect a correlation between the manifestations of mental and physical bodily powers.  
 However, this correlation between mental and bodily powers does not itself imply 
a correlation between the mental and specific neuronal states or activity. More is needed 
to arrive at and account for neural correlates of consciousness. Of aid is the concept 
introduced above regarding bodily powers requiring physical properties – RPP. From 
macro to micro levels, body parts must have certain physical properties or types of 
physical properties in order to naturally manifest the bodily powers that co-constitute 
mind-body powers. In other words, the manifestation of a bodily power that’s the 
interdependent partner-power of a mental power requires a body part(s) with sufficient 
physical properties. That’s the claim of this principle, RPP, which is a natural part (or 
implication) of Aquinas’s thought. Thus in reference to our example, the manifestation of 
Freddy’s bodily powers (BPsting), which correlates with his mental power, naturally 
requires physical bodily parts with certain types of physical properties.  
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 So neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, as I’ve described it thus far, claims human 
persons have mind-body powers consisting of interdependent mental powers of the soul 
and physical powers of the body. And the physical powers of the body require certain 
physical properties from the macro to the micro level in order to manifest. Due to this and 
the fact that the brain manifests such bodily powers, certain parts of the brain down to the 
neuronal level with sufficient physical properties will correlate with the interdependent 
mental powers. For such mental powers depend on bodily powers that need to be 
manifested via body parts with appropriate physical properties.  
 Moreover, the correspond body parts will be the same in Freddy as they are across 
the human species. This is due to FBR, the Aristotelian principle articulated just above 
that says the same type of form en-forming individual human bodies grounds biological 
regularities across the species. These regularities include macro biological regularities 
like sameness of organs such as a brain, as well as microbiological regularities such a 
neuronal structure and function. 
 When Freddy or any healthy developed human feels a bee sting, certain 
neurophysiological bodily powers are manifested – i.e. BPsting – and particular body parts 
with sufficient properties manifest these powers. Specific to our focus is the power to 
receive and send a signal corresponding to the bee sting. This power is manifested by 
firing synapses in the peripheral nervous system (given the bee stung his foot), but also 
his central nervous system, which we can label Nsting. These firing synapses have the 
physical properties that manifest BPsting, which correlates with Freddy manifesting his 
mental power to feel a bee sting – i.e. MPsting. This mental power is manifested via 
Freddy’s conscious state of feeling a bee sting, which we can label Csting. Putting this 
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altogether, Csting manifests MPsting that’s a correlated partner-power of BPsting manifested 
via Nsting. Consequently, Nsting is the NCC of Csting. And this NCC would be consistent 
throughout the human species comprised of members with the same type of form en-
forming their human body. 
 For illumination, let’s apply to our example David Chalmers’s (2000, pp. 31) 
definition of an NCC:  
An NCC is a minimal neural system N such that there is a mapping from states of 
N to states of consciousness, where a given state of N is sufficient, under 
conditions C, for the corresponding state of consciousness. 
In our example the minimal neural system N is Nsting. And there’s a mapping from Nsting 
to Freddy’s conscious state Csting of feeling a bee sting because the powers manifested by 
each (BPsting and MPsting respectively) are interdependent partner-powers that correlate 
with each other. And the same would be true of any healthy developed human 
manifesting Csting, according to the proposed hylomorphic account. The conditions C are 
background conditions, such as the heart pumping blood, that enable Nsting and Csting (see 
Tononi and Koch, 2015, p. 2).  
 To illustrate the account let’s have ↔ represent the metaphysical interdependence 
between the active bodily power and the passive mental power. And ⇔ represent the 
resulting natural correlation between the neural process and the conscious state. In 
addition, let’s have two vertical lines represent the bodily and mental powers being 
manifested through the corresponding neural processes and conscious state.  
Nsting      ⇔       Csting 
⏐                      ⏐ 
BPsting     ↔     MPsting 
	
	 225 
 On the bottom level, we have the active bodily powers manifested through the 
standard neural processes on the left side, and the passive mental power manifested 
through the conscious state on the right. These are the interdependent mind-body powers. 
On the top level, which is what we empirically study through neuroscience, we have the 
NCC represented. On the left is the neural correlate manifesting the bodily powers of the 
conscious state on the right that manifests the mental power.  
 Our diagram illustrates how the proposed hylomorphic model of NCC applies to 
our hypothetical scenario of Freddy’s mental state and the corresponding neural correlate. 
Although Freddy is just a hypothetical healthy adult and the NCC is just hypothetical, if 
they were real this diagram would not just reflect Freddy’s NCC. Because human bodies 
are en-formed by the same type of form that fixes standard biological bodily structures 
and functions, there’s homogeneity across humanity in neurophysiology. Thus the 
diagram representing Freddy’s NCC would reflect the same NCC across the human 
species.1 And the top level of the diagram would reflect a natural neurophysiological 
regularity across humanity in the actual world. So the top double arrow (that is: ⇔) 
would be representative of a natural biological regularity or law in our world. 
 However, it’s important to note that ⇔ does not represent a strict relationship of 
either logical or metaphysical necessity. According to the definitions proposed by 
Chalmers (2000, pp. 31) and Koch (2016, p. 307; 2007), neural correlates are said to be 
sufficient for the correlated conscious state. But neither Chalmers nor Koch claim that 
																																																								
1 While we can speak of homogeneity and sameness regarding neurobiology and NCC 
across a species, it’s necessary to keep in mind that we’re speaking of homogeneity 
regarding biological regularities that permit some degree of variation. Variations 
pertaining to NCC can be due to variations in overall conscious experiences or variations 
in individual brains across a species (see Chapter 2 section 2.1).  
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neural correlates are logically or metaphysically necessary for the corresponding 
consciousness. Speaking as though a bee actually stung Freddy, ⇔ represents a 
metaphysically possible NCC that’s an actual NCC in the actual world. But many 
philosophers think it’s possible for beings such as animals or aliens with different 
neurophysiology than humans to have some of the same conscious states that humans 
have (see Kripke, 1981; Putnam, 1967).  
 According to this concept of multiple realizability, an alien with different neurons 
composed of different materials could be stung by a bee and have the same conscious 
state as Freddy (i.e. Csting). Consequently, it would have a different NCC of the same 
conscious state. Given the possibility of multiple realizability, a viable account of NCC 
must be consistent with it and avoid ruling it out. In addition, there are cases where 
subjects lose a part of their brain with neural correlates of certain types of conscious 
states, but do to neuroplasticity a different part of the brain with different neurons begins 
to fulfill the same role (see section 7.5.3).1 Loosely speaking, this is like multiple 
realizability taking place in the same brain. Given such possibilities, it’s important to 
keep in mind that ⇔ is not representing a relationship of logical or metaphysical 
necessity.  
 Rather, it represents the neurobiological reality that in the actual world the 
conscious state Csting corresponds to the neural correlate Nsting in healthy developed human 
brains. Is it possible for a human person to undergo a brain injury and lose Nsting and yet 
have the same conscious state with a different neural correlate, say Nsting-alternative? 
																																																								
1 While my hylomorphic account is consistent with such cases, I have to admit that 
Moreland’s (2017) Thomistic-like position that includes organicism has the potential to 
account for such cases better than my position that’s devoid of organicism. 
	
	 227 
According to neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, the answer is ‘yes’ as long as human 
neurophysiology allows for the possibility that Csting correlate with Nsting-alternative in cases 
of brain injuries or the like where Nsting is lost. Clearly there are cases of brain damage 
that result in a permanent loss of mental function and cases where it’s possible for mental 
function to be regained as new neural correlates are established via neuroplasticity. As 
discussed above, such impossibility or possibility is ultimately grounded in the form of 
the human body (see section 7.5.3).  
 Is it possible for there to be an animal or an alien with a different form and thus 
different neurophysiology that’s capable of having different neural correlates, Nsting*, of 
the same conscious state? Yes, according to my proposed model, as long as the neural 
correlates are the type of physical entity that can manifest the requisite bodily powers for 
the experience to be a bee sting. In such a case, there would be different bodily 
neurophysiology capable of manifesting BPsting that does so. For such a case a new 
diagram could be drawn that simply replaces Nsting with Nsting*. 
Nsting*    ⇔      Csting 
⏐                      ⏐ 
BPsting     ↔    MPsting 
 According to this model, we don’t know what neural states and processes are the 
correlates of particular conscious states. What we do know, assuming the model, is that 
the natural manifestation of MPsting via Csting requires the co-manifestation of BPsting via 
some physical state or process that has the requisite characteristics to manifest BPsting. 
And accordingly we can assume that there is such a physical state or process if we know 
that MPsting is being manifested via Csting. So there is strong motivation to find out just 
what physical process in the body is manifesting BPsting. More precisely, there’s good 
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reason to do empirical investigation using the tools of modern neuroscience in search for 
neural correlates of consciousness (cf. Moreland, 2017, section I.2.1).1 
7.6.2 Example Involving Active Mental Power 
Since our example with Freddy feeling a bee sting involves a passive mental power, let’s 
briefly considering an example involving an active mental power. We can use an example 
provided by Dennis Patterson’s (2003) as a starting point: 
Suppose I place my signature on a document. The act of affixing my signature is 
accompanied by neural firings in my brain. The neural firings do not “explain” 
what I have done. In signing my name, I might be signing a check, giving an 
autograph, witnessing a will or signing a death certificate. In each case the neural 
firing may well be the same. And yet, the meaning of what I have done in affixing 
my signature is completely different in each case. These differences are 
“circumstance dependent,” not merely the product of my neural firings. Neural 
firings accompany the act of signing but only the circumstances of my signing, 
including the intentions to do so, are the significant factors in explaining what I 
have done. 
Patterson points out that he could affix his signature to a document to accomplish several 
different actions. The act depends on Patterson’s intention for signing the document and 
the correlated neural activity. His claim that the neural activity could be the same even if 
his intention differed may be mistaken. Nevertheless, he makes an important point: There 
will inevitably be a neural process and what ultimately defines the act as signing an 
autograph or witnessing a will is his intention for signing.  
 In fact, we can imagine a scenario where you have sufficient neural events to 
produce Patterson’s signature, but the lack of an appropriate intention makes a definitive 
difference. Imagine a possible world in which philosophers are like rock stars and a mob 
																																																								
1 Moreland (2017, section I.2.1) and I arrive at the same point, but the route that we took 
in arriving at this point differs in so far as mine hinges upon the interdependence of active 
and passive Aristotelian partner-powers.  
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of fans surrounds Patterson after he finishes presenting a paper at a conference. Suppose 
that unbeknownst to him, one of his undergraduate philosophy students has him sign a 
paper that’s actually a note excusing that student from the final exam. Patterson intended 
to give his autograph to one of his devoted philosophy fans, but instead he affixed his 
signature to a contract excusing his conniving student from the exam.   
 Now clearly, the contract excusing the student is phony and need not be legally 
followed. The reason involves the overall circumstances, but principally the fact that 
Patterson’s intention was to sign his autograph, not a contract. Patterson’s action relied 
on appropriate firings synapses that manifested the requisite bodily power constituting 
the action of signing his autograph. For the same physiological processes to manifest the 
bodily power constituting the act of signing a contract, Patterson’s intention would have 
had to be different. Namely, he would have had to intend to sign a contract.  
 Just as the active bodily powers in the previous example were determinative and 
hence Freddy genuinely felt a bee sting, the active power in this example determines the 
nature of the action and the constituent passive powers. As Aquinas (ST 1a 80.2c) noted, 
“a passive capacity takes its proper nature from its relationship to what acts on it.” So the 
power manifested by the neurophysiology in this example is determined by the active 
power manifested by Patterson’s mental intention to sign his autograph. If there were 
other neural processes that could have manifested the same passive powers, the model 
allows for that. And the same would be true in such scenarios: the active power would 
have determined the nature of the passive power and the action. And that action, due to 
Patterson’s intention, was the act of signing his autograph and not the act of signing a 
contract. Consequently, the conniving student is not excused from the final exam.  
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 Let’s now explicate and illustrate this example in the light of the proposed 
hylomorphic model. Patterson’s mental power to intend to sign his autograph (MPsign-auto) 
was manifested via his conscious state of intending to sign is autograph (Csign-auto) and the 
correlated bodily powers (BPsign-auto) were manifested via the correlated neural events 
(Nsign-auto). As was done above, we can represent these relationships with a diagram. 
   Csign-auto     ⇔      Nsign-auto 
⏐                      ⏐ 
 MPsign-auto    ↔    BPsign-auto 
As with the above diagrams, on the bottom level the active power is on the left and the 
correlated passive power is on the right. These are the interdependent mind-body powers. 
On the top level, we have the NCC represented. The mental state manifesting the active 
mental power is on the left and the neural processes manifesting the bodily powers is on 
the right. This time the mental power manifested through Patterson’s conscious intention 
is the active power. Accordingly, the bodily powers manifested through the neural 
processes are passive, being triggered by Patterson’s intention to sign his autograph (cf. 
Jaworski, 2016, p. 281).1 
 Patterson’s conscious intention correlates with the corresponding neural processes 
since they manifest his mental and bodily powers that are interdependent partner-powers. 
And the same would be true for all humans who have the same neurophysiology due to 
their body being en-formed by the same type of form. The metaphysical explanation of 
the correlation between Csign-auto and Nsign-auto is that they manifest MPsign-auto and BPsign-
auto, respectively, which are correlated partner-powers. Simply put, since the 
																																																								
1 Recall a clarification offered in section 7.2.1, that something can simultaneously 
manifest passive and active powers. The neural processes manifest passive power as 
they’re triggered by Patterson’s intention, but active power as they trigger other 
physiological events included in the act.   
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manifestation of the mental and bodily powers correlate, the conscious state and neural 
processes that manifest these powers correlate.  
 In summary, this section has presented my neo-Thomistic hylomorphic model of 
NCC. In order to elucidate the proposed account of NCC two hypothetical examples were 
offered. The first example involved a passive mental power. The second example 
involved an active mental power. According to the model, whether the mental power is 
active or passive the correspondence between consciousness and neural correlates is 
explained by the interdependence between active and passive powers of the mind and 
body. Thus according to this hylomorphic account, the NCC studied by neurobiology are 
fundamentally grounded in the metaphysics of interdependent mind-body powers. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Aquinas (ST 1a 77.3c) claimed the human soul is “…at the boundary between spiritual 
and corporeal creatures, and consequently the powers of both come together in it.” With 
this general idea as a starting point, I’ve constructed a metaphysical explanation of NCC. 
To accomplish this objective, four principles derived from Aristotelian and Thomistic 
thought were explicated and exploited.   
 The first principle claims things have interdependent active and passive powers. 
The manifestation of an active power depends on the manifesting of its corresponding 
passive power, and vice versa. According to the second principle, there are mental 
powers of the soul and physical powers of the body that are interdependent partner-
powers, which need to be co-manifested. I call these mind-body powers. According to the 
third principle and forth principle, the bodily powers co-constitute mind-body powers 
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rely on macro and microbiological body parts with sufficient physical properties that are 
grounded in the form.  
 I’ve proposed a neo-Thomistic explanation of NCC that integrates these 
principles. According to this model, NCC are explained by the interdependence of the 
mental and bodily powers co-manifested via the conscious state and its neural correlate. 
Since the mental power and bodily power are correlated given their mutual dependence 
as active and passive powers, their manifestations through sufficient neural processes and 
conscious states are correlated. 
Powers: Taking Stock 
 In this overall work I have responded to two chief objections to substance dualism 
regarding causal pairing and neural correlates of consciousness. Such objections, it’s 
often thought in contemporary philosophy of mind, undermine the viability of substance 
dualism, which is often considered obsolete. In response, my aim has been to demonstrate 
that there is a particular substance dualist position, neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, which 
provides a solution to the causal pairing problem and a good explanation of NCC. Given 
my overall objective of showing that a view informed by Aquinas who relied on Aristotle 
can respond to substance dualism’s chief objections, I’ve responded to these objections in 
light of Aristotelian-Thomistic thought. 
 This chapter has focused on how neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can account for 
NCC. The aim has been to provide a coherent explanatory account or model of NCC that 
is informed by Thomas Aquinas’s view of human nature and Aristotle’s metaphysics of 
powers. In this chapter I’ve relied on elements of an Aristotelian powers ontology to 
explain NCC, since doing so fits with my overall objective. One might wonder, however, 
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whether I need all the commitments regarding powers that I have embraced in light of my 
objective in this chapter and overall work?  
 In answering this question, let me first say something important about what I have 
done. I have taken ideas from an Aristotelian ontology of powers that includes principles 
that apply to causation generally and specifically applied the ideas to the particular issue 
of neural correlates of human consciousness. My focus has been to account for NCC 
pertaining to human consciousness. Strictly speaking, given this focus it’s the claims I’ve 
made specifically about the powers of human persons and how these powers apply to 
NCC that are central to my model of NCC.  
 My model depends on the idea that human persons have interdependent mental 
and bodily powers, or ‘mind-body powers.’ NCC in human persons are explained by the 
interdependence of their mental and bodily powers co-manifested via conscious states 
and corresponding neural states/process. This essential idea, as I’ve presented it here, is 
informed by Aquinas and Aristotle’s thought given my aim to demonstrate that neo-
Thomistic hylomorphism can account for NCC. But what commitments regarding powers 
are actually required by the model? 
 First, powers must exist. Otherwise human person couldn’t have mental and 
bodily powers, which is a prerequisite for there to be mind-body powers. In my project I 
am applying an Aristotelian understanding of powers to NCC. And I follow Marmodoro 
(2018, p. 15) in thinking “Aristotelian powers are pure powers…all there is to a power is 
its powerfulness; nothing inert, or impotent is needed in the power’s nature to anchor the 
power to reality.” Therefore, I’ve discussed powers accordingly, but not with the 
intention to suggest the model necessarily requires power powers. If those who hold a 
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different view of powers can give the same explanation of NCC that I’ve given, or can 
take advantage of the model I’ve presented (perhaps adjusting it accordingly), that would 
be a welcome possibility that I have not aimed to preclude nor demonstrate in this work. 
 Second, my model requires that there be some interdependent powers. Otherwise, 
human persons couldn’t have interdependent mental and bodily powers. The idea that 
there are interdependent powers flows out of the Aristotelian understanding of active and 
passive powers, which Aquinas embraced. So an Aristotelian understanding of powers 
provides a natural basis for interdependent powers that fits well with my aim to defend a 
hylomorphic view informed by Aquinas who looked to Aristotle as a philosophical guide. 
However, I am not claiming that only an Aristotelian powers ontology can support the 
idea of interdependent powers. If one has a different understanding of powers that doesn’t 
include active and passive powers, but nevertheless includes interdependent powers, it 
would be well worth considering how she could employ the explanation of NCC I’ve 
given while being consistent with her own view of powers.  
 Third, my model requires the idea that there are interdependent powers in human 
persons that naturally manifest in conjunction with each other. Here too, I developed this 
idea by appealing to the Aristotelian idea of active and passive powers that manifest in 
conjunction with each other. But what is essential to the model is that: human persons 
have interdependent powers that co-manifest with each other. This could be true without 
all powers, everywhere, at all times requiring co-manifestation.  
 In conclusion, in order to demonstrate that the neo-Thomistic hylomorphist can 
explain NCC, I’ve relied on the thought of Thomas Aquinas and the one he often called 
‘the Philosopher’– i.e. Aristotle. I hope to have shown that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism 
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is not merely consistent with neural correlates of consciousness but also capable of 


























In the first chapter of this work I highlighted the reconsideration of dualism that’s taking 
place in contemporary philosophy of mind. Dualism of any kind is still unpopular and 
physicalism is still the reigning paradigm. Nevertheless, substance dualism is being 
reconsidered. This reconsideration, however, will not last long if in fact mental causation 
is incoherent given dualism or if modern neuroscience has proven that the mind is neural 
states or events. If mental causation is necessary for agency and is impossible given 
dualism, then dualism should be rejected. If the facts of the world discernable through 
neuroscience prove that the mind is brain states or processes, then dualism should be 
rejected. 
 According to proponents of the causal pairing problem, mental causation is 
impossible for the nonphysical minds of substance dualism. And it’s often thought that 
modern neuroscience has proven that the mind is neural correlates of consciousness that 
contemporary brain imaging techniques have allowed us to identify. These lines of 
thought constitute the most threatening objections to dualism. I’ve tried to demonstrate 
that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism is a version of substance dualism that can overcome 
these two objections. I’ve argued that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism provides a solution 
to the causal pairing problem and a good explanation of NCC.   
 My accounts of mental causation and NCC do not demonstrate that neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism or any other dualist position is true. However, that has not been my 
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objective. Rather, I’ve focused on defeating dualism’s paramount defeaters. My aim has 
been to adequately respond to the two strongest objections to substance dualism. I’ve 
tried to show that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism provides a solution to the causal pairing 
problem and a good explanation of neural correlates of consciousness. If I’ve met this 
objective, then the causal pairing problem and neural correlates of consciousness do not 
provide sufficient grounds for rejecting dualism. And perhaps contemporary 
reconsiderations of dualism shouldn’t focus solely on Cartesian dualism, for there’s 
another version worth focusing on in forthcoming research (cf. Moreland, 2016, p. 126; 
Oderberg, 2005, p. 71). 
8.1 Future Research 
There are three areas in which I plan to apply my research on neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism. First, I want to explore the continuity and discontinuity between 
hylomorphism and a prominent theory of consciousness in neuroscience, the Integrated 
Information Theory (IIT). Second, I want to apply neo-Thomistic hylomorphism to the 
topic of the persistence of human persons throughout the late stages of Alzheimer’s 
disease. Third, I think my model of NCC can be fruitfully applied in the area of 
philosophy of religion and analytic theology to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation.  
 Recently the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness has emerged as a 
prominent view in neuroscience (see Tononi, 2004).1 As mentioned in Chapter 7 (section 
7.5.2), according to IIT the physical substrate of consciousness is an integrated structure 
in the central nervous system that exhibits maximal intrinsic cause-effect power (see 
																																																								
1 Throughout this section on IIT, I’m indebted to Christof Koch for very helpful 
discussions about IIT and hylomorphism. 
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Tononi et al., 2016, p. 450). In view of that, a unified neuronal structure manifesting an 
integrated network of causal inputs and outputs would be a physical prerequisite for 
maximal consciousness. While this idea is not entailed by neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, 
it’s perfectly consistent with it.1 And it seems to me that there are several further points 
of common ground that IIT shares with hylomorphism in general.  
 For example, the two leading proponents of IIT, Christof Koch and Giulio 
Tononi, have clarified that what they mean by information is not the idea of passing 
content. “Instead, IIT refers to ‘information’ in its original sense, with its root inform, 
meaning ‘to give form to’” (Koch and Tononi, 2017). Here they seem to be speaking of 
information in a way that a hylomorphist can speak of the form of the body, which 
determines the body’s organizational structure (see Chapter 7 section 7.5). Furthermore, I 
think there’s common ground between IIT and hylomorphists pertaining to ontological 
priority and powers. The IIT theorist considers the unity of consciousness as a starting 
axiom (Fallon, section i.). And it’s inferred from this axiom that “consciousness’s 
integration into a unified whole implies that the system must be irreducible” (Fallon, 
section ii.). This may indicate common ground with the hylomorphist who thinks a whole 
unified substance has ontological priority vis-à-vis its parts. Additionally, IIT theorists 
and hylomorphists both seem to be realist about causal powers.  
 Nevertheless, I think there are two areas of dissimilarity as well, where the two 
views might be able to benefit from each other. On the one hand, IIT offers hope of being 
able to measure consciousness. As a nonphysicalist, I doubt this is possible. However, 
																																																								
1 As in Chapter 7 section 7.5.2, I’m not referring here to any identity claims regarding the 
mental being reduced to the physical that IIT proponents might make. I’m only referring 
to the need for a sufficient neuronal structure. 
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that’s not to say that such efforts are futile. For if there’s even a correlation between 
consciousness and an integrated system of causal inputs and outputs, I think it might be at 
least theoretically possible to detect levels of consciousness. If IIT theorists can develop 
useful ways of doing so in an attempt to measure consciousness, this will be applicable in 
areas of applied ethics that many hylomorphists care about. For example, if we can show 
that a comatose patient has a certain level of consciousness, there can be significant 
ethical implications.  
 On the other hand, IIT addresses the nature of consciousness, but not the bearer 
of consciousness, which hylomorphism does address.1 And ultimately, in ethical matters 
we not only want to show that consciousness is present, but that a conscious subject is 
present. To do so, IIT will need to have an account of not only what consciousness is, but 
also what bears consciousness. Hylomorphism can help. 
 This brings me to the second area of forthcoming research. Since neo-Thomistic 
hylomorphism addresses the bearer of consciousness and not only the nature of 
consciousness, I think it can provide a framework for thinking about the persistence of 
human persons in the late stages of Alzheimer’s disease. Furthermore, according the 
model of NCC I constructed in Chapter 7, mental powers require the co-manifestation of 
bodily partner-powers, which require sufficient neural structures and processes. I think 
that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can explain how human persons can persist as their 
neural tissue deteriorates and they lose autobiographical episodic memory, and perhaps 
even their ability to recall their own identity.2  
																																																								
1 Here I’m indebted to Mihretu Guta, who brought this to my attention in conversation. 




 Finally, in recent years analytic philosophy has been applied to the Christian 
doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God (cf. Davis et al., 2002; Marmodoro and Hill, 
2011; Owen and Sanders, forthcoming). Neo-Thomistic hylomorphism might be capable 
of making a fruitful contribution in this area by appealing to the idea of mind-body 
powers and the model of NCC that I’ve presented. The doctrine of the Incarnation makes 
the bold claim that an omnipotent and omniscient divine person became a historical man, 
who apparently had limited knowledge and power. By appealing to the idea that mental 
powers require the co-manifestation of their bodily partner-powers, I think the analytic 
theologian can explain how a divine person can be omniscient, for example, and yet have 
limited knowledge in his human consciousness. 
 These are just three examples of further research projects relevant to neo-
Thomistic hylomorphism. They certainly do not exhaust the possibilities.1 There’s much 
fruitful research to be done relevant to hylomorphism generally and neo-Thomistic 
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